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Abstract 
Overexploitation, conflicts and inequality in resource use are common 
consequences of many fishery management systems such as those in the 
developing countries. A better understanding of the spatial dynamics of fisheries 
and the causes of past failures in management is needed in order to provide more 
effective management systems. The small-scale inland fisheries in Tonle Sap are 
used as a case study in this thesis, as they combine property rights and 
conservation in the form of distinct management zones (private, common and 
conservation zones) with access to private fishing grounds determined through 
allocation of licences through an auction system. This thesis uses a choice 
experiment approach to investigate how this allocation system affects different 
groups of fishermen. The results indicate that the auction system is likely to further 
the advantages of better-off fishermen irrespective of the characteristics of fishing 
lots. This suggests that it is unlikely that the design of fishing lots in itself would be 
an effective way of securing access to fishing resources for all types of fishermen. 
Agent-based modelling is then used to examine the links between conservation 
and private property rights, through an analysis of the spatial effects of property 
rights and conservation, using different management system designs and focusing 
on the interactions between heterogeneous fishermen, fish biomass and fishing 
regulations. Private property is found to promote better fish biomass conditions on 
its own, but does not necessary generate the best conservation or socio-economic 
outcomes for fishing communities when evaluating the entire fishery. Conservation 
zones perform better when the reserves are located in baseline quality fish habitats 
and the reserve size is large. The results show how positive effects on fishery 
sustainability can be achieved. Effective management for subsistence fisheries can 
be designed using property rights and conservation areas, combined with other 
fishery regulations and enforcement, in order to ensure biological and socio-
economic sustainability. 
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Chapter 1  
 
INTRODUCTION 
The current situation in fisheries is a global concern because of declining fish 
species, degradation of fish habitats and decreasing natural fish populations 
(Hilborn et al., 2003; Worm et al., 2009; FAO, 2012). The fishery sector is 
important because it contributes to employment, trade, food security and nutrition, 
especially for the poor as it is often the cheapest source of animal protein (FAO, 
2013a). The majority of fishery studies have focused mainly on marine fisheries 
leaving inland fisheries relatively understudied. 
Fishery resources are a classic example of an open access resource (Gordon, 
1954) where the market partly fails because it cannot exclude any users and avoid 
rent dissipation (Cheung, 1970). One solution to this problem is privatisation, which 
assigns individual ownership over resources with the expectation of an 
improvement in efficiency of resource use. According to the Coase theorem 
assumption, private property rights are understood to ensure efficiency in fisheries 
because it is assumed that there are no transaction costs, and the initial allocation 
of property rights does not affect the marginal valuation of resources (Grafton et 
al., 2000). 
This study investigates whether securing private property rights to fishery 
resources and establishing conservation reserves can discourage 
overcapitalization and encourage conservation in a developing country context. 
Tonle Sap inland fisheries in Cambodia are used as a case study, not only 
because of their importance to global fish catches but also because Tonle Sap 
demonstrates the complexity of wetland systems and mixed fishery management 
systems. Developing countries contributed approximately 90% of total inland 
fisheries output to the global fish caught in 1998 (Smith et al., 2005).  
Tonle Sap has been subjected to a combination of methods to regulate access 
to fishery resources. The Fishery Administration (FiA) assigned property rights and 
employed market-based approaches by privatising part of the wetlands using an 
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auction system and then integrated this with zonal designation of protected areas. 
The wetlands were divided into conservation zones, fishing lots (private areas), 
and public areas (common areas) for fishing purposes. The zonal management 
was expected to avoid the collapse of fish biomass and improve viability of fish 
populations. The conservation zones were protected from all fishing activities with 
the expectation that this would lead to natural fish stock enhancement. Spillover 
effects were expected to lead to an increase in fish biomass, sizes and density 
(Russ and Alcala, 1996a; Wantiez et al., 1997). The fishing lots were designated 
plots for commercial fishing during a defined fishing season and they were usually 
located in the most productive fishing grounds. Private concessionaires were able 
to bid for exclusive fishing licences. The public fishing zones were areas outside 
these two zones. This zone was open to everyone to fish at any time of the year.  
There were problems resulting from this management system including 
decreasing fish populations, habitat degradation (Nuorteva et al., 2010), and 
conflicts of access to fishing grounds among lot owners and subsistence fishermen 
(Bonheur and Lane, 2002), which were caused by increased inequality in access to 
valuable fishing grounds. These problems led to the abolishment of fishing lots in 
2012 for at least 3 years to reduce conflict over lot boundaries and to allow fish 
stock rehabilitation (Royal Government of Cambodia, 2012). All previous private 
fishing lots were converted into public fishing grounds. The management of the 
fishery is now being reconsidered and options need to be developed to develop a 
more sustainable management system. It is therefore important to understand why 
the previous management system failed. This research was established to 
investigate the situation for poorer and more vulnerable fishermen and evaluating 
the effects of the private property rights systems on them. The thesis focuses on 
small-scale fishermen because they are the largest group in Cambodian fisheries 
but they are also the most vulnerable because they have limited skills and budgets. 
In addition, information on small-scale fisheries is quite limited compared to 
commercial fisheries. This may have led to underestimates in past evaluations of 
the resource values used to set policies for small-scale fisheries (Worm et al., 
2009; Basurto et al., 2012).  
Few studies investigate the consequences of management on small-scale 
fisheries. There are several studies which investigate Tonle Sap fisheries but most 
of them focus on analyses of fish biology and/or ecosystem management (e.g., 
Kummu et al., 2006; Lamberts, 2006; Baran et al., 2007a; Lamberts and Koponen, 
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2008; Kummu and Sarkkula, 2009). Other studies (e.g., Navy et al., 2006; 
Kimkong, 2007; Nuorteva et al., 2010) emphasise socio-economic and livelihood 
issues in the Tonle Sap wetlands. The work of Navy et al. (2006) estimates the 
value of fishery resources to livelihoods surrounding Tonle Sap Lake using 
secondary data. They found that the lowest income group was small-scale 
fishermen who were highly reliant on the Tonle Sap wetlands. Thus, security of 
access to resources should be a priority for sustainable management that includes 
small-scale fishermen.  
Some research has also aimed to understand and analyse the commercial 
fishery management system. For example, Allebone-webb and Clements (2009) 
studied a commercial fishery in one of the most productive fishing lots (fishing lot 2 
in Battambang Province) in relation to conservation objectives. They found that 
there was an overlap between conservation areas and fishing lot “number 2” in 
practice even though, according to fishery regulations, commercial fishing and 
conservation areas should be separated. This overlapping area benefited both 
biodiversity and conservation objectives because the private property rights helped 
to protect wildlife and fish larvae, more than just the conservation area designation. 
Their research demonstrates the importance of understanding how property rights 
and zoning impacts fishery resources. 
Other research has made use of models to understand wetland processes. 
Kummu et al. (2006) developed an integrated modelling system of water resource 
management in Tonle Sap by connecting a hydrodynamic model with socio-
economic information (social, economic and political) to provide information about 
ecosystem processes. The model outputs included, for example, inflows, flooding 
characteristics and pollution dispersion. This information can be used to predict the 
impacts from development plans on the lakes’ ecosystem and riparian 
communities. A Bayesian model was also used to analyse different development 
policy scenarios for Tonle Sap (Varis and Keskinen, 2006). The objective of this 
Bayesian model was to evaluate risks to numerous components of the social and 
environment systems under different Mekong policy strategies. These two papers 
provide an understanding of the overall system of Tonle Sap and focus on physical 
and political aspects, however the fishery sub-system that includes the interactions 
of fishermen behaviours and dynamics of fisheries still remains unstudied. By 
focusing on the fishery sub-system, this thesis contributes to research on the 
interactions between fishing behaviour and the dynamics of fisheries to the 
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research of others in order to build a holistic view of the Tonle Sap wetland. This 
thesis not only contributes to knowledge on Tonle Sap fisheries but also adds to 
literature on inland fisheries management. 
1.1 RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVES 
This research aims to enhance understanding of fishery management systems 
and the implications for sustainable fisheries through the interactions of fishermen, 
governance systems, and fishery resources under different designs of property 
rights and conservation areas. Understanding the effects of interactions among 
these three main factors will lead to improved fishery sustainability, measured in 
terms of fish biomass and socio-economic conditions of small-scale fishing 
communities. This aim is achieved by tackling the following specific objectives: 
1) To assess the implications of the distribution of fishing rights and benefits from 
Tonle Sap wetlands, and to explore the scope of widening participation by small-
scale fishermen; 
1.1) by studying how the allocation system for fishing rights affects small-scale 
fishermen; 
1.2) by exploring whether different groupings of small-scale fishermen can be 
identified and characterised, measured in terms of differences in their valuation 
of attributes of fishing lots, and their behaviour in an auction market; 
1.3) and by investigating the preferences of fishermen toward fishing lot 
characteristics.  
2) To investigate the spatial consequences of property rights systems and whether 
the application of private property rights encourages sustainability in fisheries 
management; 
2.1) by developing a spatial fishery model for assessing various policy options; 
2.2) by exploring the spatial dynamics of fishing intensity and fish biomass 
conditions under different policy scenarios; 
2.3) and by investigating the sustainability of fishermen’s livelihoods. 
3) To examine the spatial effects of inland conservation reserves through the 
interactions of harvesting intensities and fish stock conditions under different 
management zones (private, common, and conservation zones). 
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3.1) by investigating the effects of proportion (size) of reserved areas in inland 
fisheries; 
3.2) by examining the effects of habitat quality on fishery sustainability; 
3.3) and by exploring the effects of different patterns of reserve distribution.  
1.2 THESIS ORGANIZATION AND CHAPTER OVERVIEW  
This thesis comprises eight chapters. Following this first introductory chapter, 
the second chapter provides a literature review and a description of the case study 
while the third chapter outlines the theoretical framework. There are three empirical 
chapters and each empirical chapter is presented as a journal paper with literature 
review, methods, results and discussion. The first empirical chapter, Chapter 4, 
presents an analysis of fishermen behaviours using a Choice Experiment 
approach. Chapter 5 provides an explanation of the agent-based model 
specification for the next two empirical chapters. Chapters 6 and 7 demonstrate 
different versions of the agent-based model, which has been used for spatial 
analyses of the fishery management system. The last chapter discusses the main 
findings of the thesis, draws together its conclusions, considers some of its 
limitations and makes recommendations for future research. A more detailed 
outline of each chapter follows: 
Chapter two: This chapter reviews the relevant fishery literature and describes 
the Tonle Sap wetlands. It starts with an introduction to inland fisheries, followed 
by a brief overview of management approaches that have been used for fisheries. 
Then, the chapter reviews the literature related to social simulation approaches 
that have been used as research tools in fishery management research. The Tonle 
Sap Wetlands are then introduced as a case study, outlining the biophysical 
environment, relevant livelihoods, and setting it in the context of historical and 
contemporary management of Cambodian fisheries. Tonle Sap is important 
because it is the biggest floodplain lake and one of the most productive fisheries in 
Southeast Asia. It has both local and transnational importance because it supports 
agriculture over a large area and is the main fish nursing ground for the Mekong 
watershed. Zonal management was established in Tonle Sap to ensure fishery 
sustainability. However, fish degradation, conflicts among users, illegal fishing 
activities, and limits on access to valuable fishing grounds for small-scale fisheries 
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are problematic, leading to a need for research to support improvements in fishery 
management.   
Chapter three: This chapter elicits a thesis framework focusing on research 
methodology. The chapter begins with the thesis motivation, which is derived from 
the fishery problems in Tonle Sap, and is followed by an analysis of theoretical 
concepts underpinning fishery management approaches. Then, it provides a 
framework for how problems can be addressed by understanding key components 
of the fishery system, and how the methodology as outlined can be used to 
improve the understanding of the management system. The interactions between 
fishermen, fishing regulations and fish biomass are key to the analysis approach 
taken in this thesis. The methodological framework presents choice experiment 
approach and agent-based simulation techniques, which are applied to examine 
fishery management. Choice experiments are used to simulate fishermen 
behaviour in an auction market and identify different characteristics of small-scale 
fishermen in Tonle Sap. Spatial analysis of fishery dynamics is undertaken using 
agent based modelling. This approach is used to analyse the consequences of 
property rights and conservation approaches. The combination of choice 
experiments and agent based modelling helps improve the understanding of past 
management and current fishery dynamics.  
Chapter four: The first empirical chapter investigates how the auction-based 
fishery management system affects different groups of small-scale fishermen by 
using a Choice Experiment. The management of the Tonle Sap wetlands in 
Cambodia has previously been divided into three different management zones; 
conservation, open access fishing, and private fishing. Rights to the private fishing 
zone involved auctions for exclusive rights to temporarily designated fishing lots. 
The main concerns have been an observed degradation of fish biomass and 
limited access to rich fishing grounds for small-scale fishermen. As a result, the 
system has been abolished and new fishery regulations are currently being 
considered. This chapter aims to explore the auction-based system by 
investigating how it affects different groups of small scale fishermen and how 
different characteristics of the fishing lots affect the bidding. The choice experiment 
approach was used to model fishermen’s choices in a hypothetical auction market 
by offering fishermen two options; purchase or non-purchase of potential fishing 
lots. The second option means fishing only in the communal fishing grounds. The 
preferred latent class model with two segments of fishermen showed that the 
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bidding behaviour of the more privileged group out-competes the other group 
irrespective of the fishing lot characteristics. This result suggests that it is unlikely 
that the redesign of the auction system itself would be an effective way of securing 
access to fishing resources for the two observed groups of fishermen. This implies 
that open access fishing grounds and/or other regulations may also be needed in 
future management as they serve an important role for the poorer segments of the 
fishing community. 
Chapter five: The chapter introduces the general concepts of social simulation 
and agent-based simulation approaches and presents the model settings and 
protocols for the spatial analyses in the following chapters (Chapters 6 and 7). This 
approach deals with the complexity of fisheries involving multiple users, different 
gear regulations, seasonal closures, and fishing zones. The spatial models 
address the gap identified in Chapter 4 concerning the importance of spatial 
distribution of rights and resources. The model is set for small-scale fisheries by 
adapting past management experiences of fisheries (both small-scale and 
commercial) in Tonle Sap. The main components of the model consist of the 
dynamics of fish biomass, fishing regulations, and heterogeneous and autonomous 
fishermen. 
Chapter six: This chapter aims to develop a spatial model to examine whether 
private property rights encourage fishery sustainability by investigating the spatial 
effects of a property rights system in terms of socio-economic and biological 
aspects, using agent-based modelling. A model has been used to explore the 
consequences of spatial interactions between fishermen and fish biomass in two 
fishing zones: common and private fishing zones. The results show that private 
property rights over private fishing zones provide better fish stock conditions and 
fishing profits compared to common property rights in common zones. This implies 
that private property rights may help to improve both economic efficiency and fish 
biology. In addition, different combinations of private and common fishing grounds 
were simulated. These results show that when common fishing grounds dominate, 
higher fish biomass and fishing profits are achieved compared to when private 
property rights dominate. This may be because there is less competition between 
fishermen when common areas are more dominant. 
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Chapter seven: This chapter also uses agent-based modelling to analyse 
spatial effects, this time focused on different arrangements of conservation 
reserves. Conservation reserves have been used as part of fishery management 
tools with the expectation of improvement in fishery sustainability, as they reduce 
harvesting pressure at least within the conservation zones themselves, and 
spillover effects may benefit fishing grounds as well. Three different management 
zones consisting of private, common, and reserve zones were included in the 
model. The spatial effects of reserve sizes, patterns and locations (habitat quality) 
were evaluated using fish biomass and socio-economics as indicators of fishery 
sustainability. The model results show that larger reserve sizes, square patterns 
and location in areas of normal habitat lead to more sustainable fisheries. 
However, conservation zones need to be used along with other management tools, 
such as restrictions on fishing effort, in order to maximise their benefits.  
Chapter eight: The final chapter outlines the main thesis findings and suggests 
opportunities for future work. The results presented in this thesis contribute to 
debates about property rights and conservation. Although private ownership and/or 
conservation zones have the potential to promote fishery sustainability, future 
management should not focus only on either private rights or conservation. The 
combination of private, common and conservation areas can be an option to 
improve biological and socio-economic sustainability and generate greater benefits 
for fishing communities. How the combination of property rights and conservation 
is designed is more important, as is the need to implement these management 
designs with other fishery regulations/laws. Auction-based methods for exclusive 
fishing licences do not distribute access equally between small-scale fishery 
households so mechanisms for the distribution of private property rights need to be 
carefully designed. Finally, Chapter 8 concludes by outlining how this research 
contributes a new methodological approach using choice experiments and agent-
based modelling to better understand and manage small-scale inland fisheries.  
 
 
- 9 - 
 
Chapter 2  
UNDERSTANDING INLAND FISHERIES                               
AND THE TONLE SAP CASE STUDY 
Fisheries are important because they provide food security and create 
employment for households in wetland areas (FAO, 2005). Although, small-scale 
fisheries in many countries (e.g., Indonesia and Vietnam) are important for national 
economies (Béné et al., 2010), they often get limited research attention (Béné and 
Friend, 2011). This thesis aims to enhance understanding of small-scale inland 
fisheries through the interactions of fishermen, governance systems, and fishery 
resources under different designs of property rights and conservation areas. 
Understanding the effects of interactions among these three main factors will lead 
to improved fishery sustainability. This chapter provides an overview of the 
literature related to inland fisheries and identifies the research gap that has 
motivated this research. This is followed by a description of the case study; the 
Tonle Sap wetlands in Cambodia. The first section presents a synopsis of the key 
characteristics of inland fisheries to identify factors influencing the common 
challenges, such as degradation of fish stocks and habitats. Different fishery 
management tools are evaluated and different simulation approaches are 
assessed. The second section presents the case study, outlining physical 
characteristics, livelihoods, fisheries, and the problems related to fishery 
management focusing on small-scale fisheries.  
2.1 INLAND FISHERIES 
Inland fisheries have been important for human sustenance since the pre-
historic era. They contribute enormously to food security, especially for low income 
households in rural areas because they provide cheap and numerous animal 
protein supplies (FAO, 2013b). Protein from fish was calculated as contributing 
15.3% of total animal protein consumption in 2000 (FAO, 2003b) and 
approximately one billion people were dependent on this protein as their primary 
source of animal protein (Allan et al., 2005). The income from fisheries contributes 
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to gross domestic product (GDP) in many countries, especially from the large-scale 
fisheries. Inland water resources have also been used for other purposes such as 
recreation, water quality, and flood control (Welcomme, 2001). Inland fisheries are 
crucial to livelihoods worldwide, nevertheless, they have received less attention as 
discussions have been more focused on marine fisheries (Hilborn et al., 2003; 
Allan et al., 2005).  
2.1.1 Fish catches and difficulties in inland fisheries 
The annual yield of inland capture fisheries, including from aquaculture, is 
reported to be over 10 million tonnes (Welcomme et al., 2010; FAO, 2013a), 
although these figures are considered to be perhaps 2 or 3 times lower than the 
real catches (FAO, 2013a). Catches from subsistence fisheries, recreation 
fisheries, and agriculture-related sources such as rice-field fisheries were mostly 
excluded from the report. The amount of inland capture has increased almost 
linearly since the early 1950s (Welcomme, 2011). There are also numerous 
species of inland fish that are not usually reported in capture statistics. Around 
41% of all fish species (approximately 11,500 fish species) are exclusive to inland 
fisheries and around 1% are diadromous (when fish migrate between the sea and 
fresh water) (FAO, 2013b). From FAO’s statistics in 2010, the Asian continent 
made the biggest contribution (more than 50%) to world captures, particularly 
China, followed by Africa.  
However, inland fisheries have been under threat for a considerable period of 
time. First and foremost overexploitation has been identified as a key factor, 
especially in tropical fisheries. Fish stocks and biological diversity of fish species 
have been continuously decreasing (Arlinghaus et al., 2002; Allan et al., 2005) and 
this is mainly attributed to overfishing. Vertebrate species, such as fish, are mainly 
affected by overfishing, while invertebrate species, microbes and megafauna are 
more disturbed by other threats such as habitat degradation (e.g., eutrophication, 
removal of vegetation, sedimentation), pollution from industrial and domestic point 
sources, and modification of water channels through dams and irrigation (Dudgeon 
et al., 2006). However, most inland captures depend on recruitment from fish 
populations that are affected by habitat loss and environmental degradation too. 
Failure to fully account for inland captures is another threat to improvement of 
inland fisheries. These threats reduce the opportunity for fisheries management to 
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improve food security, and increase the social and economic advantages from 
inland resources (FAO, 2013b).  
Apart from biological and environmental threats, social conflicts also impact on 
inland fisheries. The water resources that supply fisheries are also subject to other 
uses such as domestic use of water, agriculture, wildlife conservation, power 
generation, flood control, navigation and industry. Conflicts among users are 
common, especially in tropical countries (Welcomme, 2001; FAO, 2013b). FAO 
(2003a) have suggested that policy and institutional management frameworks are 
important to reduce conflicts between fisheries and other sectors, by coordinating 
management plans of shared resources. So, fishery management needs to be 
implemented in the context of other uses in order to tackle the key threats 
identified and maintain fishery resources for future generations.  
In addition, there is an important relationship between poverty and small-scale 
fisheries where poverty is inversely related to fishery resources and catch levels 
(Béné et al., 2010), i.e., as availability of fishery resources and catch levels in 
communally accessed fisheries decrease poverty increases. If many fishermen 
compete for few fish stocks, only small profits will be generated. In addition, 
aspects of poverty, such as food insecurity and low income, can be key drivers of 
environmental degradation as they force people to over exploit fishery resources 
(Cowx and Portocarrero Aya, 2011). In these cases, the actions of a dominant 
group of small-scale fishermen can affect the condition and functioning of inland 
fisheries overall.  
2.1.2 Fishery management 
The management of Inland fisheries has a long history. In the Middle Ages in 
Europe, fishermen were split into guilds and were charged for exploitation and 
resource management. Landings were controlled in seventeenth century in France 
and local traditional regulations were reinforced, mostly by religious sanctions, in 
other parts of the world (Welcomme, 2001). This shows that limited fishery 
resources have been a concern since ancient times, when the first recorded 
control measures were introduced.  
There are three main objectives for fishery management, which have emerged 
from the UNCED process, the Convention on Biological Diversity and FAO Code of 
Conduct for Responsible Fisheries: 1) preservation of the diversity of living aquatic 
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resources, 2) fishery sustainability, and 3) fair distribution of fishery and ecosystem 
benefits (FAO, 1995; Welcomme, 2001). Fisheries management is defined as “the 
integrated process of information gathering, analysis, planning, consultation, 
decision-making, allocation of resources and formulation and implementation, with 
enforcement as necessary, of regulations or rules which govern fisheries activities 
in order to ensure the continued productivity of the resources and accomplishment 
of other fisheries objectives.” (FAO, 1997, p. 7). The methods of fishery 
management are frequently based on science in order to protect fishery resources 
and to provide evidence for the level of sustainable extraction. The focus for 
objectives in inland fishery management differs for developed and developing 
countries. Developed countries focus more on recreation and conservation, while 
developing countries have their focus on food security (Arlinghaus et al., 2002).  
Conventional approaches to fishery management are usually regulated by 
national governments and focus on regulations that control the types of gear that 
can be used, catch amounts and limited fishing seasons (Welcomme, 2001). 
Regulations directly or indirectly control either input access or outputs and are 
biological or technical in nature. These sets of rules are implemented through 
monitoring and surveillance. Examples include ownership systems (such as fishing 
licences1 and quotas), closed seasons, conservation areas, gear restrictions, and 
a limitation on the number of fishing vessels. Fishing methods in inland fisheries 
are dissimilar from marine fisheries because there is greater variability. For 
example fishermen in inland fisheries use a wide variety of fishing gear that 
includes hooks, nooses, bait holders, barriers, traps, nets, seines and trawls. As a 
result of this greater variability, the biological and technical fixes used for marine 
resources may not always apply in inland fisheries. 
When the classic biological and technical approaches to fishery management 
have failed solutions have been drawn from other disciplines, namely economics 
and sociology. For example, economists focus on improving economic efficiency 
by promoting transferable quotas (Grafton and McIlgorm, 2009). The quota system 
                                               
1 Fishing licences are normally issued by government and ideally their numbers are limited by scientific 
calculation of CPUE and fishing effort. In this sense, it is almost impossible to impose a licence system on small-
scale fisheries, especially in flood plain systems, because it involves many fishermen fishing for subsistence over 
a very wide geographical area (Welcomme, 2001). 
 
- 13 - 
 
contributes to decreases in excess capacity but does not deal with inequality in the 
distribution of access or with ecosystem protection. Sociologists meanwhile, have 
addressed fishery problems using participatory management approaches (Wilson 
et al., 1999). These also focus on access control or defining ownership, as in more 
conventional approaches, but power is shared between government and local 
communities. In particular, community-based or co-management strategies (e.g., 
Pomeroy, 1995; Bruckmeier and Höj Larsen, 2008) have been designed to 
improve distributional equity. However, these do not promise economic efficiency 
or conservation.  
It is clear that there are strengths and weaknesses to each approach. 
Historically, these approaches have been applied to inland fisheries and adapted 
to local contexts individually. However, if the complex, diverse and dynamic inland 
fishery problems are to be addressed then the single perspective and approach 
might not be sufficient; hence there is a need for a mixed approach or integrated 
techniques for research and governance in order to successfully achieve the goals 
of sustainable fishery management.  
Biologists and ecologists widely use conservation, or zonal, management in 
research on fisheries (Roberts et al., 2005). Conservation management involves 
creating protected areas, providing stock enhancement, regulating fishing 
activities, and restoration and rehabilitation (Cowx and Portocarrero Aya, 2011). 
Conservation areas are portions of environment that are reserved to reduce 
disturbance from fishing activities so as to allow natural processes to replenish fish 
populations (Suski and Cooke, 2007). Conservation can not only enhance 
ecosystem protection by reducing fishing on spawning stocks, but also can 
improve recruitment and so fish abundance. It is also expected that the benefits in 
conservation areas will spill over into neighbouring areas, increasing fish 
populations in areas surrounding conservation zones and so increasing fish 
captures. While conservation can help to preserve local biodiversity and fish 
habitats it is not designed to lead to improvement in harvesting efficiency or equity. 
Marine protected areas (MPAs) have been well established, while there are fewer 
freshwater protected areas (FPAs), which have also been slower to establish 
(Herbert et al., 2010). This may be because of poor scientific knowledge about the 
conditions of freshwater fish (status and disturbances). Ecosystem based 
approaches are also considered promising for sustainable fisheries (e.g., Pikitch et 
al., 2004; Smith et al., 2007). These approaches emphasise ecosystem 
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components and interactions in order to maintain a healthy ecosystem. Healthy 
fish stocks and ecosystems are thought to ultimately lead to a healthy society in 
terms of food, income and jobs (Branch et al., 2006).  
Not only have conservation approaches been used in fishery management but 
ownership systems have also been considered as a management tool to promote 
fishery sustainability (Welcomme, 2001). The implications of common property 
resources or open access resources have been broadly claimed as the major 
cause of fishery depletion. In economic theory, lack of property right leads to a 
race among fishermen to exploit fishery resources (Dewees, 1998) because 
fishermen consider short-term profits over long-term profits. Ownership systems 
create incentives for fishermen to protect the fishery resource as an asset 
(Sumaila, 2010) and reduces the race to over fish in the long-term. FAO (2003a) 
have pointed out that where fishing rights are granted for a long period, fishermen 
have greater interest in managing fisheries sustainably. In contrast, research has 
shown that fishermen might attempt to generate a quick profit by intensively fishing 
if fishing rights are assigned only for a short time (Yandle, 2007). In both these 
contexts implementation of access policies, such as gear limitations, together with 
the ownership system can help control fishing intensity (Grafton et al., 2006). 
Ownership system approaches have been applied to fishery management for a 
long time. For example, traditional methods for inland fishery management in 
Africa has been dominated by a common property approach (GmbH, 2002). 
Property rights over resources were given to groups or communities through social 
consent. To compliment with other prevailing norms, this approach offered 
incentives to invest and preserve fishery resources. Whereas, private property 
rights are very uncommon for inland fishery management in Africa they are more 
common in Asia e.g., in Cambodia. 
One popular and classic example of using property rights for fishery 
management is individual transferable quotas (ITQs), which has been used in state 
regulation of marine fisheries (Grafton et al., 2000). ITQs are catch share quotas 
providing exclusive use and transfer rights to concessionaires, as a means to raise 
fishing efficiency and returns to the concessionaires. Principally, ITQs are given as 
a proportion or percentage of total allowable catch (TAC2) of fish (Dewees, 1998) 
                                               
2 As ITQs are based on catch quotas, the abundance of fish stocks needs to be estimated precisely, however 
these estimates are sometimes subject to uncertainty and political interference (Sumaila, 2010). Then, if 
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and can be transferred by trading in an open market or through an auction system. 
Dewees (1998) revealed that the operation of ITQs did indeed improve economic 
efficiency. However, when the right holders do not have full property rights3, they 
may not be motivated to conserve the resource in the long term (Hannesson, 1996; 
Bromley, 2009). This can result in high-grading, discarding, and misreporting. 
Consequently, individual fishermen will gain the benefits of these illegal activities in 
the short-term only; whereas the long-term costs will accrue to all participants. 
Property right allocation through an ITQ system covers only the flow of fishery 
resources but not the fish stocks and their environment. Controversy, the quotas 
may end up in the hands of a few large business enterprises due to their economic 
and political power. Recommendations to improve the quota system include the 
use of stock assessments, strong arms-length monitoring and control, and 
integration with an ecosystem based approach (Sumaila, 2010). 
The allocation of quotas or fishing rights can be distributed by different 
alternatives, such as administrative decision, lottery or auction (Morgan, 1995). 
Administration is generally centralised, depending on each case. Entry to fishing 
grounds can be limited through grandfather clauses to fishermen who receive 
grandfather rights (Karpoff, 1989; Libecap, 2007) while lottery allocations might 
lead to mismatches between quotas and fishing capacity (Morgan, 1995). Auction 
systems are market-based mechanisms used in order to enhance the transparency 
of quota allocation and to divert resource rent to the national budget. Auctions 
provide economic efficiency by identifying market demand and appropriate prices 
for the quotas. Potential resource users are identified through the auction as the 
bidders with the highest use-values for the fishery (Milgrom, 1985; Morgan, 1995). 
Theoretically, the willingness to pay (WTP) of the successful bidder would be equal 
to the maximum resource rent but there is a chance of paying less. Over bidding 
can happen if bidders under estimate the cost of policing their rights. The 
concession fee, the transaction cost (i.e., the cost of participating in the market) 
and enforcement costs are all additional costs (Smith and Panayotou, 1992).  
                                                                                                                                   
significant factors have not been addressed suitably, overestimates of resource stocks can lead to stock 
collapse. 
3 The holders of full property rights are provided with 1) a complete security, 2) exclusivity and 3) unrestrained 
transferability.  
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There are advantages and disadvantages to the auction system. The auction 
system was considered a fair distribution system in Estonia (Peipsi-Pihkva Lake) 
and in the Russian Far East (Anferova et al., 2005; Sumaila, 2010). It has also 
contributed to the state budget in Cambodia and the Russian Far East (Tana and 
Todd, 2001; Anferova et al., 2005). Although the auctions supplied more income 
for Russian federal budgets than expected, the additional cost e.g., debt (Vetemaa 
et al., 2002; Anferova et al., 2005) encouraged many business enterprises to 
harvest more than the quota allowance, particularly as the monitoring and 
enforcement system was not strong (Anferova et al., 2005). The auction in Estonia 
provided an opportunity for local inhabitants and new small enterprises to access 
fishing resources and the number of small enterprises grew as a result. These 
were mainly attractive to the most efficient users (Vetemaa et al., 2002). Even 
though the advantages of auctioning property rights were identified, the system in 
Estonia is no longer operational. Fishing rights over Peipsi-Pihkva Lake were first 
auctioned in 2001 and the system was terminated in 2003 on political grounds, as 
the political parties were concerned that they would not gain the votes of auction 
opponents in the next election. Similarly in the Russian Far East, the auction 
mechanism was introduced in 2000 and was cancelled in 2003 because of 
depletion of fish stocks and the effects on the economic performance of the fishery 
sector. Both of these cases illustrate that the auction system needs to be well 
designed to achieve both economic efficiency and conservation (Morgan, 1995). 
There is a need for holistic auction designs, which should be considered case by 
case, taking into consideration factors such as the ability of fishermen to participate 
in the auction and political influences.  
Fishery management also links with social issues as it influences equity and 
socio-economic conditions in fishing communities. For example, good fishery 
management can assist in reducing poverty because fisheries act as a source of 
income and employment (Cochrane and Garcia, 2009). People who benefit from 
fisheries are not only fishermen but also fish traders, processed fish makers, 
fishing gear makers and boat manufacturers (Welcomme, 2001). However, there 
are also conflicts between groups of fishermen and non-fishery interests, such as 
tourists, who use the same space for different purposes. For example, fishing gear 
from subsistence fisheries can be destroyed by tourist motorized boats 
(International Centre for Environmental Management, 2003), conflicts over the use 
of water can arise between farmers and commercial fishermen (Degen et al., 
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2000), and there can be conflicts over access to certain areas between small-scale 
fishermen and commercial fishermen (Keskinen et al., 2007). Hence, conflict 
reduction is another important objective in fishery management. 
The mixed fishery management system (combining property rights, 
conservation, and auction-based approaches) in Tonle Sap is an interesting case 
to be evaluated. Ownership is not only assigned over flow of fishery resources 
through ITQs but also over a fish stock in particular wetland areas. As a result 
understanding fishermen behaviour towards regulations and their interactions with 
the dynamics of fish stocks is of key importance. Most fishery management 
studies, conducted predominantly in marine fisheries, emphasise a balance of fish 
stocks and optimum harvesting levels (e.g., Ransom and Mertz, 1998; Ami et al., 
2005; Armstrong, 2007; Beddington et al., 2007). Research on fishermen 
behaviour (e.g., Branch et al., 2006; Hilborn, 2007; Fulton et al., 2011; Andersen et 
al., 2012) has developed since the early 1990s and focuses particularly on 
allocation of fishing effort (Branch et al., 2006). No research has focused on 
simulating the consequences of interactions between fishermen behaviour and 
fishery dynamics under property rights and conservation management approaches.  
2.1.3 Modelling fishermen behaviour 
Suitable methods for modelling fishermen behaviour depends on the 
hypothesis, data, sample, and the decision which is to be modelled. The Choice 
Experiments (CE) approach is used to model behaviour of fishermen in this thesis. 
This is because it can analyse behaviour of heterogeneous fishermen and identify 
different characteristics for groups of fishermen. The model is based on utility 
maximisation or optimisation and applies consumer theory in order to investigate 
human decisions (Simon, 1959).  
This microeconomic theory focuses on human preference as the main factor 
influencing behaviour and has been widely used in marketing and business (e.g., 
Simon, 1979). Many studies have used CE for valuation purposes through 
measurement of WTP/WTA (e.g., Hanley et al., 1998; Hanley et al., 2006). 
However, CE can go beyond valuing benefits of resources. For fishery resources, 
for example, Wattage et al. (2005) investigated stakeholders’ responses to 
different combinations of fishery objectives (reduce conflict within the fishery, 
improve fishery socio-economic structure, conserve fishery and marine 
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environments) using a case study of UK fisheries in the English Channel. The 
greatest preference was for a combination of an increase in sustainable yields, 
promotion of regional employment and a decrease in conflict between towed and 
fixed gear. Many CE studies (e.g., Bockstael and Opaluch, 1983; Eales and Wilen, 
1986; Wilen et al., 2002; Andersen et al., 2006) have focused on allocations of 
fishing effort and choice of location. Smith (2005) used a combination of tools in a 
mixed logit and state dependence model, to study choices of fishing location for 
commercial sea urchin in California. In this system, individuals may have 
heterogeneous preferences over fishing ground characteristics because most of 
them have different information on the quality of fishing grounds depending on 
personal experiences. For instance, seemingly similar individuals regularly select 
different locations even if they start from the same fishing port and go on the same 
day (Smith, 2005). CE has also been used for modelling/analysing fishermen 
behaviour. For example Hutton et al. (2004) used the approach to understand 
behaviour in the English beam-trawl fleet in the North sea, while Andersen et al. 
(2006) conducted a similar study on the Danish North Sea Gillnet fleet. Although, 
there are many papers using stated preference methods for fishery studies, none 
of them so far, have analysed fishermen behaviour in context of auction markets. 
2.1.4 Fishery simulation approaches 
Simulation has been applied as a tool in resource management in order to 
better understand the resource system. A model represents a simplification of real 
world situations or systems. The model can be either static, examining how inputs 
and outputs correspond at a certain point in time, or dynamic, where the outputs in 
one period influence outputs at a later point in time. Static models can be used to 
identify indicators which might be useful for predicting impacts, sensitivities or 
vulnerabilities, while dynamic models go beyond those by assessing future 
quantifiable impacts and assessing different management or development 
scenarios (Castle and Crooks, 2006). Many types of simulations have been used in 
fishery studies such as discrete models, mathematical models, econometric 
models, and agent-based models. Most of the studies on fishermen behaviour 
have focused on fishing effort, choice of fishing locations or targeted species (e.g., 
Bockstael and Opaluch, 1983; Jules Dreyfus-León, 1999; Babcock and Pikitch, 
2000; Wilen et al., 2002; Millischer and Gascuel, 2006). However, this thesis 
emphasises the interactions between fishermen behaviour and the dynamics of 
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fishery resources under different types of wetland management and property 
rights. This provides a framework for understanding the bigger picture related to 
inland fishery management including economic, ecological and regulatory aspects.  
Simulations have also been used for fishery management analysis. Early 
simulations relied on biological aspects, such as surplus-production and yield-per-
recruit models (e.g., Pikitch, 1987). However, bio-economic models have been the 
favoured approach for policy analysis (Carothers and Grant, 1987). These models 
combine biology and economic aspects. The models, for example, explore how 
various parameters (e.g., fishing effort) affect fish stocks. They intend to determine 
the optimal level of socio-economic activities that the biological system can 
sustain. The bio-economic concept in fishery studies was initially developed by 
Canadian economists Scott Gordon (1954) and Anthony Scott (1955), although the 
fishery model was primarily applied by Schaefer (1957). The basic bio-economic 
model for fisheries comprises of three equations: stock growth, harvest function 
and profit function which is sometimes called the Schaefer-Gordon model4 
(Hartwick and Olewiler, 1986; Béné et al., 2001; Knowler, 2002). A steady-state 
bio-economic equilibrium (where growth rate equals harvesting rate) is the overall 
objective for renewable resources, whereby a standing stock is maintained at an 
optimal level (Conrad and Clark, 1987). Practically however, fishermen continually 
harvest until there is no more profit, which implies that average revenue equals 
average cost of effort. This represents a common property or open access 
equilibrium, which is inefficient because marginal revenue is less than marginal 
cost (Conrad and Clark, 1987; Tietenberg and Lewis, 2009). When the marginal 
cost is equal to marginal revenue it is termed the private optimum and it means 
economic efficiency is achieved.  
Studies in marine economics use these biological and economic concepts. For 
example, a bio-economic model was used to assess optimal size of marine 
reserves for a cod fishery (Sumaila, 1998). This research found that reserve size 
influences fish populations within protected areas and provides spillover effects to 
adjacent fisheries. Large sized reserves were found to lead to better productivity of 
fish stocks. Armstrong and Skonhoft (2006) also used a bio-economic model to 
                                               
4 Alternatively called Gordon’s model or Gordon-Schaefer or Schaefer-Gordon. 
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investigate the effects of marine reserves by assuming asymmetric density 
migration between inside and outside reserves. Their results revealed that 
dispersal between the fishing grounds and the protected areas influences the 
economic and ecological outcome. If policies incorrectly assume symmetric 
migration, then this can negatively impact long-term returns to resource use. 
Recently, simulations of fishery management have focused not only on harvesting 
equilibrium but also on ecological system properties and spatially specific analyses 
of fisheries. For instance, Lachica-Aliño et al. (2006) applied an ecosystem-based 
model which allows an investigation of the interaction and dynamics of multiple 
species and multiple gear in fisheries in Philippine. The models were derived from 
single species data such as yield per recruit and surplus production and integrated 
with an ecosystem-based approach. Pelletier and Mahévas (2005) used a spatially 
and seasonally explicit model to study the consequences of different policies on 
fishery dynamics such as gear restriction, marine protected areas and total 
allowable catch. Although the spatial and ecological models outlined above can 
include seasonal differences, none consider the heterogeneity of fishermen.  
This research extends the bio-economic modelling literature by incorporating 
spatial analysis of fishery dynamics and heterogeneous characteristic of humans 
using a multi-agent simulation. Agent-based modelling (ABM) is considered an 
effective method, providing a novel understanding of scientific research enquiries, 
and can be used to explore the theoretical consequences of complex assumptions 
(Janssen and Ostrom, 2006). ABM goes beyond the models discussed above 
because it can deal with complex systems, and qualitative and quantitative 
inputs/assumptions. Multiple heterogeneous agents and different characteristics of 
environments can be included in ABM. Furthermore, spatio-temporal dynamics of 
fisheries and the individual level of agents can be studied. Although, cellular 
automata models can also address the research questions at the individual level, 
ABM is more appropriate to deal with a complex system like Tonle Sap because it 
enables the creation of various and heterogeneous characteristics of agents and 
landscapes. This goes beyond the study of a specific location and history which 
can be implemented within cellular automata (Janssen and Ostrom, 2006). There 
has been an increase in the number of papers combining ABM and other empirical 
methods such as laboratory experiments, case studies, role playing games (e.g., 
Adamatti et al., 2005), and GIS (e.g., Robinson and Brown, 2009). ABM is one way 
of approaching the challenges in studying empirical social sciences which are 
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complex and relate to contextual factors such as geography, culture, policy and 
economics. For environmental issues, ABM has been used to analyse land cover 
change (Evans and Kelley, 2004), ecosystem and catchment management (Becu 
et al., 2003; Doran, 2006), wildlife ecology (McLane et al., 2011) and cooperative 
behaviours (Touza et al., 2012). It has also been used to analyse various interests 
in fisheries such as fleet response (Soulié and Thébaud, 2006), trading of 
multispecies fisheries quotas (e.g., ITQs) (Little et al., 2009), and multiple use 
management of coastal marine resources (McDonald et al., 2008). A more specific 
review of the ABM literature in accordance with the specific objectives is provided 
in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.  
2.2 A CASE STUDY: TONLE SAP WETLANDS, CAMBODIA 
2.2.1 An Overview of Cambodia 
The Kingdom of Cambodia (Cambodia) is a part of the Mekong watershed or 
the Greater Mekong Sub Region (GMS5) in Southeast Asia (Figure 2-1). This 
country covers an area of around 181,035 square kilometres and has a tropical 
monsoon climate (Royal government of Cambodia, n.d). For administrative 
purposes, the country consists of 18 provinces and 2 municipalities. Importantly, 
16 provinces mainly rely on fisheries for livelihoods and their economies.  
 
                                               
5 The Greater Mekong Watershed or The Grater Mekong Sub Region covers areas of the Kingdoms of Cambodia, 
Thailand, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar (Burma), Vietnam, and Yunnan Province of the 
People’s Republic of China. The Mekong river commission (MRC) was established in 1995 in order to make 
cooperation among those countries. The agreement of the regional cooperation program for the sustainable 
development of water and related resources in the Mekong basin was signed by the governments of 
Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand and Vietnam.  
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Figure 2-1. The first map (top image) shows the Greater Mekong Sub Region 
(GMS) which consists of six countries. The second map (bottom image) presents 
the Mekong watershed. The brown line depicts the boundaries of the watershed. 
Source: www.psywarrior.com/CambodiaPsyop.html; google.com 
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Historically, Cambodia was prosperous and powerful under the Hindu state of 
Funan and the Kingdom of Angkor (or Cambodia) until the mid-nineteenth century 
(Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs U.S. Department of State, 2008). 
However, the level of development of the country has lagged behind other Asian 
countries particularly up until 2004 (Swedish International Development 
Cooperation Agency; Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs U.S. Department of 
State, 2008). Cambodia has been a colony and has also suffered from genocide 
during the Khmer Rouge period, when most educated people were killed (Swedish 
International Development Cooperation Agency). There were 14.31 million people 
in Cambodia in 2011, the majority of which (90%) are Khmer ethnic (Central 
Intelligence Agency, 2009; Royal government of Cambodia, n.d). In 2011 its GDP 
was 12.88 billion USD, while GDP per capita has increased from USD 632 in 2007 
to USD 900 in 2011 (The World Bank, 2013). The Cambodian economy has been 
progressing rapidly from dependence on agricultural and service based sectors 
(The National Institute of Statistics, 2005) towards a growing industrial sector e.g., 
textile and cloth industries (Ballard, 2007; Brett, 2007). In addition, oil and natural 
gas deposits were discovered in 2004 (Chandler, 2008) which have been another 
boost to their economy. Although the economy has developed to a certain degree, 
an income gap (between the rich and the poor) still exists and the unequal 
distribution in natural resources is still a concern.  
The abundance of natural resources and biodiversity has been used by 
Cambodia for development. Economic activities and household incomes mainly 
depend on natural resources. The main diet is rice and fish. Cambodian people 
annually consume (fresh and processed) 13-70 kilograms of fish per person (the 
average is 27-38 kilograms of fish per person). Rice is the main agricultural crop 
and is grown on most of the cultivated areas in the country. The rice fields 
constitute approximately 2.32 million ha from a total of 2.8 million ha of cultivated 
land, and around 0.6 million ha of cultivated lands are floodplain. From 2001 to 
2002, the average farming household cultivated approximately 1.4 ha of rice and 
the average yield was around 2.1 tonnes/ha or around 2.4 tonnes/household 
(McKenney and Prom, 2002). Wet season rice is grown in every province but 
mostly in lowlands, whereas dry season rice is grown largely in the Mekong river 
floodplain which supplies water for the rice fields. Often households combine 
farming and fishing in their livelihood strategies. Most forests in Cambodia are non-
commercial and highly degraded, such as the flooded forests which have mostly 
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been cleared for agricultural purposes. The rate of deforestation has risen in the 
last decade due to illegal logging, corruption, ambiguous concession agreements 
and weak enforcement and management. The flooded forests decreased from over 
1 million ha in 1973 to only 450,000 ha in 1997 (McKenney and Prom, 2002). This 
also impacts on fisheries as the flooded forests are the nursing grounds for fish.  
Over the past decade, Cambodians have faced the increasing challenges of 
resource scarcity, competition and degradation due to an increase in population 
and weak implementation of policy and regulations. Tonle Sap wetlands are also 
faced with these problems. 
2.2.2 Tonle Sap: biophysical environment, climate and livelihood 
The Tonle Sap wetlands and Mekong river is the main hydrological system in 
Cambodia. It contributes to the water requirement of the country and supports the 
livelihoods of the majority of people in Cambodia. Indeed, over 90% of Cambodian 
livelihoods depend on this system as it contributes to the main economic activities, 
both agricultural and non-agricultural. Agriculturally, the main activities are inland 
farming and fisheries (International Centre for Environmental Management, 2003) 
including aquaculture6. For the non-agricultural sector, the main activities are 
forest product gathering, wildlife sanctuaries, and tourism (McKenney and Prom, 
2002). 
2.2.2.1 Physical geography of Tonle Sap 
The Tonle Sap wetlands have a unique landscape and they are one of the most 
productive freshwater fisheries in the world and provide incredible advantages for 
Cambodia itself and other countries in Mekong watershed (International Centre for 
Environmental Management, 2003). A brief description of Tonle Sap is given in 
Table 2-1. 
 
 
 
                                               
6 Aquaculture refers to fish-raising and other aquatic animals such as crocodiles, eels, frogs, and shrimp. 
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Table 2-1 Features of Tonle Sap  
Feature Wet season  Dry season  
Length from northwest to  
southwest (up to) 
250 km. 120-160 km 
Width  (up to) 100 km 35 km 
Coverage 1,100,000-1,600,000 ha 250,000 -300,000 ha 
Water flow 
60,000 cubic metres per 
second 
15,000 cubic metres 
per second 
Water level increases by 15-18 metres  
Water temperature  28 - 29°C on the surface and 26-28°C at the depth 
pH  6.6 - 6.9  
Climate conditions                                    
- Monsoon                                                
- Average annual temperature 
 
- Southwest monsoon in May - October                             
- 26.7 °C (maximum at 40.3 °C and minimum at 9.5 
°C) 
 Source: modified from ASEAN regional centre for biodiversity conservation 
(2009), Bonheur and Lane (2002) and Hickling (1961). 
 
Water in the Tonle Sap wetlands comes from the combination of melting snows 
in the Mekong headwaters (in Tibet), heavy monsoon rains in Cambodia and water 
flows from other countries in the upper catchment. These sources are able to raise 
the flow of water from 15,000 to 60,000 cubic metres per second in the rainy 
season (Hickling, 1961).The large volume of water cannot all be drained directly 
into the sea, so the level of water increases to the point where it flows over land on 
either side of the river. Forests surrounding the lake are flooded to a depth of many 
metres; sometimes water levels can rise 10 metres. 
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Figure 2-2 The Tonle Sap wetlands in wet (top image) and dry (bottom image) 
seasons 
Source: http//earthobservatory.nasa.govIOTDview.phpid=3483 
 
The various types of land and water resources, such as flooded forests, flooded 
grassland, seasonally flooded crop fields and swamp, support inland capture 
fisheries in these wetlands. The lake joins with the Mekong river system and 13 - 
20% of the Mekong’s flow enters Tonle Sap Lake in the rainy season making it five 
times its normal size (Sithirith and Grundy-warr, 2007) (Figure 2-2). In the dry 
season, when the water level of the Mekong river drops, the waters of Tonle Sap 
recede, replenishing this great river. These wetlands act as major nursing grounds 
for fish breeding before fish return to the Northern Mekong Basin, and the flooding 
also results in increased nutrient input into the ecosystem.   
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2.2.2.2 Variables that influence fish resources 
The Tonel Sap wetlands are complex areas with high biodiversity and are a 
highly productive ecosystem. Variables that influence the availability of fish in 
Tonle Sap include river hydrology, floodplain quality, and fish migration. 
Firstly, flooding is the main hydrological factor that influences the abundance of 
fish stocks. Floods establish the grounds for fish breeding and fish growth during 
the rainy season. The long duration of floods provides benefits for fish growth 
through increased nutrition. Not only does the longer flooding season provides a 
better environment for fish growth but also when the floods are early they influence 
sizes of fish stocks by providing good environmental conditions for larvae and 
juveniles (Kurien et al., 2006). For example, low levels of water in 2003 resulted in 
an approximately 50% decrease in fish catch (Baran et al., 2007b). Seasonal 
changes in water levels are called a “flood pulse”, which refers to the changes 
between high and low levels of a water cycle and explains the dynamic interactions 
between land and water which help to maintain diversity (Junk et al., 1989). The 
flood pulse phenomenon is recognized as the most important factor in explaining 
the productivity of Tonle Sap wetlands. “If the Tonle Sap Great Lake is the heart of 
Cambodia, the annual “flood pulse” is what keeps it alive” (Baran et al., 2007a, 
p.11). This concept was first used to describe the Amazonian floodplain. Ecological 
functions such as production, consumption and decomposition are driven by the 
flood pulse (Sparks et al., 1990) and succession is driven by the tidal system 
(water fluctuations) (Middleton, 2002).  
Secondly, the quality of the floodplain acts as an environmental variable driving 
fish biomass. Most of the primary organic matter that influences fish production is 
locally produced (Lamberts and Koponen, 2008). Higher diversity habitats such as 
flooded forests are considered the favourite habitat for fish. This corresponds with 
interviews (conducted for this research) with local fishermen that indicate how the 
most productive fishing grounds are near the shore, which are flooded forests, 
shrub and grassland. It is likely that important food for fish is derived from the land 
in flood dependent fisheries. With the rise in water level during floods, fish have 
access to wider and better food stores (Hickling, 1961) resulting in higher fish 
productivity even though less food is available from rivers. However, the amount of 
flooded forest has decreased year on year due to demands for land for rice fields 
(Kurien et al., 2006) and for other infrastructure developments such as dams and 
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irrigation systems. This infrastructure affects the wetlands’ hydrology, fish habitats 
and routes for fish migration, factors that determine the productivity of Tonle Sap 
fisheries (Baran et al., 2007a). Water flow and habitats are considered the main 
features driving ecosystem biodiversity (Hickey and Diaz, 1999).  
Thirdly, fish migration is a crucial characteristic of Mekong fisheries. Fish move 
between feeding grounds, breeding grounds and sanctuary areas. Fish movement 
is a part of the biological cycle of fish after they have spawned in the floodplains or 
deeper riverine areas. The fish population is able to move out over the surrounding 
land into the larger habitat that is created by the floods. This enables fish 
populations to be much higher than if fish were restricted to river channels. The 
incredible productivity of the fisheries is driven by synchronisation between the 
annual floods and fish reproduction. Mekong fish species have evolved to be ready 
to spawn as soon as the floods start (Hickling, 1961). The floods not only provide 
an enormous living-space for fish but also abundance of food. In these conditions, 
mature fish are able to recover condition rapidly after spawning offspring are 
hatched where there is the maximum amount of food. 
2.2.3 Livelihoods in Tonle Sap 
Tonle Sap wetlands play an important role in Cambodian livelihoods, especially 
in rural areas where they are dependent on natural resources. There are many 
activities related to fisheries and livelihoods, such as fishing (including fishing in 
rice fields), fish aquaculture, fish trading, fish processing and fishing gear making. 
Households are also involved in farming, especially rice farming, livestock raising, 
fuel wood collection, small shop businesses, money lending and daily labour 
including boat driving. The Tonle Sap wetlands are essential for floating 
households (see a floating village in Figure 2-3) whose houses float on the Tonle 
Sap Lake. These households are extremely reliant on fishing and fishing-related 
activities. The floating villages in Tonle Sap Lake themselves are attractions for 
tourists, while land-based households have other sources of household income 
such as agriculture. 
- 29 - 
 
 
 
 Figure 2-3 A floating village on Tonle Sap Lake 
 
2.2.4 Cambodian fisheries 
Fisheries are not only the main source of household income for poor people and 
help with their food security, they also support some wealthier households who are 
involved in fish trading businesses rather than fishing. Small-scale fisheries are the 
main type of fishery in Cambodia. The fisheries peak at the beginning of the dry 
season (November to February) when flood waters start to recede and fish stocks 
migrate from paddy fields and flooded forests into deep water. The fish catches at 
this time contribute highly to total global inland fishery capture. A property rights 
and conservation management system has been applied to fishery management in 
Tonle Sap in the form of fishing management zones consisting of private, common 
and conservation zones. Recently, the private zones have been (temporary) 
abolished in order to replenish fish stocks.  
2.2.4.1 History of fisheries management 
The formal management system in Cambodia can be traced back to the King 
Norodom era (1859-1897). Traders (or investors), particularly Chinese, bought 
fishing concessions from the King and sub-leased their rights multiple times (there 
could be eight stages of sub-leases between the state and actual exploiter 
(Hickling, 1961)). These concessionaires gained returns of around double the 
payments to the Royal Treasury (Degen and Nao, 2000; McKenney and Prom, 
2002). The concession and sub-leasing system continued until the Democratic 
Kampuchea regime under Pol Pot emerged. After that, fishing activities were 
somewhat limited. Fishery resources were neglected in order to develop 
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agriculture, which involved clearing flooded forests and wetlands. The fishing 
management system was changed again after the Democratic Kampuchea regime 
was overthrown in 1979. A fishery management system called collective fishing 
was undertaken through solidarity groups called Krom Samaki. During this era, 
access to fisheries was open to all. The concession system was brought back in 
the late 1980s and was reformed in 2000. The reforms involved a decrease in the 
fishing lot areas and establishment of community fisheries in order to deal with 
serious conflicts between fishing lot owners and local fishermen (McKenney and 
Prom, 2002). The fishing lots were designated plots for commercial fishing 
involving private concessionaires bidding for exclusive fishing licences. In late 
2011/early 2012, the fishing lots were temporarily abolished in order to replenish 
fish stocks and to improve the livelihoods of small-scale fishermen (Royal 
Government of Cambodia, 2012).  
2.2.4.2 Zonal designation and fishing lot system 
Zonal designation has been applied to fishery management in Tonle Sap. The 
wetlands were previously divided into three different zones: 1) commercial zones 
or fishing lots, 2) conservation zones, and 3) communal or public fishing zones 
(Figure 2-4 ).  
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Figure 2-4 Zonal designation of Tonle Sap fisheries 
Source: Tonle Sap biosphere reserve, 2009 
Fishing lots (Figure 2-5), were designed plots for commercial fisheries involving 
private concessionaires bidding for exclusive fishing licences. The number of years 
that concessionaires had authority over the lots depended on the contract and type 
of fishing lot, and were generally two-year or ten-year contracts. The fishing lot 
areas existed and were allowed to operate in the open season only and they 
became public fishing zones in the closed season. The open season corresponded 
with the dry season which begins on the 1st of October and ends on the 31st of May 
north of Phnom Penh and starts on the 1st of November and ends on the 30th of 
June south of Phnom Penh. The closed season was the wet season. Fences 
constructed to be boundaries of fishing lots had to be removed when the closed 
season started. 
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Figure 2-5 An example of fishing lots 
 
The fishing lots were leased by government through an auction. 
Announcements7 for auctions would be issued a month in advance by the 
Department of Fisheries (DoF). Individuals who wanted to participate were 
required to submit their application8 at least 10 days before the auction day. The 
auction was restricted to Cambodian citizens except government officers. Ad-hoc 
committees9 would be set up to supervise the auction processes held in each 
province. However, attendees and retired fishing lot leasees complained about 
poor management including corruption (Tana and Todd, 2001). Lot owners were 
usually businessmen with power in terms of finance and/or networks with 
government.  
                                               
7 Announcements consisted of date and venue for the auction day, the floor price for each fishing lot and 
specifications for fishing lots. 
8 The application had to include 1) personal biographical data 2) a declaration to comply with the regulations of 
the fishing lot 3) a deposit (one-third of the floor price as a cheque or cash) 4) a commitment form of 
payment. The first payment was two-fifths of the winning bid which had to be paid within 15 days of  the 
auction day 5) a commitment form of payment for fine and service fees if the concessionaire failed to make 
the first payment within 15 days 6) a commitment form of payment if they wanted to abandon the fishing lot 
before the contract ended. 
9 Principally, the ad-hoc commission comprised of 1) Provincial governor or representative as chairperson 2) the 
vice chair as the director of the Department of Fisheries or representative 3) Head of the provincial planning 
department or a representative 4) Head of the provincial finance department 5) Head or a representative of 
the provincial agriculture department 6)Head or a representative of the provincial bank 7) Head or a 
representative of the provincial tax office 8) Head or a representative of the provincial fisheries department. 
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Once obtained, fishing licenses could not be legitimately transferred or sub-
leased and lot owners were required to follow the fishing regulations set out in “the 
burden book”. This book specified the operating rules including the fishing 
allowance, payment regulations, fishing locations in the form of a map and GIS 
data (showing boundaries between the exclusive fishing area and public areas), 
and time periods for open and closed seasons (McKenney and Prom, 2002). 
Fences around the lots were constructed as a massive cage for fish at the 
beginning of the open season and were removed at the end of season. License 
holders usually employed guards to protect their lot boundaries. Interestingly, 
fishing lot owners might get a third party, called co-sharers or shareholders, to 
share responsibility, capital costs and benefits from the lots. Also, most of the lot 
owners illegally sub-leased some areas (usually after the first few harvests) to 
other fishermen by selling one-year sub-contracts and/or collecting a fee or sharing 
fish catches. In addition, the military might be offered some areas in return for 
boundary protection (Vuthy et al., 2000). There were many barriers against small-
scale fishermen accessing the fishing lot system. For example, sizes of fishing lots 
were often too large10 and their floor prices were too high. Therefore, some small-
scale fishermen could only be labourers in fishing lots in the fishing season.  
The conservation zones were areas where fishing activities were principally not 
allowed at any time of the year. Areas outside the fishing lots and conservation 
zones were called public/common fishing zones, where anyone could fish all year 
around but were generally only used by small-scale fishermen. Fish production in 
these areas tended to be lower than in the fishing lot areas. Small-scale fishermen 
usually fished in the areas close to their homes for the whole year and used 
household or relative labour. Their harvests were and are mainly for household 
consumption and income.  
There are a wide range of fishing methods used in Tonle Sap, from simple gear 
e.g., simple nets, lift-nets, hand-lines and traps, to more complicated gear e.g., 
barrages, which are made of split bamboo fencing rolls and are installed/attached 
with poles into the lake or river bed to confine the fish to a certain space or to lead 
them into various traps. The bigger the size of the enclosed area, the more works 
                                               
10 The previous lot number two in Battambang province covered an area of around 500 square kilometres 
(Allebone-webb and Clements, 2009) 
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and material needed including a large number of workers, high organisation, and 
long-established traditional skills (Hickling, 1961). For example, three large ships, 
five smaller boats for carrying bamboo fencing, ten sampans or dinghies, 40,000 
stakes, 20,000 metres of split bamboo fencing, and 50 labourers (both fishermen 
and workers for cutting poles, repairing boats, making fences etc.) are required in 
order to work for a concessionaire operating a fishing lot around 20 kilometres in 
circumference. This contrasts with small-scale fisheries which require fewer 
labourers and simple gear.  
Management systems have been the responsibility of the DoF under the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Forest and Fisheries (MAFF). This formal organization is 
responsible for developing and conserving fishery resources. The authority of DoF 
lies in enforcing regulations, issuing concessions, collecting fees as well as fines, 
and controlling fish processing and trade. Statistics from the Ministry of Economy 
and Finance in 2002 revealed that the official income of DoF was between 1-4 
million USD per year, while local authorities earnings came from more informal 
revenue from fisheries (McKenney and Prom, 2002).  
2.2.4.3 Fish catches and fish market values 
The total harvest for inland fisheries in Cambodia varied between 290,000 and 
430,000 tonnes/year between 1994 and 199711 and between 365,000 and 445,000 
tonnes/year from 2006 to 2011 (Ministry of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries, 
2012). From the statistics on per capita inland capture fisheries, Cambodia is at the 
top of the list (McKenney and Prom, 2002; FAO, 2003b) and the majority of 
catches are from the Tonle Sap wetlands. Fish yields from Tonle Sap floodplain 
are estimated at between 139 and 230 kg/ha/year, which was higher than other 
countries in Mekong watershed (Baran et al., 2007b). Rab et al. (2006) compared 
total fish catch in the open season in 2002 and the closed season in 2003 and 
                                               
11 These statistics are estimated based on a combination of survey research, such as socio-economic household 
surveys by Ahmed et.al (1998), rice field fisheries research by Gregory (1997), and combined data from 
studies of fish catch and consumption across different scales by Van Zalinge et al (2000). Department of 
Fisheries (DoF) provided significantly different fish yields at approximately 50,000-70,000 tonnes per year. 
Some papers such as (McKenney and Prom, 2002) claim that the statistics from DoF are problematic 
because the national statistics do not reflect the catch from small-scale fishermen and does not include fish 
production from 11 other provinces which were not licensed and leased by DoF (Ahmad et al., 1998). 
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found that the harvests in the open season were around seven times more than 
the closed season. The price of fish depends on fish species and seasons. The 
lowest fish price starts when fishermen sell their harvests at the landing sites or to 
middlemen. The fish price for local consumers is 3 to 4 times higher than that paid 
to the fishermen (Baran et al., 2007b). The highest price is paid for fish for the 
export market. The monetary values of fish caught is estimated to be 100-200 
million USD at the landing site and market chains increase the value to 250-500 
million USD (Van Zalinge et al., 2000).  
The products of freshwater fisheries are domestically consumed either as fresh 
or processed fish e.g., fermented fish, fish paste (prahok), fish sauce (tuk trey) and 
dried fish. The traditional ways that are used to preserve fish are sun-drying and 
smoking. Fishermen prefer to trade fish and processed products in local markets 
rather than export markets due to constraints such as government interventions, 
export licences, and official and unofficial taxes and fees (Ministry of Commerce, 
2001). As a result, the export market has only a small share of fish products. 
Thailand is the biggest market for export followed by Vietnam, Hong Kong, 
Malaysia, Singapore, Europe and United States. 
2.2.5 Main problems and conflicts related to fisheries  
The main problems related to Tonle Sap fisheries are depletion of fishery 
resources and conflicts in fisheries derived from competition between land-uses. 
Degradation of fish stocks and fish habitats have been reported in several studies 
(McKenney and Prom, 2002; Song et al., 2005; Sneddon, 2007; Nuorteva et al., 
2010). Clearing flooded forests and shrub vegetation for agriculture immediately 
destroys fish habitats and builds up sedimentation in the lake. However, high 
maize prices or an increase in demand for rice encourages farmers to clear 
flooded forest. The contaminated runoff water (pesticides and chemical fertilizers) 
also affects nearby fisheries and directly impacts on paddy field fish production 
(McKenney and Prom, 2002). The increase in sediment deposition reduces lake 
depth, especially in dry season, and amounts of dissolved oxygen. Other problems 
include overexploitation of fishery resources because of an increase in the number 
of fishermen, intensification of fishing techniques, widespread use of illegal fishing 
methods such as electro-fishing, use of poison and use of small mesh nets 
(McKenney and Prom, 2002), and destruction of fish habitat (Brett, 2007). 
Although, the catch per unit of effort and the value of the catch has declined, the 
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overall tonnage of fish captured in Tonle Sap has increased, reflecting an increase 
in the fishing effort of fishermen and rapid improvements in fishing technology 
(International Centre for Environmental Management, 2003). However, a decline in 
some long-lived species, and a shift towards more short–lived species and smaller 
sizes of fish have been noticed (International Centre for Environmental 
Management, 2003). 
 Social conflicts over enforcement of boundaries between the different fishing 
zones and between different groups of users have also been reported (Bonheur 
and Lane, 2002; Keskinen et al., 2007). Some of the fishing lots covered large 
areas of fishing grounds and overlapped with some transportation routes for 
inhabitants who lived in those areas. A long-term tension has been reported 
between lot owners and local fishermen due to inequitable access to productive 
fishing grounds (Keskinen et al., 2007; Nuorteva et al., 2010). Arguments over lot 
boundaries between local fishermen and lot owners are extremely common. Local 
fishermen claim that lot owners have tried to expand their boundaries illegally, 
while lot owners claim that local fishermen have tried to invade into their lots. 
There were also complaints about the auction system, such as lack of information 
about the auction and corruption. In addition, conflicts between fishermen and 
farmers are also problematic. Rice is the dominant crop in Cambodia and dry 
season crops are mainly grown on floodplain areas so as to be close to water and 
to make use of the nutrients deposited by the flood waters. As a result, harvests of 
dry season crops are higher than wet season crops. These temporary rice fields 
along the shore of the Tonle Sap Lake in the dry season lead to conflict among 
small-scale fishermen, fishing lot owners and farmers in terms of the impacts of 
intensive land use on the fishery.  
To reduce the conflicts, fishing lots were reformed by decreasing the size and 
number of fishing lots in late 2000. Approximately 56% of fishing lot areas were 
decreased (surface areas of fishing lots were reduced from 954,000 ha to 417,000 
ha and the number of fishing lots reduced from 135 to 82 in 2001) and the number 
of people associated with the fishing lots decreased from 756,000 to 148,000 
(Degen et al., 2002). Furthermore, all fishing lots were abolished in early 2012 
(DAP-NEWS, 2011; Royal Government of Cambodia, 2012).  
Difficulty in accessing the credit market is a problem for small-scale fishing 
households. From March to May (dry season), fish harvests for poor households 
do not meet their daily requirements because they do not have the modern fishing 
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gear necessary for fishing in areas with very low levels of water. Loans from fish 
traders/ private lenders/ middlemen in form of money and fishing gear become 
important for them at this time. After harvesting, fish products are usually sold to 
creditors cheaply (lower price than the market) (Brett, 2007). However, there is no 
choice for poor households because they are not able to access credit elsewhere 
(Béné and Friend, 2011). Private loans are the only options that small-scale 
fishermen have to access credit (Turton, 2000; Kimkong, 2007). This problem may 
be a significant big barrier preventing small-scale fishermen in participating in the 
auction, leading to lack of access to productive fishing grounds in the open fishing 
season. 
2.3 CONCLUSION 
This chapter provides an overview of management issues of inland fisheries 
and a background of the case study: Tonle Sap fisheries. There are different 
management approaches that have been used for inland fisheries. The 
conventional approaches intend to regulate the type of fishing gear, amount of fish 
catches, and seasonal closure. The alternative approaches regulate in terms of, for 
example, ownership, conservation and co-management. Tonle Sap fisheries 
provide an interesting mixed-management approach combining property rights, 
market-based approach and conservation. However, degradation of fish resources 
and conflict between resource users are still obvious problems. Understanding 
attitudes and behaviour of fishermen and the spatial interactions between 
fishermen, management system and fishery resources are important to improve 
sustainability in fisheries. There is potential to use simplified simulation models of 
complex fishery systems to investigate the biological and socio-economic 
implication of choosing different management strategies.  
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Chapter 3  
 
RESEARCH FRAMEWORK  
This chapter describes the conceptual framework of the thesis. It provides an 
overall picture of the research and motivates the choice of methodological 
framework, while the research methods are presented in each of the empirical 
chapters. Two different approaches, choice experiments and agent-based 
simulation, are used in this thesis. The choice experiment approach is used to 
investigate the individual purchasing behaviours in the auction market for fishing 
lots. The agent-based simulation is used to analyse the complexity of fishery 
dynamics under different management. The combination of both approaches offers 
a framework for understanding the particular fishery system in Tonle Sap at both 
the micro and macro scales, and allows exploration of the spatio-temporal 
dynamics of the system.  
The Tonle Sap fishery is an interesting case of mixed management in a 
complex fishery system involving multiple users. The concepts of property rights, 
conservation and market-based approaches are integrated in the Tonle Sap 
management system. The management aims to improve fishing efficiency, reduce 
fishing effort, encourage people to preserve fish stocks and their habitats, and also 
generate income for the nation. However, the results have never lived up to 
expectations. Small-scale fishermen are faced with limited access to the most 
productive fishing grounds during the fishing season because those areas are 
semi-privatised into (temporal) private fishing lots. An auction has been used to 
allocate exclusive fishing licences. It is likely that the auction itself and the design 
of fishing lot characteristics created barriers for small-scale fishermen, especially 
financially, because most of the previous fishing lots covered large areas and 
involved high investment, high bidding prices and many labourers. Furthermore, 
there is still continued degradation of fish stocks and habitats. In order to meet the 
fishery management goals (fishery biology, social justice, and economics), the 
following three main components of fisheries should be well understood: fishermen 
behaviour, dynamics of the fishery and the management system (regulatory 
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system as well as institutional context).The framework used in this thesis is 
adapted from Ostrom (2009)‘s framework for evaluating sustainability of socio-
ecological systems. This framework demonstrates the associations of four core 
subsystems in social-ecological systems: resource systems, resource units, 
governance systems, and users. 
Fishermen behaviour is one of the most important factors determining fishery 
sustainability. Hilborn (1985) claims, that most fishery management problems are 
caused by misunderstanding and mismanagement of fishermen more than limited 
information from fishery statistics. Fishermen have different preferences and 
dissimilar ways of thinking and conducting fishing activities. It is important to 
understand their behaviours because different behaviours result in different 
impacts on the ecosystem. It is also vital to understand their reasons, and thus 
processes of valuation as an underlying driver or motivation for their actions. Both 
fishermen decision and the management system are needed to be well understood 
because the management system partly controls fishermen incentives and spatial 
distribution of fish stocks and their reproduction. This thesis therefore focuses on 
the interactions among fishery regulations, heterogeneous fishermen and fish 
biology contexts under a sustainable management goal. In order to achieve fishery 
sustainability, there are different alternative policy decisions which can be 
evaluated using economic, social and ecological criteria (see Figure 3-1). This can 
help to inform decision makers and stakeholders. 
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Figure 3-1 Framework for research problems 
 
To understand the three important components, different methods are used at 
different stages (see Figure 3-2). The first part of thesis aims to understand the 
allocation of fishing rights and distribution of fishing licences through a market-
based approach (an auction system), and to explore bidding behaviour of 
fishermen when they have to select between types of fishing grounds. Purchasing 
behaviours for private fishing licences involves multiple choices where fishermen 
need to assess different characteristics of each available fishing lot. A CE 
approach is applied to model fishermen behaviour in purchasing hypothetical 
fishing lots. The estimated choice model explains individuals’ choice between 
buying potential fishing lots and the choice of only fishing in the public fishing 
grounds. The actual values of fishing licences are not the main finding of this 
thesis, but the valuation of different characteristics of fishing lots. This emphasis 
allows for an analysis of fishermen’s heterogeneous preferences for attributes of 
the fishing lot system.  
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Figure 3-2 The framework of research methodology 
 
Different techniques were used to collect data. Focus group and interviews 
were employed to collect data from fishermen, previous lot owners, government 
and NGOs staff in order to design questionnaires and choice sets including various 
characteristic of fishing lots. The questionnaires were piloted and improved to 
produce an appropriate questionnaire including choice options for small-scale 
fishermen. The survey was carefully conducted in different locations and covers 
different socio-demographic characteristics of fishermen. More information is 
included in Chapter 4. The analysis of the CE model seeks to identify different 
socio-demographic groups of fishermen according to their preferences. 
Furthermore, the analysis of preferences for different characteristics of fishing lots 
which allow an analysis of how fishermen trade-off different characteristics when 
considering alternative options.  
The CE simulation does not cover analysis of spatio-temporal dynamics of 
fisheries, which is crucial for fishery management. The management of fishery 
resources is complex because it involves multiple users and the dynamics of fish 
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understand the interactions between fishermen, fish stocks and the management 
system under various and competing ways of management in order to improve the 
sustainability of the fishery. ABM was chosen as the most suitable model because 
of its ability to incorporate social, economic and biological aspects of the system 
into one model. In addition, complicated circumstances such as a mixed fishery 
management tools and a complex ecosystem can be examined at both individual 
and system level. The choice of ABM therefore allows a suitable tool for evaluation 
of the management system of the Tonle Sap fisheries. The model setting is based 
on the information from relevant fishery literature, questionnaires and the CE 
outcomes from the first part of the thesis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-3 Two spatial models using an agent-based simulation. 
 
The spatial analysis is divided into two sections (see Figure 3-3). The first 
simulation (FISH model) focuses on a dual property rights system with private and 
common areas. The first section investigates spatial effects of property rights 
through the interactions of fishermen behaviours, fish stocks and fishing 
regulations comparing between private and common property rights. These 
simulations use the same parameters and default values except different layouts of 
property rights assigning over fishing grounds. The results of private and common 
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areas are compared in terms of fish stocks condition and fishing profits. Different 
combinations of private and common areas are also analysed including sensitivity 
analysis of model parameters. The second section develops a model including 
conservation areas into the FISH model. This model is termed the FISHCON 
model. The simulation evaluates a zonal (spatial) management system consisting 
of conservation, private and common areas. This model focuses on the effects of 
conservation, as the marine conservation literature (e.g., Russ and Alcala, 1996a; 
Wantiez et al., 1997; Halpern, 2003) have suggested that the conservation areas 
benefit to fisheries due to spatial spill-overs. Different conservation sizes, patterns 
and locations are simulated. The simulations explore spatial dynamics of fisheries 
in three different zones: private, common, and conservation zones considering the 
socio-economic and biological effects of spillover from conversation areas. This 
spatial analysis help to fill a research gap as most literature does not explicitly 
include spatial interactions.  
In summary, the combination of CE approach and ABM provides a better way of 
understanding the fishery dynamics and implications of the fishery management 
system because the overall outcome provides macro consequences derived from 
actions of and interactions between individuals. It is also important to understand 
the drivers of individual’s decisions, actions, and interactions taking place at the 
local level. Only through understanding decision making is it possible to model the 
collective effects for the whole fishery and begin to understand the implications of 
alternative policy options.   
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Chapter 4  
MODEL OF FISHERMEN’S BEHAVIOUR IN                                  
AN AUCTION MARKET 
This chapter investigates how fishery management through an auction-based 
system affects different groups of small-scale fishermen using a choice experiment 
approach. The first section introduces to research interests, research questions, 
and the purpose of this chapter. The second section discusses the concept of 
property rights and its relevance to fishery management, outlining how the property 
rights influence overexploitation of fishery resources. This is followed by a 
description of Tonle Sap wetlands and a synopsis of the fishery management 
system to understand the context of the choice experiment. Then follows a section 
presenting the research methods and survey design, which is followed by results 
and discussions. The main findings show that small-scale fishermen are willing to 
bid for fishing licences; however an auction-based approach might not be an 
effective way to distribute the licences if a fair distribution is an important outcome.  
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Regulation based on a mix of auctions and zonal designation has been used in 
Cambodian fisheries. The rationale behind using an auction system was that a 
market based approach generates resource rents to the government, and that by 
securing property rights to the resource, the system discourages overcapitalization 
(Mansfield, 2004; Acheson, 2006). The Tonle Sap wetland has been divided into a 
conservation zone, an open access fishing area and an area with individually 
auctioned fishing rights. The auction system has been in place since the late 
1980s, involving private concessionaires bidding for exclusive temporary fishing 
licences for designated plots, called fishing lots. Statistics from the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance in 2002 revealed that the official income from the 
concession system was between 1-4 million USD per year, while local authorities 
might earn more from informal revenues (McKenney and Prom, 2002). The 
fisheries sector was reported to have increased revenues to government, 
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contributing 3.2 – 7.4% of GDP in 1995, 11.7% in 2003 and 16% in 2004 (Baran et 
al., 2007b) . However, the aim of the management system was also to achieve a 
more biologically sustainable fishery. Achieving this aim seems to have been less 
successful with reports of continuing degradation of fish stocks and fish habitats 
(McKenney and Prom, 2002; Song et al., 2005; Sneddon, 2007; Nuorteva et al., 
2010).  
The way in which the management system has been operating has also been 
questioned and social conflicts over enforcement of boundaries between the 
different fishing zones and between different groups of users have been reported 
(Bonheur and Lane, 2002; Keskinen et al., 2007). Furthermore, local fishermen 
and auction participants have raised concerns about the unfair distribution of 
fishing licences. A lack of information about the bidding system has been cited as a 
particular problem. A long-term tension has been reported between more wealthy 
fishermen (fishing lot owners) and poorer users of the communal fishing grounds, 
due mostly to inequitable access to rich fishing grounds (Keskinen et al., 2007; 
Nuorteva et al., 2010). The imbalanced allocation of property rights to rich and 
poor (also called ‘elite capture’) is not exclusive to the Tonle Sap but has often 
been highlighted in different fisheries and other common pool resources vital to 
poor and vulnerable groups (Beck and Nesmith, 2001; Meinzen-Dick and Mwangi, 
2008; Working Group on Property Rights, 2008). To counteract the developing 
conflicts in Tonle Sap, fishing licences were revoked in late 2011 and early 2012 to 
allow fish stocks to recover (DAP-NEWS, 2011; Royal Government of Cambodia, 
2012). Access and use of renewable resources are key problems which research 
in the ecosystem management field attempts to solve (Bousquet and Le Page, 
2004). With the possible future reintroduction of the auction-based system in 
Cambodia, it is important and timely to study the impacts of potential future licence 
based systems, to increase understanding of how alternative allocation systems 
might impact different groups of users of the resource.  
This chapter investigates the scope for widening participation and the 
implications of implementing an auction system by focusing on small-scale 
fishermen who often have limited access under such a system. The attractiveness 
of alternative lot characteristics was measured through lot valuations using CE 
(Bennett and Adamowicz, 2001; Hanley et al., 2001), where the lot characteristics 
define the attributes of a choice. The price of a fishing licence was represented by 
the floor price, which is the minimum bidding value in the auction. This floor price 
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represents the monetary attribute in the CE design. This approach enables an 
assessment of the implications of using an auction-based system to allocate 
fishing rights and the conditions under which an auction-based system could help 
to improve access for smaller scale fishermen. Small-scale fishermen were 
targeted for study as they are in the majority in Cambodian fisheries but have 
limited access to the most productive fishing grounds. Initial investigations found 
that the majority of fishermen expressed an interest in the opportunities that a 
redesigned auction system might bring. However, this research expected to find 
variations in how individual fishermen assess the value of a fishing licence 
depending on size of the lot, location, productivity, management and financial 
restrictions as well as socio-demographic characteristics of the fishermen. This 
leads to the hypothesis that the characteristics of available fishing licences in the 
auction have significant implications for the extent to which the auction system 
creates access for a larger group of small-scale fishermen.  
This research aims to understand how an allocation system impacts on the 
distribution of fishing rights and benefits in Tonle Sap. This research focuses on 
small-scale fishermen to explore the scope for widening participation as this group 
is in the majority in Cambodian fisheries but has had limited access to rich fishing 
grounds and has experienced barriers to participation in the auctions. In order to 
achieve this aim, the research investigates whether different groupings of 
fishermen can be identified in the study area, measured in terms of differences in 
their valuation of attributes of the fishing lots, and therefore their likely behaviour in 
an auction market. Furthermore, this research explores how the allocation system 
influences different groups of fishermen by asking how the designation of lots, i.e., 
their size, location, potential catch and fishery management restrictions, affects 
their attractiveness to different types of fishermen and whether they are likely to bid 
for the individual lots in an auction. 
4.2 LITERATURE REVIEW: Property Right Regimes 
The study of overexploitation of common pool resources such as fisheries has a 
long history (Gordon, 1954; Clark, 1973; Feeny et al., 1990; Cunningham, 1994; 
Sinclair et al., 2002; Hilborn et al., 2003; Rosenberg, 2003; Pauly et al., 2005; 
Ostrom, 2008), concluding that the open access nature of many fishing stocks 
leads to misallocation of fishing rights, which poses challenges for achieving 
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economically efficient harvesting. The literature has suggested alternative ways to 
deal with overexploitation and improve efficiency and conservation of fish stocks 
such as individual transferable quotas (ITQs) (Morgan, 1995; Hannesson, 1996; 
Chu, 2009), seasonal closures (Watson et al., 1993; Conrad, 1999; Hilborn et al., 
2004; Murawski et al., 2005), and designation of protected areas (Carter, 2003; 
Marinesque et al., 2012). Assigning property rights has been argued as a 
successful approach for decreasing fishing effort, generating resource rents and 
conserving fish stocks (Sinclair et al., 2002; Sutinen and Soboil, 2003; Grafton et 
al., 2006). For common-pool resources, property rights are defined through access 
and resource withdrawal rights but higher level property rights such as rights to 
manage, exclude and alienate are also important in fisheries management 
(Schlager and Ostrom, 1992). A property rights system which includes the right to 
alienation is often considered the most efficient as it can be defined as equivalent 
to private property (Ostrom, 2003). Lawrence (2000) points out that the necessary 
condition for a property rights system to lead to resource conservation is that 
ownership generates a tangible financial value from resource use over a long time 
period. Some empirical studies support this argument, e.g., studies of land based 
resources have shown that individual land ownership and more secure formal 
property rights to land have resulted in more investment in improved productivity of 
the land (Feder, 1987; Feder and Feeny, 1991). Furthermore, other studies show 
that fishermen who have clearly defined private rights are able to increase 
efficiency in the use of space and technology (Schlager, 1994) and generate a 
positive incentive for conservation (Bodal, 2003). For example, establishing access 
rights to members of an elite fishing caste in Padu, Estonia has been helpful in 
reducing the conflicts between fishermen and maintaining a sustainable marine 
fishery (Coulthard, 2011). However, it has also been argued that private property 
rights alone do not ensure resource conservation even when they are secure 
(Acheson, 2006). For example, property rights in marine fisheries in the form of 
ITQs have been reported to generate negative effects on sustainability due to high-
grading, by-catch species dumping, and misreporting of fish catches as fishermen 
seek to maximize the value of their trip landing (Copes, 1986; Matthew A, 1997; 
Hilborn et al., 2003; Grafton et al., 2006; Sumaila, 2010).  
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4.3 BRIEF OVERVIEW OF FISHERY MANAGEMENT 
This section provides a brief explanation of fishery management in order to 
understand choice simulations, the main attributes of the system have been 
introduced in Chapter 2. The number of years that fishing licence owners had 
authority over lots depended on the contract and type of fishing lot, and were 
generally either two-year or ten-year contracts. Fishing operations were divided 
into two different types classified by fishing gear and licences; small-scale 
subsistence fishing and large scale commercial fishing. Small-scale fishermen 
required no licence for fishing all year around in the public fishing areas, but were 
excluded from the fishing lots during the open fishing season. Large scale fishing 
operations were linked to fishing lots and dai lot fisheries12. The lots, which were 
normally located in the most productive fishing grounds, were allocated by the 
government. The concessionaires had authority to operate the lot for, normally, a 
two-year concession period. The lot owners were usually businessmen with power 
in terms of finance and/or connections with government. Fences around the lots 
were constructed as a massive cage for fish at the beginning of the open season 
and were removed at the end of the season. The licence holders usually employed 
guards to protect lot boundaries. The characteristics of the previous lots and 
administration of the auction system were both barriers to small-scale fishermen as 
the sizes of the lots were often too large13 and their floor prices were too high. 
Therefore, a minority of actual fishermen were part of the fishing lot system, and if 
they were, it was mainly as seasonal labourers. Most small-scale fishermen only 
operated in the less productive communal fishing areas. 
In early 2012, the fishing lots were totally abolished for at least three years with 
the purpose of fish stock replenishment and improvement in the livelihoods of 
small-scale fishermen (Royal Government of Cambodia, 2012). The management 
of the fishery is now being reconsidered in order to introduce more efficient and 
sustainable fishery regulations. It is therefore important to understand the previous 
                                               
12 Fishing lots were specific areas of land and water while dai lots were an anchoring position in a river for bagnet 
or stationary trawling, which were used for capturing fish during migration downstream. 
13 The previous lot number two in Battambang province covered an area of around 500 square kilometres 
(Allebone-webb and Clements, 2009). 
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system and potential changes that might be considered to address past failures. 
This study is designed to contribute to this by surveying the small-scale fishermen 
in the study area and assessing whether a redesigned auction system could 
address some of the conflicts observed under the previous system. In particular, 
this research focuses on the conflict related to the perceived unfair allocation of 
fishing rights to the productive fishing areas of Tonle Sap.  
4.4 METHOD AND DATA ANALYSIS 
The hypothesized management system is based on resource users choosing 
either to fish in the open access area or to purchase the exclusive right to fish in a 
fishing lot. This research therefore use a CE approach (Bennett and Adamowicz, 
2001; Hanley et al., 2001) to model fishermen’s behaviour in a hypothetical auction 
market where the fishermen can choose to bid on different lots with given 
characteristics or choose not to bid (fish in the common areas). The combinations 
of characteristics for lots were designed for small-scale fisheries as previous 
market transactions only give information on the purchase of licences for larger 
commercial fishing grounds; hence the CE approach is used to explore behaviour 
in a hypothetical auction for lots that might appeal to small-scale fishermen. 
The CE approach was developed from Lancaster’s model of consumer choice 
(Lancaster, 1966) in which individual utility derives not directly from the goods 
themselves but from the characteristics of the goods (Birol and Cox, 2007). For a 
full explanation of the theory behind the CE approach to model choice behaviour 
please refer to Lancaster (1966), McFadden, (1974; 1984), Ben-Akiva and Lerman 
(1985), Heckman and Singer (1984), and Swait (1994). 
4.4.1 Discrete choice models 
There are several statistical model specifications available for estimating 
discrete choices among a set of exclusive options based on an assumption of 
utility maximization (Davies et al., 2001; Train, 2009). The models are often 
referred to as Random Utility Models (RUM) (McFadden, 1974; 1980). Following 
this framework an individual n is faced with a choice among j alternative options. If 
Unj represents the utility of option j to individual n, j will be selected only if Unj >Uni, j 
≠ i; where i is the other alternatives. For analytical tractability, Unj is viewed as 
being divided into two components; an observable component or representative 
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utility (Vnj) and an unobservable component (εnj):  Unj = Vnj +εnj where Vnj = f(Xnj), 
and Xnj represents the characteristics of choice j, such as fish abundance and 
accessibility. The observable/deterministic component is analysable and based on 
the choice’s attributes, while the unobservable random component is not 
(Bockstael and McConnell, 1983; Train, 2009). The probability of individual n 
choosing option j can be expressed as the probability that the utility from choosing 
option j is higher than the utility from any other option: 
 
Pnj   = P (Unj > Uni ∀ j ≠ i) 
       = P ((Vnj +εnj) > (Vni +εni) ∀ j ≠ i) 
            = P ((εni - εnj) < (Vnj -Vni)) ∀j ≠ i)                                (Equation 4-1) 
 
In this study, two different discrete choice models, the conditional Logit Model 
(CLM) and the Latent Class Model (LCM), are estimated using Nlogit 4.0 (Greene, 
2007). 
4.4.1.1 Conditional logit model 
First, a conditional logit model is employed to estimate a simple choice model to 
address how the characteristics of a fishing lot affect the likelihood of purchase. All 
fishermen are assumed to hold the same preferences for the various lot attributes. 
The CLM specification assumes that the error term, εnj is distributed IID extreme 
value (Hensher et al., 2005). The CLM assumes an independence of irrelevant 
alternatives (IIA) property (Hausman and McFadden, 1984; Hensher et al., 2005; 
Train, 2009), which means that the relative probabilities of two alternatives being 
chosen are not affected by introducing or removing one of the other alternatives. 
Although CLM has some disadvantages (such as homogenous preferences and 
the IIA assumption), it provides an initial test of whether the different attributes are 
important determinants of choice.  
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In CLM, the probability of individual n choosing alternative j (Pnj) in preference to 
any other alternatives i is given as:                                          
 
  =	 	
	
⋯
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⋯
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 		                             (Equation 4-1)  
 
Where βk is the utility coefficient and Xkni is the level of attribute k for alternative i 
for fisherman n. 
Although the basic CLM does not allow for any preference heterogeneity 
between groupings of fishermen, a CLM including socio-demographic interaction 
terms allows an examination of whether different fishermen displayed different 
preferences. This is carried out by testing interaction variables between socio-
demographic characteristics and choice attributes. 
4.4.1.2  Latent class model 
LCM is used for the analysis of heterogeneity of preferences (Heckman and 
Singer, 1984; Boxall and Adamowicz, 2002; Greene and Hensher, 2003). A full 
discussion of the theory can be found in Heckman and Singer (1984). The basic 
CLM outlined above assumes homogenous preferences across respondents while 
preferences may in fact be heterogeneous, even within those socio-demographic 
distinctions which are observable to the analyst. LCM accommodates preference 
heterogeneity between latent segments of the fisherman population, while 
permitting for the number of segments to be decided endogenously by the data 
(Milon and Scrogin, 2006). This assumes that the fishermen in each segment are 
homogenous, while representing the whole sample heterogeneity by modelling 
several segments. The error terms are assumed to be distributed independently 
across segments and individuals (Swait, 1994). This means that each respondent 
has an estimated probability of belonging to a particular segment, each of which is 
characterized by segment specific utility parameters (Boxall and Adamowicz, 2002; 
Burton and Rigby, 2009).  
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In LCM, the probability that an individual n selects alternative j (	p′)	is 
characterized by:  
 
	p′ = ∑ P P                                                              (Equation 4-3) 
 
Where S is the number of segments and P represents the probability that 
individual n selects option j conditional on segment S. In LCM, the utility function 
(Equation 4-1) can be expressed as UnjS = βsXnj +εnjs. In this expression, the utility 
parameters are now segment specific and the choice probability becomes: 
 
! = ("#
#	)∑ ("#
#	)$                                                                  (Equation 4-4) 
 
In this model individual n faces a choice of one option from a finite set and k, 
%	and	)	are the segment-specific, scale and utility parameters respectively. The 
error term is assumed to be distributed independently across segments and 
individuals with a type I extreme value distribution (e.g., Jacobsen et al., 2012). By 
incorporating these assumptions, the probability of an individual’s membership of 
segment S will take the form:  
 
P = *+,(-./01)∑ *+,(-./01)/23                                                               (Equation 4-5) 
Where 4 denotes a vector of the segment specific parameters and α is a scale 
factor that is assumed to be equal to one, each respondent therefore has a 
probability of belonging to a particular segment (Boxall and Adamowicz, 2002; 
Burton and Rigby, 2009). By substituting the choice Equation 4-4 and membership 
Equation 4-5, the probability in Equation 4-3 is expressed by: 
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The choices of each individual are therefore considered independently of other 
individual’s choices, as there is no recognition of any learning from observing the 
bidding behaviour of other individuals or individual learning from repeating the 
choice experiment. The panel structure of the data set does however allow 
estimation of individual specific lot valuations (Greene, 2007). While it would be 
interesting to study bidding behaviour and estimate potential interaction between 
fishermen, this is not possible given independent data collection. Therefore, the 
small-scale fishermen are modelled as independent agents who consider their own 
fishing capability, their expectation about the return on investment, the need for 
labour and budget constraints.  
Potential explanations for the observed heterogeneity are identified in a 
separate second stage analysis investigating the relationship between socio-
demographic characteristics and membership probabilities using a binary model. 
This analysis establishes the evidence for any relationship between membership 
functions and socio-demographic characteristics.  
4.4.2 Experimental design  
Primary and secondary data from preliminary fieldwork and pilot tests were 
used to determine attributes and their levels for lot characteristics. It was very 
important to ensure that alternative attributes and their levels were meaningful to 
respondents. Several techniques were used to collect the information in order to 
generate a preliminary list of attributes such as literature reviews, focus groups, 
interviews and pilot tests. The various sources of secondary information on 
Cambodian fisheries and fishery management systems were reviewed before 
focus groups and interviews were conducted. Two focus groups and twelve face to 
face interviews were used to gather information from small-scale fishermen. Face 
to face interview is the main technique used to collect information from fishing lot 
owners (previous) and participants in the auction. The face to face interview 
provided in-depth information and clearer details on attribute selection. The focus 
groups allowed observation of the attitudes and views of fishermen on the fishery 
management system. Informal consultations have also been conducted with 
specialists and other researchers who have worked/ carried out research in Tonle 
Sap, such as staff from the Fishery Administration (FiA), an advisor to the Wildlife 
Conservation Society (WCS), an advisor to Conservation International, Cambodia 
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(CI), an exclusive director for the Fishery Action Coalition Team (FACT) and an 
advisor to FACT. 
The attributes and their levels for the choice experiment represent different 
fishing lot characteristics; fish catch, floor price, leasing period, distance from home 
to the fishing lot and conservation management plans. These attributes and their 
levels were designed based on interviews and secondary sources. Two pilots were 
carried out to ensure that the questionnaires and choice experiment design were 
appropriate for small-scale fishermen. After the first pilot an additional 
characteristic of ‘flexible finance schemes’ was added to the list of attributes. So, 
there were six attributes all together used in the choice experiments design. This 
description was consistent with the information given for the options available in 
the real auctions, except flexible finance schemes, which have not been offered in 
the real auction. The attributes and their levels are especially designed for the 
targeted respondents. For instance, (after the first pilot) hypothetical fishing lots 
were resized to be smaller than the previous actual lot sizes which resulted in 
cheaper floor prices and less requirement for hiring labourers. Also, flexible finance 
schemes were included in order to evaluate the barriers created by a lack of capital 
access; as perfect credit markets rarely exist for small-scale fisheries (Béné and 
Friend, 2011). Private loans using middlemen, private lenders or relatives seem to 
be the only options fishermen have to access credit (Turton, 2000; Kimkong, 
2007). In practise these options are usually very expensive and a flexible finance 
scheme might be attractive to poorer fishermen by postponing payment for the 
fishing licence until harvests have been sold, rather than requiring payment in 
advance on auction day. 
4.4.2.1  Attributes  
Six attributes were used to describe fishing lots: fish catch, floor price, flexible 
finance schemes, leasing period, and distance to fishing lot and conservation 
management plans. The explanations of each attribute are as follows; 
(1) Annual fish catch  
This attribute represents the ‘official record’ of average fish caught per year for 
the past years in the fishing lots.  
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(2) Floor price 
This attribute is used to illustrate the minimum amount of money that 
concessioners have to pay annually to the Cambodian government in order to get 
exclusive fishing rights. The floor price in this research referred to the initial/starting 
price which was set for bidders in the auction. The floor prices of each lot varied 
depending on FiA calculation, which was based on a calculation of annual fish 
catches from individual lots and market prices. In the actual auctions participants 
are informed of the floor price and information about each fishing lot before the 
auction day. 
(3) Flexible finance schemes  
This attribute provides schemes to assist small-scale fishermen in overcoming 
budget constraints. The flexible finance scheme provides fishermen with access to 
a flexible payment system. The annual payment can be made at the end of the 
harvesting season every year instead of paying a large deposit on auction day and 
paying the balance before the fishing season started. 
(4) Leasing period 
This attribute is defined by the number of years that a concessionaire would 
have authority over a fishing lot. This permission is only active six months every 
year for two years or ten years. The length of the leasing period is indicated in a 
contract between a concessionaire and the government. There is no study 
exploring whether two-year or ten-year leasing periods helps with conservation in 
Cambodia. The hypothesis is that a longer leasing period helps to preserve fish 
habitats. The work of Yandle (2007) found considerable evidence that the longer a 
resource user’s time horizon, the greater their incentive to manage sustainably 
because they are more confident of the long-term benefits. For example, lot 
owners may conserve flooded forests and avoid fishing gear that destroys their 
fishing grounds. Choice modelling will help establish whether the leasing period 
changes the attractiveness of the lot to fishermen.  
(5) Distance 
This attribute is used to describe the distance from a respondent’s house to the 
fishing ground. A shorter distance leads to less expenditure (e.g., lower fuel costs). 
Also, it is assumed that fishermen have more fishing expertise in the areas 
surrounding their house. Local fishing knowledge, such as searching for productive 
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fishing grounds, the direction of wind, the level of water and water flows are 
required in Tonle Sap fisheries. 
(6) Conservation management plans 
The attribute of conservation management plans explained restrictions on 
activities in fishing lots. This complied strictly with fishery law (Fisheries 
Administration, 2007). For instance, pumping water into small ponds and electro-
fishing gear were prohibited. Also nets with mesh sizes bigger than four 
centimeters are not allowed. Including this attribute allowed an investigation as to 
whether a conservation incentive is valued by the right holder. Fishing lots has 
normally been located in the productive habitats and fish nursery grounds (near 
shore/flooded forests). Conservative behaviours of right holders are assumed to 
maintain/improve fish habitats and therefore encourage fish to return to the same 
habitat for breeding. This research applied this attribute to investigate how small-
scale fishermen respond to conservation requirements. 
4.4.2.2 Levels of attributes  
The attribute levels were explained either qualitatively or quantitatively. Other 
research has shown that a large range of levels should be selected to get better 
parameter estimates and that it is statistically preferable (Hensher et al., 2005; 
ChoiceMetrics, 2012). The more levels used in choice design, the higher number 
of choice situations will be generated, while also mixing the number of attribute 
levels for different attributes may yield even higher numbers of choice situations 
(ChoiceMetrics, 2012). Different value ranges were assigned to each attribute. The 
values of each level were revised to make them more appropriate for small-scale 
fishermen after the first pilot test. Table 4-1 shows the levels for each attribute. 
There were four quantitative levels for annual fish catch and floor price. Two 
different levels were assigned for leasing period, conservation plans and flexible 
finance schemes.  
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Table 4-1 Attributes and their levels for the experiment design  
Attributes Levels 
1.Annual fish catch  5, 10, 20, 45 (Tonnes) 
2.Floor price  400, 750, 1600, 3500 (USD) 
3.Flexible finance schemes with, without 
4.Leasing period  2, 10 (years) 
5.Distance  Less than or equal to 2, 10 (Km) 
6.Conservation management plans No restriction, with conservation 
 
Remarks:  1 USD (US dollars) = 4,025 KHR (Cambodia Riels) (12 March 2011) 
   1 GBP (UK pounds) = 6,472.80 KHR (Cambodia Riels)  
1 hectare = 0.01 square kilometer = 10,000 square meters 
1 tonne = 1,000 kilograms 
 
The levels were chosen to be realistic and represent the possible values of 
fishing lots. In addition, these levels were selected to parameterise the preference 
for each attribute so as to reflect the diverse quality and size of fishing grounds. 
For example, the floor price levels were adapted from past bidding prices in 
relation to fish catch statistics. This was done by reducing the size of commercial 
fishing lots to an affordable scale for small-scale fishermen.The fish catch was also 
reduced by the same ratio as the floor price. 
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4.4.2.3 Creating choice experiment 
(1) Model specification 
There are three unlabeled alternatives consisting of two resource used options 
(V1 and V2) and one status quo (V3) as shown below: 
V1= U (lot A)    = β2*FISH_CATCH + β3*FLOOR_PRICE + β4* PAYMENT_SCHEME + β5* 
DISTANCE +   β6* LEASING_PERIOD + β7* CONSERVATION_PLAN 
V2= U (lot B)    = β2*FISH_CATCH + β3*FLOOR_PRICE + β4* PAYMENT_SCHEME + β5* 
DISTANCE +   β6* LEASING_PERIOD + β7* CONSERVATION_PLAN 
V3= U (no bid)     = β1 
These options were used both to create a choice experiment with Ngene 
version 1.0.2 (ChoiceMetrics, 2012) and to estimate choice parameters with Nlogit 
version 4.0 (Greene, 2007). 
(2) Generation of experimental design 
The experimental design is generated for the specific utility model above using 
the simultaneous orthogonal factorial design to detect main effects. All possibilities 
of resource use options using full factorial design could not be applied in this case 
because the design would be too large and exceed the capacity of respondents 
(ChoiceMetrics, 2012). Therefore, “a fractional factorial design”, which is a subset 
of choice situations from the full factorial, is selected as a strategy to solve this 
problem. Orthogonal design is the most well-known type of a fractional factorial 
design but there are some limitations. As such there are choice situations in which 
a certain alternative is clearly more preferred over the others. The orthogonal 
design aims to minimize correlations between attribute levels (Hensher et al., 
2005). To summarise, the orthogonal fractional factorial designs (simultaneously 
orthogonal) generate a way that the attribute levels are orthogonal. It means this 
design provides no correlations between levels of attributes within alternatives and 
across alternatives. Using the orthogonal fractional factorial design, Ngene created 
20 choice situations, which were still considered to be too many to present to a 
single respondent. “Blocking” was therefore used to split the choice situation into 
smaller design. 20 choice situations were blocked into two groups of ten choice 
sets per individual. An example of choice card is shown below (Figure 4-1) and the 
full sets of choice cards are provided in appendix A. 
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Q 2.3 Please choose ONLY ONE OPTION after considering the following three options. 
Which option would you like to choose? 
Attributes Annual 
fish catch 
(tonnes) 
Floor 
prices 
(USD/ 
year) 
A flexible 
payment 
scheme 
Leasing periods 
(years) 
Distance  
 (kms) 
A 
conservation 
management 
plan 
My 
choice 
is (tick 
only 
ONE) 
Options 
 
 
 
 
 
Option A 
 
 
With a 
flexible 
payment 
scheme 
 
2 
 
 
10 
 
No 
restrictions 
 
Catch 45 
tonnes of 
fish per 
year 
The 
minimum 
additional 
annual 
Payment is 
800 USD. 
You  have 
a flexible 
payment 
scheme 
You have 2 
years 
guarantee for 
exclusive 
fishing rights 
over the lot. 
The 
fishing 
lot is 
located 
10 km 
from 
your 
house. 
There are no 
restrictions. 
 
 
 
 
 
Option B 
 
 
 
With a 
flexible 
payment 
scheme 
 
2 
 
10 
Include a 
CONSERVATI
ON plan 
 
Catch 20 
tonnes of 
fish per 
year 
The 
minimum 
additional 
annual 
Payment is 
1,600 USD. 
You  have 
a flexible 
payment 
scheme 
You have 2 
years 
guarantee for 
exclusive 
fishing rights 
over the lot. 
The 
fishing 
lot is 
located 
10 km 
from 
your 
house. 
A 
conservation 
management 
plan needs to 
be included 
in the lot 
operation. 
Option C I do NOT want to bid or pay for any of these options.  
            
  Figure 4-1 An example of a choice card 
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4.4.2.4 Sample size  
The minimum sample depends on the statistical power needed for the model 
(Bennett and Adamowicz, 2001). Some guidelines suggest that the minimum 
sample size should be 50 (Hanley et al., 2006; Barkmann et al., 2007). Guidance 
on the appropriate sample size based on levels of attributes, number of 
alternatives per choice set and the number of choice questions per individual 
(Kanninen, 2007) is as follows: 
 
 : ≥ <==>?@                                                                                   (Equation 4-7) 
 
where, “N” is a  required sample size, “C” means levels on the biggest attribute, 
“T” denotes the total number of choice questions per individual, and “A” represents 
alternatives per card. This guideline was applied for this research and produced a 
minimum sample of 67 ((500 ∗ 4) (10 ∗ 3))⁄ 	for each of the two block designs 
applied. The minimum sample of the survey therefore was 134 (67*2).   
4.4.3 Questionnaire development and pilot tests 
Questionnaires were carefully developed and pilot tests were conducted to deal 
with challenges of conducting a survey in a developing country.  
4.4.3.1 Questionnaire development  
Questionnaires (Appendix B) comprised of 4 sections: fishery background, 
choice card presentation, follow-up questions and socio-demographic information. 
Section one consists of questions about the fishery background of the respondent 
including fishing experience, the number of fish caught and the number of boats 
and labourers. The second section gives an explanation of the attributes followed 
by a “cheap talk” script, used to reduce positive hypothetical bias. This script 
reminded respondents about their budget constraints, which has been shown to 
reduce bias in contingent valuation and choice experiment surveys (Cummings 
and Taylor, 1999; Carlsson et al., 2005; Aadland and Caplan, 2006; Hensher, 
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2010). Due to limited formal education, the short reminder version14, which 
involved reading a script that clearly highlights hypothetical bias problems, was 
used instead of the long version. Afterwards three choice cards were presented 
and respondents were asked to select only one option in each choice set. The third 
section is a series of follow-up questions that not only helped understanding 
respondents’ preferences but also assisted in checking for any problems with how 
respondents understood the questionnaire. This section included a question to 
investigate ignorance of attributes when an option from a choice card was 
selected, and questions on respondents’ attitudes towards the allocation system. 
The last section contained questions on socio-demographic information and 
individual history of fishing in Tonle Sap wetlands such as age, education level and 
household income.  
4.4.3.2 Pilot tests 
The questionnaires were piloted to test feasibility of the choice sets. Two pilot 
tests were carried out to ensure that the questionnaire was understandable and the 
attributes and their levels were meaningful to the target respondents. After the first 
pilot test, the presentation of the choice cards was improved by translating the 
choice sets to Khmer language with colour photographs. In addition, large coloured 
picture cards and less text on the choice sets were used to simplify choice 
situations for the respondents. Also, the levels of fish catches and floor prices were 
decreased and a new attribute called flexible finance schemes was added in order 
to provide more opportunity for small-scale fishermen to participate in the 
hypothetical auction. 
                                               
14 The cheap talk script is used in this study was as follows; First, I would like to remind you about your own 
household budget, at what price would your household be able to buy a fishing lot? The payment for a chosen lot 
option would be made annually and you also have other expenses. Second, keep in mind that there are 
alternative fishing grounds such as the public fishing areas. And third, please keep in mind that in the previous 
surveys we have found that people chose options that they actually would not be able or willing to purchase. For 
this reason, please imagine that your household is actually paying for the selected options. 
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4.4.4 Survey implementation 
The survey was performed in 2011 with small-scale fishing households in five 
provinces surrounding Tonle Sap Lake: Kampong Chhnang, Pursat, Kampong 
Thom, Battambang and Siem Reap. The targeted villages are shown in Figure 4-2. 
Small-scale fishermen has been targeted because this group is in the majority in 
Cambodian fisheries, but have had limited access to the most productive fishing 
grounds in the open season and have experienced barriers to their participation in 
the auction market.  
Face to face interviews were considered the best means of data collection to 
avoid any misunderstanding of the questionnaire, as the respondents were 
expected to be unfamiliar with responding to questionnaires. Highly qualified 
enumerators with a high level of responsibility and experience in working with local 
people were recruited to carry out the survey. The enumerators had to complete a 
training process before starting. The villages were selected through consultation 
with local people and fishery organizations in each province in order to achieve a 
wide distribution of levels of income, location and socio-economic conditions. The 
sample covered households who lived in floating villages, land-based villages and 
half-year flooded villages (the villages are flooded for half a year every year). The 
poorest group seemed to live in the floating villages and the better off households 
were based on land. Arrangements were made with village chiefs to introduce 
enumerators and the purpose of the surveys. Systematic sampling was used and it 
was the priority to interview the head of each household. In each village, each k’th 
household was interviewed, where k is the number of households divided by the 
number of interviews needed. The number of interviews in each village was the 
total sample size divided by the number of targeted villages After that, enumerators 
used the survey instructions (Appendix C) to introduce themselves and to ask for 
consent from participants. Information on incomes and profits were carefully 
collected using techniques that assisted the respondents in recalling past financial 
information (e.g., Rozelle, 1991). This was done by requesting respondents to 
identify sources of household income (primary and secondary sources) and the 
amount of money from each source (per fishing trip/ per month/ per season) before 
summarizing total household income. Profit information was also collected by 
calculating profits from individual costs and revenues. The enumerators assisted 
them to calculate household incomes and profits. 
- 63 - 
 
 
(A) Targeted provinces 
 
(B) Sampling Villages 
Figure 4-2 Location of sampling areas  
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4.5 RESULTS 
4.5.1 Respondents’ socio-demographic characteristic  
The data were analysed using responses from 272 households15 operating 
small-scale fisheries in Kampong Chhnang, Pursat, Kampong Thom, Battambang 
and Siem Reap. Approximately 60% of the respondents were from floating villages 
and 40% were from land-based households. Demographic information about the 
respondents is shown in Table 4-2.  
The target group has never participated in the actual auctions. Some of them 
had experience of illegal sub-leasing of fishing lots or being a labourer in a fishing 
lot. The average number of years of fishing experience in Tonle Sap was 23 years 
and the annual average fish catch was 2.1 tonnes. Approximately 34% of the 
households relied on fishing activities only, while the rest had other sources of 
income mainly from agriculture, especially aquaculture, rice and corn farming. 
Some were employed in fishing lots earning, on average, 5 USD a day16. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
15 There is no, to the authors knowledge, official information on the number of fishing households, however, 
the final census in 2008 showed that there are 13,395,682 people (10,781,655 in rural districts), and 2,841,897 
households with an average household size of 5 people in Cambodia. The provinces that surround the lake have 
a population of nearly 3 million people (30% of the country population). Approximately 50 per cent of population 
have not completed primary school education and adult literacy in rural areas was 74%. (National Institute of 
Statistics, 2008).  The number of households around Tonle Sap wetland was estimated at 219,621 households 
with a population of 1,186,192 people (Baran, 2005). The percentage of female-headed households in Cambodia 
was 29% in 2004 (Cambodia Inter-Censal Population Survey, 2004).  
 
16 There is no law setting a minimum wage in the fisheries sector.  However, the regular minimum wage for 
factory workers is 55 USD/month (October 2010 - 2014). The average wages for manufacturing workers 
and construction workers are approximately 76 and 83 USD/ month respectively (Prake (2012). 
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Table 4-2 Socio-demographic information of the respondents 
Variables Mean  S.D. Min Max 
Age (> 17 years) 41 years 10 18 65 
Gender (% male) 68%                 
Nationality (% Khmer) 91%    
Education      
- Illiterate 
38.2%    
- Barely literate but never went to 
school 12% 
   
- Primary school 
41.8%    
- Secondary school 
7.6%    
- Diploma and above 
0.4%    
Household members 6 people 2 2 13 
Annual household income USD1,776 1,416 275 10,300 
Annual profits of current fishing activities USD 679 578 45 3,750 
 
4.5.2 Respondents’ attitudes toward privatization and 
marketization of fishing licences   
Respondents’ attitudes towards the fishing lot system are shown in Table 4-3. 
The previous fishing lot system, relating to large commercial fisheries, was not 
supported by small-scale fishermen. They believed that the previous system did 
not lead to sustainable fisheries and the auction system was not the best way to 
allocate fishing licenses. 
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Table 4-3 Fishermen’s attitudes towards the allocation system 
Statements Strongly 
agree 
Agree Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Not sure 
1. The fishing lot system depletes fish 
stocks 
21.8 62.5 11.3 2.5 1.8 
2. The fishing lot system is an unfair 
allocation system 
23.6 67.3 5.1 0.4 3.6 
3. Lot owners always have conflicts with 
the fishery community and I support the 
fishery community and I believe that all lots 
should be abolished 
35.6 56.7 5.8 1.1 0.7 
4. Lots’ owners should be able to sub lease 
some areas 
39.3 58.2 2.2 0.4 0 
5. The fishing lot system is the best system 
because the fishery resources can be used 
in the best way 
0.7 16 64.4 9.8 9.1 
6. Fishing lot operation helps to protect bird 
species and flooded forests which are 
nursing grounds for fish 
11.3 31.6 40.4 8.7 8.0 
7. An auction system is the best way to 
allocate fishing rights 
1.1 14.2 56.4 14.9 13.5 
8. The auction system for allocating fishing 
lots in Cambodia should be improved 
26.5 45.8 5.5 0 22.2 
Unit: percentage of respondents 
 
4.5.3 Estimates of discrete choice models  
4.5.3.1 Date requirements  
The primary data from the questionnaires needed to be prepared using 
appropriate codes for Nlogit analysis. Linear specification and dummy codes were 
applied to the attributes and socio-demographic variables for Nlogit version 4.0 
(Greene, 2007) as shown in Table 4-4.  
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Table 4-4 Fishing lot attributes and their levels, socio-demographic variables, and 
model codes 
Attributes/Variables Definition Levels Coding 
Attributes    
1.Annual fish catch  The average amount of fish 
caught per year  from the 
fishing lot 
5, 10, 20, 45 
(tonnes) 
Linear specification 
2.Floor price  The minimum bidding price 
to secure exclusive fishing 
rights 
400, 750, 
1600, 3500 
(USD) 
Linear specification 
3.Flexible finance 
schemes 
The schemes provides 
fishermen access to a 
flexible payment system 
with, without Dummy: with =1, 
without =0 
4.Leasing period  The time period of authority 
over the fishing lot 
2, 10 (years) Dummy: 2 years =0,                 
10 years =1 
5.Distance  The distance from the lot 
owner’s house to the fishing 
lot 
Less than or 
equal to 2, 10 
(km) 
Dummy: Less than 
or equal to 2 km =1,     
10 km = 0 
6.Conservation 
management plans 
Defines restrictions on 
activities in the fishing lots 
No restriction, 
with 
conservation 
Dummy: no 
restriction= 0, with 
conservation=1 
Other variables    
7.Age (years) Age of the respondent  Linear specification 
8.Income (USD) Household income per year   Linear specification 
9. Education Education level of the 
respondent 
 Dummy: illiterate 
and barely literate 
=1, otherwise =0 
10.Fishing experiences 
(years) 
The number of years the 
respondent has fished in the 
Tonle Sap wetlands 
 Linear specification 
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4.5.3.2 Results of conditional logit model  
The results of the CLM estimations revealed the important factors in 
determining the value of a fishing licence, as shown in Table 4-5. 
Table 4-5 Estimation results of discrete choice models: conditional logit and latent 
class models 
 
Variables 
    
Conditional 
Logit Model 
Conditional 
Logit Model  
with 
interactions 
Latent Class Model                       
( 2 segments) 
Seg. 1 Seg. 2 
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Fish catch  0.0531*** 0.0544*** 0.0731*** 0.0673*** 
Floor price -0.0014*** -0.0015*** -0.0049*** -0.0013*** 
Flexible finance schemes  0.6942*** 0.7782*** 1.1766*** 0.9105*** 
Leasing period 0.0053 0.0669 0.3542** 0.3850*** 
Distance 0.3657*** 0.4245*** 1.0405*** 0.4997*** 
Conservation management plans 0.0294 0.0299 -0.3160* 0.2797** 
ASC (status quo)  1.133*** 1.0937*** 1.2428*** 0.3814*** 
Floor price*age  -0.00001**   
Floor price*income  0.000001***   
Floor price*education  -0.0006***   
Floor price*fishing experience  0.00003**   
Flexible schemes*income  0.000001***   
Flexible schemes*fishing experience  -0.0173**   
Average probability of segment 
membership 
  0.59*** 0.41*** 
Log likelihood -1997.0 -1925.1 -1592.2  
Pseudo R-square 0.251 0.278 0.467  
Number of observations 2720 2720 2720  
Number of individuals 272  272 272  
*,**,*** indicate  statistical significance at  5%, 1% and 0.1% respectively 
The results of both the CLM and the CLM with interactions show that the signs 
of the estimates are in line with expectations for all models. For example, the 
results show a positive relationship between the value of the licence and the 
expected fish catch, presence of a flexible payment scheme, length of leasing 
period and distance to the fishing lot. This means that the respondents preferred 
lots that had a high rate of fish catch, where the fishing rights were secured for a 
longer period, provided them access to flexible payment schemes, and was close 
to their houses. Unsurprisingly, negative values are associated with the floor price 
attribute. The relatively high model fit indicators (pseudo-R2) suggest that the 
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variables might reasonably describe the choices made by fishermen in the Tonle 
Sap wetlands in an auction of this type.  
For the model with interactions, richer fishermen were more willing to spend 
money on buying fishing lots than poorer fishermen, and older fishermen were less 
interested in investing in fishing lots. Illiterate fishermen were less likely to 
participate in an auction system than educated fishermen. However, fishermen 
who had more experience in the industry were more interested in participating in 
the auctions, possibly because they trusted that they were capable of making the 
investment pay. But the flexible payment schemes were not as attractive to them 
as they were to fishermen who had less experience. Surprisingly, the flexible 
finance schemes were not as attractive to poorer fishermen as to richer fishermen. 
4.5.3.3  IIA test 
The assumption of independence from IIA was tested (Hausman and 
McFadden, 1984). CLM may be biased if the IIA assumption is violated and in such 
cases a more advanced model is needed. For this specification test, first the model 
with all choices is estimated. Then, the model with a restricted set of alternatives 
and the same model specification is estimated (Greene, 2007). The results of the 
IIA test in Table 4-6 show that the basic CLM is inappropriate for analysis of the 
data because the IIA assumption is violated and a more advanced model is 
needed. Nevertheless, the conditional logit models (with/without interactions) offer 
a guideline in order to select an appropriate advanced model. The results of both 
models led to the choice of a latent class model for advanced analysis because it 
does not include the IIA property and it can represent proper heterogeneity of 
preferences.  
Table 4-6 Test of independence of irrelevant alternatives 
Alternative dropped X2 D.o.f Probability 
Lot A 38.89 6 0.000001 
Lot B 26.76 6 0.000161 
No bid 137.46 6 0.000000 
D.o.f means degree of freedom and x2 represents chi-square test 
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4.5.3.4 Latent class model  
This model allows choice behaviour and segmentation of groups of fishermen to 
be described simultaneously. Choosing the number of segments is an iterative 
process that can be subjective, therefore latent segment models were estimated 
over 2, 3, 4, and 5 segments to select the most appropriate number of segments, 
using the minimum Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), the minimum Bayesian 
Information Criterion (BIC) (Swait, 1994) and McFadden’s Pseudo R2 statistics to 
guide the choice (Table 4-7). However, there is no fixed rule for determining the 
number of segments (Boxall and Adamowicz, 2002).  
Table 4-7 Statistical model selection criteria for the latent class model 
Discrete choice models Log 
likelihood 
Function 
Pseudo-R
2
 AIC BIC 
Conditional Logit Model -1997.03 0.251 1.47 1.48 
Conditional Logit Model with 
interaction 
-1925.14 0.278 1.42 1.45 
Latent Class Model - 2 segments -1592.23 0.467 1.18 1.21 
Latent Class Model - 3 segments -1385.08 0.536 1.04 1.09 
Latent Class Model - 4 segments - - - - 
Latent Class Model - 5 segments -1339.31 0.552 1.01 1.10 
All models based on sample size of 272 individuals, 4-segment latent class model failed to converge 
LCMs showed better performance over the standard CLM with a higher level of 
predictive capability (Pseudo-R2). The 2-segment LCM was chosen as the most 
appropriate model for further analysis. Statistically, the 5-segment LCM offered a 
better model than the 2-segment model in terms of the Pseudo R2, AIC and BIC 
test statistics. However, it contained a segment with very few members (around 
two per cent). Considering the modest size of the data set, this segment was 
considered to represent too few respondents to justify selection of the model for 
further analysis. The 3-segment LCM did offer a statistically superior model 
specification to the CLM and the 2-segment model but had several statistically 
insignificant attributes and therefore limited interpretable explanation of segments.  
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It can also be concluded that the empirical data did not support a three segment 
specification. The results of the 2-segment LCM offered a significant improvement 
over the standard CLM model (with Pseudo-R2 of 0.47) and all parameters were 
highly significant and their signs defined two distinct groups of fishermen (Table 
4-5). This was further supported from kernel density estimation showing a bimodal 
distribution of valuations of the lot attributes (see Figure 4-4). Both the 2-segment 
model and the 3-segment model (see appendix D) showed a bimodal distribution 
of valuations. Therefore it was concluded that the 3-segment model did not provide 
much additional information about the likely bidding behaviour in the fishing 
community.  
Segment one consisted of respondents who viewed the existence of a 
conservation management plan as a reduction in the value of a fishing lot, while 
respondents in the second segment regarded such lots as higher value, 
presumably believing them to be more productive in the long run. The coefficient of 
the attribute representing flexible finance schemes was highly significant for both 
segments, but highest values were revealed for segment two (Table 4-5). The 
majority of respondents were more likely to be in the first segment, with around 
two-fifths in the second segment. 
4.5.4 Socio-demographics of segment membership 
To understand the socio-demographic characteristics potentially underpinning 
bidding behaviour, the relationships between the probability of segment 
membership and all socio-demographic variables were estimated using a binary 
logistic model predicting segment membership of segment one. Income was the 
only socio-demographic variable which could be shown to distinguish fishermen 
between the two segments to some extent, as shown in Table 4-8.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 72 - 
 
Table 4-8 Socio-demographics of segment membership (predicting segment 1) 
Variables Coefficient P-Value Mean 
Constant 0.30848 0.570 - 
Age 0.01548 0.210 40.87 
Education 0.30491 0.236 0.49 
Income -0.00036 0.038 1,757.87 
Profit -0.00030 0.453 669.12 
Note: This calculation used segment two as the baseline for the prediction to socio-
demographic of segments one (with codes 1 for segment one and code 0 for segment two) 
 
This means that the odds of a fisherman being in segment one relative to 
segment two decreases 4% for an increase in income by 100 USD. The 
relationship is fairly weak, but does suggest that the fishermen who reported a 
higher income level were more likely to be members of segment two. 
4.5.5 Estimation of willingness to pay 
In discrete choice modelling, it is a common objective to measure the amount of 
money that individuals are willing to forfeit in order to gain some benefits. 
Willingness to pay (WTP) is measured as the ratio of two significant parameter 
estimates, holding all others constant (Hensher et al., 2005). Estimation of WTP in 
US dollars was determined by calculating the marginal rate of substitution between 
the changes in the fishing lot attributes and the marginal utility of income which 
was represented by the parameter/coefficient of the floor price attribute multiplied 
by minus one (Birol and Cox, 2007).  
 
H?I = −( 
KLLMNOLP
QRSSM	TMUP)                                                                    (Equation 4-8) 
 
The WTP for each attribute is reported in Table 4-9 and kernel density 
estimates for empirical WTP are plotted in Figure 4-4 and Figure 4-5. 
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Table 4-9 Marginal Willingness to Pay for fishing lot attributes (USD) 
Variables CLMs     
CLMs               
with interactions 
LCMs      (2 segments) 
Segment 1 Segment2 
Fish catch 38 36 15 52 
Flexible finance schemes 496 519 240 700 
Leasing period - - 72 296 
Distance 261 283 212 384 
Conservation management 
plans 
- - -64 215 
ASC 809 729 254 293 
 
The respondents in segment two of the LCM had the highest marginal WTP 
overall and showed more interest in bidding for fishing lots. The marginal value of 
increasing fish catches was low compared to the market price of fish, which was 
variable depending on the fish species but in general was approximately one USD 
per kilogram. This may be expected as small-scale fishermen still have the option 
of fishing in the public fishing zone and fishing expenditures also need to be taken 
into account. In addition, the WTP might not correspond with the real market price 
in an auction because the floor price (which was used to calculate the WTP) 
represented the starting price in the auction (not the final price). Consequently, the 
calculated WTP in this study is expected to be lower than bidding values in the real 
market. However, the WTP can be used to provide information about which group 
of fishermen will bid in the auction and what characteristics of fishing lots they 
would prefer. The results indicate that the members of segment two would outbid 
members of segment one if an auction system was designed with the attributes 
tested in this research, independent of the combination of characteristics of the 
fishing lots. This corresponds with the kernel density estimates of individual WTP 
which separated two groups of respondents (Figure 4-4 and Figure 4-5). This 
result is illustrated for a specific fishing lot (Figure 4-3), but holds for the other 
possible lot specifications.   
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Figure 4-3 Value of fishing lot (300 tonnes of fish catch, no flexible finance 
scheme, 10-year leasing period, 2 km from home and with conservation plans) 
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(a) Value of Annual fish catch 
 
 
(b) Value of Flexible finance schemes 
 
 
(c) Value of Leasing period 
Figure 4-4 Kernel density estimates from the 2-segment Latent Class Model for 
fish catch, flexible finance schemes, and leasing period 
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(d) Value of Distance 
 
(e) Value of Conservation management plans 
 
 
(f) Value of Status Quo 
Figure 4-5 Kernel density estimates from the 2-segment Latent  Class Model for 
distance, conservation plans and status quo 
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4.6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS  
The CE approach was employed in this study in order to improve the 
understanding of fisherman behaviour in an auction. As suggested by the analysis, 
the CE design has captured key aspects of the factors determining interest and 
participation in an auction-based management system. The majority of 
respondents seemed to understand the questionnaire and had sufficient 
information about management context to make consistent choices in the 
experiment. The latent class model specification with two segments represented a 
good portrayal of the preferences in the study area and showed support for the 
existence of heterogeneous preferences. The model was preferred over the basic 
conditional logit model and the conditional logit model with interactions. 
Nevertheless, the conditional logit models (with/without interactions) provided 
useful information about key drivers of purchasing behavior in an auction market 
and the source of varying preferences across fishermen. This chapter has made 
the following contributions; 
4.6.1 Policy implications 
Acquiring a better understanding of the purchasing behaviours of small-scale 
fishermen in an auction market and sources of heterogeneity could help fishery 
managers to make adjustments to the fishery management system. For instance, 
they could offer different combinations of fishing lots’ characteristics to different 
groups of small-scale fishing households. The latent class model revealed that all 
attributes significantly influence the utility of purchasing fishing lots. Depending on 
the combinations of characteristics and price of the lots, fishing lots are likely to be 
very attractive to small-scale fishermen. However, the analysis suggests that a 
number of small-scale fishermen will continue not to purchase access rights to 
fishing lots, irrespective of how fishing lots are designated. There is some evidence 
that the segment of the fishermen who will purchase access rights tends to be the 
richer segment although there is little difference between the socio-economic 
characteristics of the groups. Seemingly, therefore, an auction system is likely still 
to be criticised on equality terms because the poorest segment is still effectively 
excluded from the fishing lot system. However, the findings from this study can 
provide input to the evaluation of a redesign of the fishing lot system to benefit 
some small-scale fishermen. Restructuring the operation of the auction system in 
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order to increase participation in the system is an option that policy makers should 
take into account. A further discussion on this point is provided below. 
The model showed that the interest of fishermen to participate in auctions 
generally increased when they were provided with flexible finance. Indeed, the 
availability of such flexibility had a substantial influence on households’ willingness 
to purchase fishing lots rather than choosing only to fish in the open access fishing 
grounds. Interestingly. However, it was the richer group that was most attracted by 
such flexible finance schemes. As a result, it is likely that financial schemes as 
they are designed in this survey will be beneficial mainly to those segments of the 
population who need such support the least. Both groups of fishermen value this 
attribute higher than other lot characteristics; however investment costs are still 
likely to act as a barrier for many individuals as the cost of a fishing lot is not the 
only expenditure. Other costs, which are not funded by the finance schemes, also 
need to be considered, such as fishing gear, fences, labourers and guards.  
More support is needed to enable the poorest fishermen to engage with and 
access the auction system. Such support mechanisms could focus on assistance 
with the auction process, or support for the development of small-scale fishermen 
co-operatives that will enable them to increase their purchasing power. 
Alternatively, the problem of limited access to productive fishing grounds for small-
scale fishermen could be solved if the fishing lots system is permanently abolished. 
However, this comes with the well-known risk of over exploitation of the stock 
(Gordon, 1954; 1996; Grafton et al., 2000; Hilborn et al., 2003; Ostrom, 2008). 
Consequently, there is a need to put in place other practical management 
strategies, such as fishing gear control. Finally, the auction method could be 
replaced by a system that distributes a quota of fishing lots to communities of 
small-scale fishermen on a rotational basis. 
4.6.2 Evaluation of privatisation of property rights 
As part of the Cambodian fisheries management system, fishing lots are forms 
of both privatization and marketization mechanisms for allocating exclusive fishing 
licences. Both mechanism are mean to generate incentives for conservation and to 
increase efficiency of resource exploitation (Mansfield, 2004). The system secures 
de jure rights to fish and licence holders have an incentive to choose the 
harvesting strategy which maximises income (Acheson, 1989) and ensures future 
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benefits/income. However, in order to develop biologically and socially sustainable 
resource management it is essential to ensure security of long term property rights 
(Yandle, 2007). Yandle (2007) has shown that annual catch entitlements (ACE) 
create few incentives for management for long-term sustainability, as owners hold 
only access and withdrawal rights. Instead of long term and full owner rights to 
concessionaires, the Cambodian government only confers rights of access and 
withdrawal, as well as partial rights of management, exclusion and alienation. Such 
“incomplete property rights” are unlikely to promote conservation of fish stocks 
because they generate externalities such as fish habitat degradation (Schlager and 
Ostrom, 1992; Acheson, 2006; Yandle, 2007) by incentivising short term gains 
over long term sustainability. Interestingly, the findings from the latent class model 
showed preferences for longer leasing periods, as fishermen expressed a 
willingness to pay more annually for a longer leasing contract. It might have been 
expected that fishermen would value the fishing lots as a short term resource 
extraction opportunity; however the results suggest that fishermen also have 
longer term objectives. A possible explanation could be that fishermen have an 
interest in securing longer term fishing rights in order to avoid the uncertainty of 
future auction outcomes. This is an encouraging finding as it indicates that 
fishermen could possibly be encouraged fishermen to consider long-term profits as 
opposed to short-term resource exploitation. This could also lead to improvements 
in fish habitats as lot owners may be more willing to preserve habitats, therefore 
paving the way for fish to return to the lots in the future. Furthermore, this model 
illustrated that the segment consisting of slightly richer fishermen appeared to be 
more influenced by conservation objectives. There could therefore be a potential 
link between the characteristics of ‘private’ fishing lot owners and conservation 
behaviour which requires further empirical study.  It has been argued that even 
private property rights holders will not be incentivized to reduce degradation if 
profits earned from investment are too low, when it takes too long to appreciate 
returns, or when economic pressure and uncertainty about the potential return or 
uncertainty about resource availability are high. (Lawrence, 2000; Acheson, 2006; 
Sandberg, 2007). Further research could provide evidence as to the relative 
influence of these factors in promoting potential conservation behaviour in a fishing 
system relying on private lot owners. Ultimately, to promote appropriate incentives 
for sustainable fishing practices, a combination of property rights along with price 
signals, harvesting responsibilities (under fisheries law), adequate monitoring and 
surveillance will all be needed in this context (Grafton et al., 2006). Addressing the 
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reported high levels of corruption is also a critical priority if the functioning of the 
monitoring system is to be improved in the short term. 
4.6.3 Evaluation of marketizing fishing rights through an auction 
In the two segment latent class model, the richer group of fishermen in segment 
two expressed a higher willingness to pay for fishing privileges and was more 
positive towards investment in fishing lots/participation in the auction than the 
fishermen in segment one. This is not surprising, as other studies have also 
pointed out that poorer groups in a community face more difficulties in accessing 
and exercising property rights (Beck and Nesmith, 2001; Meinzen-Dick and 
Mwangi, 2008; Working Group on Property Rights, 2008). This is related to their 
different budgets but also to levels of education, as wealthier fishermen are likely 
to be better educated and therefore more able to handle the formal documents that 
form part of the official auction system. As suggested by observation at a previous 
auction day in the region, this is indeed the case. The provision of flexible payment 
schemes may not improve the access of poor fishermen to fishing licences unless 
the auctions are designed in such a manner as to create more interest from this 
group. This might explain why the majority of respondents believe that sub-leasing 
fishing lots from lot owners is the way they can access the rich fishing grounds 
during the fishing season.  
4.6.4 The challenges of using CE in the context of wetland 
fisheries in the developing world 
This chapter contributes to the limited literature on the application of the CE 
approach in the context of wetlands and developing countries. There are 
challenges to using CE in the context of the developing world (recommendations 
for using CE in developing countries are given in Bennett and Birol (2010)). 
Generally, only a few studies have so far applied CE for wetlands valuation and 
management (Birol et al., 2006; Milon and Scrogin, 2006; Birol and Cox, 2007), 
and even fewer in developing countries (Do and Bennett, 2009). In the mid-2000s, 
Wattage, Mardle and Pascoe (2005) applied CE to assess the importance of the 
United Kingdom fisheries management objectives. More recently, Agimass and 
Mekonnen (2011) used CE for valuation of fisheries and watersheds in the context 
of a developing country; Ethiopia. No published research has yet, to the authors’ 
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knowledge, employed CE for modelling fishermen’s behaviour in auction markets. 
Further research could usefully expand the scope of the survey used here to 
include a wider range of socio-demographic characteristics, such as including 
groups of previous lot owners or businessmen, using different choice designs and 
questionnaires, and including larger samples in order to get better representation. 
Understanding the preference of ‘private’ fishing lot owners for conservation 
behaviour could also be enhance as a result of further empirical study. Comparing 
the behaviours of people who used to participate in auctions (previous lot owners) 
against people who have not participated in auctions before could indeed be an 
interesting undertaking. This could potentially reveal further segments of fishermen 
which would also need to be considered in the design of a future auction-based 
system. This research has highlighted the relevance of including small-scale 
fishermen in evaluations of future management plans.  
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Chapter 5  
 
AGENT-BASED MODELLING FOR FISHERY RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT  
This chapter describes a social simulation approach called agent-based 
modelling (ABM). It introduces the literature behind ABM development and 
discusses how the simulation can be used in social sciences. Recently, ABM has 
become a popular research approach for understanding the complexity of resource 
systems under different scenarios (policies) (Railsback and Volker, 2012). This 
chapter formulates the framework for ABM to investigate how different scenarios 
(policies) might impact fishery resource systems and their utilization. The 
simulations of fisheries in a spatial context describe dynamic and complex 
interactions, i.e., the spatial distribution of fishing activity, fish reproduction and 
movement. This chapter also provides an overview of the model settings for the 
spatial analyses in Chapters 6 and 7. In addition, it outlines how fishermen and 
fishing grounds are specified in the models and identifies the parameters used to 
simulate the different scenarios analysed in subsequent chapters.  
5.1 BACKGROUND  
This study uses an ABM approach to investigate the spatial dynamics of fishery 
resources and fishermen behaviours. This bottom-up modelling approach enables 
analysis of the interdependence between fine scale processes and behaviours at 
local and larger scale patterns. It has been argued this approach allows the 
bridging of disciplines by combining similar issues that arise in two or more 
disciplines (Axelrod, 2006; Epstein, 2006a). In this context, the relevant disciplines 
are economics and biology. The focus is on understanding fishermen behaviour, 
the impact on fish stock and in turn, the fishermen’s response.  
An additional advantage to this approach is that it can be used to combine 
quantitative and qualitative methods by simulating hypothetical scenarios based on 
in-depth interviews and socio-demographic data (Nainggolan et al., 2012). For 
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example, quantitative (i.e., fish catchability and reproduction) and qualitative (i.e., 
fishermen’s property rights) assumptions can be combined in the model 
implementation (Millischer and Gascuel, 2006). This can help fill the gap between 
theory and evidence from case studies by describing the emergence of macro-
level effects or properties relying on micro-level interactions observed in case 
studies (Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005). For example, the micro-level interaction 
between fishermen’s fishing intensity results in macro-level effects on the fishing 
communities in terms of fish biomass conservation and socio-economic outcomes.  
Recently, ABM is being used in environmental management (Monticino et al., 
2007; Little et al., 2009; Worrapimphong et al., 2010; McLane et al., 2011). 
Bousquet and Le Page (2004) propose that agent-based models are useful tools to 
address the integration of social and spatial aspects, such as the complex 
dynamics of socio-ecological systems. (Touza et al., 2012). In marine fishery 
management, an agent-based model has been applied to understand competition 
and cooperation in fisheries (BenDor et al., 2009). Their research assesses the 
interactions between economic (i.e., fish harvests and economic returns) and 
ecological (i.e., multiple species interactions) systems. Furthermore, the seasonal 
and spatial pattern of fishing efforts in Danish fisheries has been modelled using 
an ABM approach (Bastardie et al., 2010). Similar to this research, Little (2009) 
modelled the effect of an individually transferable quota system of multi-species 
fisheries in Queensland. Existing explorations of agent-based models in the 
context of fisheries, therefore, suggests that ABM can be a useful tool to analyse 
complexities in such systems.  
5.2 AGENT-BASED MODELLING 
This section provides a brief introduction to social simulation and ABM. A full 
description of ABM concepts can be found in Wooldridge (2009) and Paredes and 
Iglesias (2008).  
5.2.1 Social simulation 
Simulation is a particular type of modelling that has become a popular method 
in the social sciences for understanding the complexity of social systems. It is a 
simplified representation of a specific aspect of the system of interest. The model 
simplifies the complexities of the social phenomena (e.g., social dilemmas in 
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relation to common pool resource utilisation) and complex dynamics of the 
environment (e.g., resource mobility and reproduction) by using a few sub-models 
and linking their behaviour in the model of the whole system. This approach makes 
it more understandable and transparent to users how the overall model outcome 
relates to individual sub-components and assumptions made about the behavior of 
the individuals (e.g., fishermen) and the dynamics of their environment (e.g., the 
biology of the resource).  
Alternatively, statistical/mathematical models have been used in social science 
to gain insight into management of environmental problems. However, such 
models are often based on aggregate relationships between variables, ignoring 
individual heterogeneity of fishermen and the spatial heterogeneity of the 
environment. Therefore, mathematical models may be more appropriate for 
analysis of simple systems (Law and Kelton, 2000). Social phenomena often 
involve nonlinear processes that are difficult to predict using a single equation for 
the entire system.  
It has been observed that the occurrences of complex behavior in real systems 
can be emulated by aggregation of comparatively simple actions (Simon, 1996). 
Therefore, simulation can be an effective technique to study nonlinear and 
complex behaviours by building the model from a set of simple relationships that 
generate complex behaviours when combined.  
Rational choice theory has been the dominant paradigm for modelling social 
science processes (Axelrod, 2005). Human behaviour is complex, thus 
assumptions about rational behaviour are often imposed for modelling tractability. 
In reality humans make decisions using a variety of approaches and adaptive 
rather than fully optimal behaviour may be more realistic (Nielsen, 2012). 
Furthermore, humans often have a variety of objectives so two agents might both 
be “rational” yet behave in different ways. Simulations modelling a range of 
individuals might therefore be better suited to simulating real system dynamics. 
The adaptive behavior can be applied to multiple levels such as the individual level 
(through learning processes) or population level (through survival of different 
individuals) (Axelrod, 2005).  
The use of computer simulation in social sciences began in the early 1960s; 
however, computer simulation started to be widely used for understanding social 
sciences in the 1990s (Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005). During that time many 
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computer simulation models were developed, such as spatial interaction modelling, 
microsimulation and cellular automata. Spatial interaction modelling is used for a 
flow analysis between various origins and destinations, i.e., the distance or time 
taken from the origin to the destination. The flows often represent migration, 
recreation or travel (Fotheringham and O'Kelly, 1989). Small-scale components, 
such as individual households, and heterogeneous behaviours of individuals are 
not incorporated in these applications. Microsimulation is based on large samples 
of populations of individual units (households, firms, individuals) by disaggregating 
data to the individual level (Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005). This approach will not 
been used in this study as very limited data are available at both aggregate and 
individual level for the study site. Cellular automata is used to comprehend the 
properties of large aggregates of matter in mathematics, physics, chemistry and 
many other areas of science. Predicting global behaviours from local 
configurations can be explored in cellular automata; however, adding new 
interactions or features creates structural instability (Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005). 
The lack of agents in this framework also makes it less useful to social science 
applications. Although there are many types of simulation, agent-based models are 
important in the social sciences. An agent-based model is a model based on 
individual agent behavior and interaction between agents. This means that agents 
are autonomous and not directed by higher level rules. The emergent properties 
are stable macro-level patterns arising from local interaction of agents (Axelrod, 
1997; 2005). Agent-based models are therefore referred to as a bottom-up 
modelling approach as opposed to a top-down approach. Agent-based models will 
be discussed in more detail below (section 5.2.2). 
Three specific features are important in any simulation (Axelrod, 2005). Firstly, 
the simulation programme should aim at internal validity, usability and extendibility. 
Internal validity means that the model itself is correctly implemented. The goal of 
usability and extendibility is to give other researchers and future users 
explanations and interpretations enabling them to adjust the model accordingly. 
Secondly, the ability to reconstruct results either by re-running models or 
generating more data for analysis is an important feature in social simulations. For 
example, if the data generated are insufficient, researchers can easily run the 
model again by increasing the number of runs or altering parameters to produce 
new scenarios. Finally, documenting model specifications is essential for 
advancing the work on social simulations. As outcomes are sensitive to model 
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specifications, users would be unable to replicate the model without a fully detailed 
model description. Emphasis on common formats for documentation is therefore 
an important development in the field (Railsback and Volker, 2012).  
5.2.2 Agent-based modelling 
An agent-based model was first developed by Axelrod and Hamilton (1981). 
Initially, ABM was used to model animal behavior such as the behavior of bumble 
bees (Hogeweg and Hesper, 1983). In early social science applications, ABM was 
mainly used in economics and sociology. For example, Raberto et al. (2001) used 
ABM to simulate the dynamics of financial markets using basic trading rules. ABM 
also provides a unique approach to understanding social interaction by 
emphasizing the heterogeneity of individuals and describing how individuals 
interact as well as the consequences of such interactions (Epstein, 2006a).   
ABM commences with assumptions of autonomous agents (i.e., decision 
makers) and their environment. The agents can be individuals or social groups 
such as households, agencies, communities or nations. The model can create 
agents with individual characteristics and investigate effects on group dynamics 
from individual behaviour.  
It is relatively straightforward to capture social communications and complex 
physical environments using an agent-based model compared to using 
mathematical models (Axtell, 2000). At this point it is unmanageable to use pure 
mathematical methods to identify the dynamics of competitive interactions between 
multiple heterogeneous agents (Axelrod, 1997; Epstein, 2006b). Agent-based 
models can be flexible enough to capture dissimilar groups with the same model 
specifications (Brantingham and Brantingham, 2004). For example, two different 
groups of fishermen characterized by different economic characteristics can still be 
modelled using the same set of rules. 
Despite the advantages mentioned earlier, there are some disadvantages to 
using ABM in the social sciences. For example, complex psychology and 
seemingly irrational behaviours can be difficult to capture in a model (Bonabeau, 
2002). Furthermore, a small inaccuracy in one sub-component of the model can 
result in complex interactions in other sub-components. This can lead to 
exaggeration of the interpretation of the interdependencies in the systems.  
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While it has been noted that macro behaviours can emerge from micro actions, 
society (macro level) and individuals (micro level) effect each other in both 
directions, not predominantly from micro to macro (O'Sullivan and Haklay, 2000). 
This aspect is not sufficiently captured in most ABM applications. Furthermore, 
while it is argued that ABM can offer an improvement to modelling human 
behavior, the extent a model can characterise an agent with bounded information 
and bounded computing capacity is limited (Axelrod, 2005; Epstein, 2006a). 
Grüne-Yanoff (2009) claims that agent-based models can only partially explain a 
social phenomenon, and will never be able to provide causality or a complete 
explanation. Grüne-Yanoff (2011) argues that decision makers may not fully 
appreciate the uncertainty related to model assumptions when the agent-based 
model is developed from a small number of cases. However, this problem is not 
specific to ABM applications. In decision-making processes, information from a 
variety of sources and different approaches should be considered. While 
O'Sullivan and Haklay (2000) raise the issue of the individualist bias in agent-
based models, the same paper also suggests solutions for constructing an agent-
based model in order to deal with this specific issue. 
Researchers have developed a classification of agent attributes or 
characteristics that can be used to specify agents in particular model 
developments (O'Sullivan and Haklay, 2000; Epstein, 2006a). The following agent 
characteristics have been used: 
Autonomy and self-direction: Agents are independent in their own environment 
i.e., not under direct control by a top-down or central controller. This characteristic 
is appropriate when modelling human society. An individual agent can interact with 
others and its environment with the ability to understand its circumstances (Macal 
and North, 2010). An agent responds by using probabilistic rules to determine its 
behavior in the next time step, based on its own characteristics, other agents and 
its environment.  
Heterogeneity: Either agent populations are heterogeneous or they can be 
aggregated into a few homogeneous groups. Individuals can be different 
genetically, culturally and socially. The agent’s preferences can be adapted and 
changed over time. For example, fishermen in this thesis have different wealth and 
fishing capacities. 
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Reactivity and proactivity: Agents engage in goal-directed behavior. Also, 
agents can perceive and respond to changes in their environment. The responses 
can be proactive and indicate the direction of their goal-orientated behavior 
(Wooldridge and Jennings, 1995). In this thesis, the goal of fishermen’s behavior is 
profits. Fishermen recognize qualities of fishing grounds and can observe the 
extent to which other fishermen are successful. 
Explicit space and local interaction: In this thesis, the explicit space is fishing 
grounds. The interactions of an agent and its neighbours are controlled by their 
location.  
Bounded rationality: Agent actions are performed with limited perception 
(bounded rationality) of their environments and other agents. Thus, the agents 
interact locally because they use simple rules based on local information (Epstein, 
2006a). Their choices are therefore not perfectly optimal (Castle and Crooks, 
2006).  
For the model design, some agent attributes are important to consider. In 
computational processes, human intelligence is never included in the model 
(Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005), rather the agents are specified in a simplified manner 
by the analyst according to the research requirements. The agent’s action is based 
on their knowledge and belief. If they have incorrect information, they will have 
incomplete knowledge. 
ABM has the potential to be a powerful scientific tool to represent spatial 
distributions of heterogeneous autonomous agents with bounded information and 
capacity to interact locally (Epstein, 2006a). Although fishermen cannot be 
perfectly modelled as humans, the agent-based model has the capacity to simulate 
fishermen with differing perspectives of fishing opportunities and heterogeneous 
fishing capacities. Furthermore, ABM is suitable for modelling complex system 
dynamics which is relatively difficult to capture using traditional mathematical 
modelling. 
5.2.3 NetLogo Modelling Language 
There are many ABM platforms such as Cormas (CIRAD, 2012), RePast 
(Argonne National Laboratory, 2013), DIMA (Guessoum, 2000) and NetLogo 
(Wilensky, 1999). NetLogo was selected for this research because it is appropriate 
for complex and dynamic system analysis. It is widely used (Wilensky, 1999) 
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because it is free, user-friendly and advanced enough for many research fields 
(Papert, 1980; Wilensky and Novak, 2010). It is a good medium to use when 
building multi-agent models that are simple to specify and fast to simulate (Gilbert 
and Troitzsch, 2005). In addition, NetLogo includes a graphical user interface 
(GUI) that allows the researcher to monitor agents and create graphic illustrations 
of the results. The model code is integrated with a software tool called 
BehaviorSpace, enabling researchers to run the model under different parameter 
settings. This tool also records the results of each performance of the model 
(Wilensky, 1999). Due to the above-mentioned qualities, NetLogo facilitates 
sharing between model developers and users thus encouraging the development 
of models for specific policy advice. 
NetLogo can be used to analyse the dynamics of complex fisheries that include 
many interacting components. The programme outcomes present changes in the 
states of the fishery system over time through a discrete sequence of clock ticks. 
The same set of rules can be applied to execute all agents (called “turtles” in 
NetLogo) at each time interval (called “clock tick”) while collective behaviours will 
not be repetitive because the turtles have different internal properties (i.e., 
catchability coefficient and wealth) and are positioned in different environments 
(i.e., locations in the wetlands defined by habitat properties and fishing 
regulations). 
5.3 THE RATIONALE FOR DEVELOPING A SPATIAL ANALYSIS 
Spatial analyses are required to develop the spatial model framework used in 
the previous chapter. According to the literature reviewed above, an ABM 
framework is considered a suitable approach to understand the complexity of 
fishery management, including property rights regimes.  
The ABM approach is well suited to capture the nature of fisheries involving 
heterogeneous autonomous fishermen, different fishing regulations, such as 
various fishing zones and seasonal or area closures, and various types of fish 
habitats and fishing grounds. Given the above classifications, the agents 
(fishermen) in the agent-based model are heterogeneous and autonomous 
because they can autonomously react to different fishing grounds and can 
exchange information with other agents. The artificial fishermen in the model 
capture important aspects of real world fishermen. As shown in the previous 
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chapter real world fishermen can have heterogeneous preferences and will not 
have uniform decision making regarding the selection of fishing grounds, fishing 
gear and effort. In addition, they can communicate with each other to improve their 
fishing ability. The goal of fishermen’s behaviour can be set in the agent-based 
model. Although the agents may execute the same set of rules, the individual 
behaviours will not be identical and repetitive as each agent may have different 
internal properties, may be located in different environments and may 
communicate with and learn from different fishermen. Furthermore, ABM is 
particularly suited for dealing with varying spatial contexts (environments) such as 
zonal designation of fishery management regulations including private fishing lots, 
common fishing areas and conservation areas. All of these properties can be 
captured using an agent-based model approach. Using a simplified mathematical 
model would force the researcher to exclude most aspects considered important 
for the issues addressed in this thesis. ABM provides not only a bottom-up 
evaluation of spatio-temporally defined fishery management but it also gives 
flexibility to easily add, adjust or change agents and rules in the model. Thus, the 
macrostructure of fishery dynamics can be generated from the specified micro-
level dynamics in the ABM. 
NetLogo is chosen as a platform for ABM because it is a user-friendly software 
with sufficient flexibility to address the research questions in this thesis. This 
means that the benefit of NetLogo is not only for the modeller but also for other 
researchers and stakeholders (e.g. policy makers) to discuss the scenarios or to 
suggest further extensions of the model. 
5.4 MODEL PROTOCOL 
This study uses NetLogo version 5.0.4 (Wilensky, 1999) to simulate fishing 
activities involved with different fishing zones and exclusive licenses. The principle 
of the model, Overview, Design Concepts and Details (ODD) of Gilbert and 
Troitzsch (2005) is used as an outline for the model design and documentation. A 
common model setting for ABM in this chapter is also used for Chapters 6 and 7. 
The simulation in Chapter 7 is a modified version of the model used in Chapter 6. 
The overall primary modifications are fishing fees and zonal systems. The details 
of the additional and modified settings are described in Chapter 7.  
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5.4.1 Fishery simulation 
A key challenge for modelling fishery resource management lies in the 
integration of insight into micro-level activities with evidence of cumulative macro 
phenomena emerging from those micro processes. In other words, fishermen 
make decisions or exchange information on fishing activities at the individual scale 
such as selecting fishing grounds and fishing effort. The consequences of these 
micro-level activities affect both micro-level aspects, such as the individual 
fisherman and local fish stocks, and macro-level aspects, such as other fishermen 
and fish stock distributions. The effects can accumulate and influence the whole 
ecosystem.  
In this research, the spatial simulations allow us to investigate whether 
assigning property rights to fishery resources generates pro-environmental 
behaviours of small-scale fishermen. The simulations are used to analyse the 
effects of different fishery policy scenarios. The ABM applications are divided into 
two chapters, Chapters 6 and 7. Chapter 6 presents an analysis of the 
consequences of a property rights system for fishing behaviours and sustainability 
of fish stocks. The analysis includes the spatial analysis of two different fishing 
areas, common and private. The model in Chapter 7 is further developed from 
Chapter 6 by including conservation areas. The fishermen’s behaviours in all 
fishing grounds are observed and analysed in terms of economic and biological 
sustainability. Various policy scenarios are developed and simulated. The results 
of these analyses can be used to offer alternative suggestions for fishery policy 
makers. Better understanding of the interaction and dynamics of the socio-
ecological system with respect to natural and socio-economic sustainability is 
needed in order to improve fishery sustainability. 
5.4.2 Overview of the simulation 
This model captures actions and interactions of the agents (i.e., fishermen) and 
is designed to investigate how local (micro) level actions affect the overall (macro) 
system. It incorporates mobile agents who reside both initially and through time at 
different places in the spatial landscape (fishing grounds). Fishermen can choose 
the best location available in the fishing grounds from their perspective. The 
locations/patches represent geographically located fishing grounds containing 
various levels of fish biomass and different qualities of habitats. They are 
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characterised by particular property rights rules (private and common). Private 
property patches tend to be located in good habitats. The attributes of fishermen 
comprise different wealth and fishing abilities. One time step (or one tick) of the 
model represents one year’s activities and includes different activities as shown in 
Figure 5-1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-1 Timeline of fishermen activities in one-year time period  
 
A one-year period consists of two fishing seasons, closed and open, with six 
months in each season. The first six months are a closed season. Fishermen 
select the location for fishing and communicate with other fishermen in order to 
adopt fishing strategies from the most profitable neighbour. After fish are harvested 
and sold, fish stocks reproduce. The last six months of the year is the open 
season, where fishermen must decide whether to purchase an exclusive fishing 
licence or to fish in common fishing grounds. A fisherman who buys a private 
fishing license becomes a “private” fisherman, and in the same way a fisherman 
who occupies a common fishing ground is a “common” fisherman. Boundaries of 
private patches are designed to be closed. This means that fish cannot migrate 
and other fishermen are excluded from entering the area. The simulation is run 
without incorporating demographic growth of the fishermen population. 
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5.4.3 Design concept 
The basic principle of this model is that competition among fishermen for limited 
renewable fishery resources may lead to overexploitation without fishery 
regulation. The emergent phenomenon (overexploitation) results from relations 
between fishermen and between fishermen and fish stocks; however, management 
can regulate this relationship. In order to survive in the fishing business, the 
fishermen’s goal is to make a profit. They adapt their fishing efforts by observing 
and learning from the fishermen around them. They attempt to imitate their most 
successful neighbour. This feedback mechanism can be observed through fish 
stock density, harvesting intensity and numbers of fishermen in private or common 
areas. This model is a simplified representation of the real situation with standard 
assumptions made for growth, harvesting and profit functions (Conrad and Clark, 
1987). This simple model could be further adapted to represent specific 
management contexts but an empirical parameterisation is beyond the scope of 
this research.  
5.4.4 Habitats 
Fisheries vary in quality of habitat. The most productive fishing grounds are 
usually close to mangrove or flooded forests. The simulations in this model include 
four different hypothetical habitat qualities that influence the rate of fish growth 
where better habitats have higher rates of fish reproduction. In the model the 
habitat quality is modelled as a variation in growth rate. The layout of habitats is 
shown in Figure 5-2. The lighter colour represents the better habitat in the 
simulations.  
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Figure 5-2 Layout of different habitat qualities; the lighter colour represents better 
habitats 
 
5.4.5 Property rights 
The two types of property rights are specified as patch attributes in the model in 
order to analyse the effects of property rights regimes. All fishing grounds are 
common property with free access in the first half of the year. After that, private or 
common property rights are assigned to each patch. Fishermen need an exclusive 
fishing license in order to access private patches. 
5.4.6  Dynamics of fish stocks 
The mathematical equations specifying fish stock dynamics are adapted from 
standard equations widely used in resource economics of fisheries. Further details 
can be found in Conrad and Clark (1987),Clark (1990) and Conrad (1999). 
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5.4.6.1 Fish stocks  
Fish stocks are mobile and renewable. Stock size or stock density is influenced 
by migration, harvesting and reproduction. In this study, fish biomass grows twice a 
year and the fish stock is scaled according to standard formulation used in bio-
economic models such as Touza et al. (2012). There are different levels of fish 
biomass in private and common patches due to spatial movement, harvesting and 
fish growth.	VW,Y is the amount of fish biomass in grid i at season t. The amount of 
fish biomass harvested in grid i at year t (ZW,Y) is determined by harvesting rate ([W,Y) 
and size of fish biomass in the grid (VW,Y). The harvesting rate is between zero and 
one. In this study, r is the growth rate which is determined by the habitat quality (r 
= 0.05, 0.08, 0.12, 0.24). A constant proportion (m = 0.2) of fish biomass is 
assumed to migrate from each cell. There is no data available on migration of fish 
in Cambodia, however McClanahan and Mangi (2000) assumed an emigration rate 
from marine reserves to fishing grounds of approximately 0.5. Fish can also 
immigrate from neighbouring grids (L(i)). The number of neighbourhoods (N) 
surrounding cell i can be set as four or eight cells. 
 For a common patch, the natural growth, spatial movement and harvesting 
activities are the main parameters to determine the dynamics of fish biomass in a 
focal common fishing patch as show in (Equation 5-1) 
 
,L+ −	,L 	 = 	M,L		 − ,L − ,L	,L, ],L −^,L + ^: ∑ R,LR	∈`()       (Equation 5-1) 
 
For the focal private fishing patch, the changes in fish biomass from season t to 
season t+1 is determined only by fish growth and harvesting activities. There is no 
spatial movement between the focal private patch and others because the 
boundaries are closed (Equation 5-2)  
 
,L −	,L 	= 	 M,L		 − ,L − a,L	,L, ],L																					            (Equation 5-2)  
 
- 96 - 
 
5.4.6.2 Harvesting   
The harvesting equation (h) is called the Schaefer harvest function (Schaefer, 
1957). The production function is known as catch per unit effort function (CPUE) or 
discrete time analogue of catch function. This should be proportional to the fishable 
stock (qXt). Harvest (H) is denoted as the output whereas fishing effort (E) and fish 
stock (X) are the inputs (H = f (Xt, Et)) (Conrad, 1999); 
 
],L = bc,L7 ,L
                                                                             (Equation 5-3) 
 
CPUE is relative to the stock density. The catchability coefficient or the 
efficiency of the fishing fleet, represented by (q), is a constant number greater than 
zero. The parameter α is the congestion effect which affects fishing efficiency 
when more fishermen are fishing in the same location, while β accounts for the 
fishing gear saturation coefficient (e.g., limitations of the capacity of boats or 
fishing gear). The functional form of the harvesting function is therefore general, 
but for simplicity it is assumed that α and β are equal to one in the simulations. 
Fishing effort is an important variable in this model. It is formulated based on 
adaptive behaviour which is a learned process based on accumulated experiences 
from interactions with other agents and the environment.  
5.4.7 Adaptive behaviour  
Adaptive behaviour represents behaviour that aims to achieve goals, but the 
agents are unable to derive the behaviour that is in their best interest due to the 
complexity of the management situation. Agents therefore learn from observation 
of the results when trying out different behaviours as well as the results that other 
agents achieve from their behaviour. In the fisheries, fishermen communicate and 
learn from their neighbours’ fishing strategies. By comparing their profits and their 
neighbours’ profits, fishermen try to apply the best strategy from the most profitable 
neighbour who is in a similar situation. In the model developed in this thesis a 
similar situation is that the fishermen have the same catchability coefficient (i.e., 
fishing gear). Fishermen can learn from what other fishermen are doing by 
adopting fishing effort (i.e., fishing hours, location) from their most successful 
neighbour. The decision to purchase a licence is not modelled explicitly. Chapter 4 
modelled the decision to purchase a fishing licence. In this chapter and the 
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following modelling chapters, the focus is on modelling fishing location and effort. 
In Chapter 4 data derived from choice experiments with individual fishermen was 
used and this chapter was therefore unable to derive interdependence in fishermen 
purchasing behaviour. No data exists on individual fishing effort and location, and 
the models cannot be empirically parameterised. Therefore, the model is 
developed using adaptive behaviour, a standard assumption about agent 
behaviour in ABMs. It is reasonable to assume that fishermen rely on observation 
of other fishermen both when purchasing licences and developing fishing 
strategies. In this work it has only been possible to include interaction between 
fishermen in the ABM formulation.  
 In this model, fishing ability is determined by the catchability coefficient. The 
catchability coefficient is assigned initially to each fisherman randomly, varies 
between 0.02 and 0.05, and represents the different skills or different fishing gear 
of the individual fisherman. There is only a little variation in the catchability 
coefficient. This is supported by the questionnaires conducted for this thesis, 
where the variability between individual fishermen was quite low. The initial fishing 
effort is assumed to vary in the range from 0.4 to 0.8 but is altered during the 
simulations as fishermen adopt fishing effort from the most profitable neighbour to 
optimise their business. So, in this study this process captures direct social 
interaction (communicating and learning). Fishermen also indirectly impact each 
other through their influences on fish stocks and available fishing grounds. 
5.4.8  Profits  
The payoff function is specified as fishing revenue minus fishing cost. The 
equation is shown as π = ([W,Y*1000) – (catchability coefficient* fishing effort *500). 
The fishing activity brings costs that are derived from fishing intensity which 
assumes the cost of fishing is 500 USD per unit of fishing intensity (catchability 
coefficient* fishing effort). The harvest revenue is driven by the marginal revenue 
(R), assumed to be a constant of one USD per one tonne of fish. So, income is 
1,000 USD per tonne of fish. The average selling price of fish per kilogram in Tonle 
Sap is around 1 USD (from the interviews). 
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5.4.9 Summary of model protocol 
 The model includes fish biomass dynamics and fishermen activities. Fishermen 
are goal oriented to survive and accumulate wealth. Table 5-1 summarizes the 
dynamics of the model procedures in a one-year time period.  
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Table 5-1 Summary of equations and logic behind fishermen’s decisions  
 
Activities/Timeline Common patches Private patches 
C
lo
se
d
 s
e
a
so
n
 
Search for fishing ground Max (fish stock), fishermen 
vision and closest to 
themselves 
 
Profit (Income – fishing 
cost) 
π = ([d,e*1000) – (catchability 
coefficient* fishing effort 
*500 ) 
 
Select fishing effort Max (profit) of neighbours or 
their own fishing effort 
 
Harvesting [d,e = fgd,eh Vd,e)   
Fish growth iVW,Y 	= 	jVW,Y		1 − VW,Y  
Update fish stock (from 
growth, harvests, migration) 
VW,Y −	VW,Y 	= 	jVW,Y		1 −
VW,Y − ZW,Y	VW,Y, [W,Y −
kVW,Y + lm ∑ Vn,Yn	∈o(W)         
 
Update wealth Wealth = wealth + π  
O
p
e
n
 s
e
a
so
n
 
Fee of private property 0 Fee = habitat values * 500  
Decision of selecting fishing 
grounds 
 Max (fish stock) Max (habitat) and fee  ≤ ¾ of 
wealth 
Profit  π = ([d,e*1000) – (catchability 
coefficient* fishing effort 
*500 ) 
π = ([d,e*1000) – (catchability 
coefficient* fishing effort *500 
) 
Update fish stocks VW,Y −	VW,Y 	= 	jVW,Y		1 −
VW,Y − ZW,Y	VW,Y, [W,Y −
kVW,Y + lm ∑ Vn,Yn	∈o(W)         
VW,Y −	VW,Y 	= 	jVW,Y		1 −
VW,Y − ZW,Y	VW,Y, [W,Y        
Update wealth Wealth = wealth + π Wealth = wealth + π 
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5.5 MODEL VERIFICATIONS 
There are several model verification methods when using NetLogo as a 
simulation platform. Although NetLogo is a user-friendly programme, software 
mistakes such as run-time, syntax and formulation errors are common. Simulations 
were tested several times using different techniques for debugging and verifying 
the NetLogo programme. 
5.5.1 Syntax checking  
The syntax checker, which is a part of NetLogo, helped detect and interpret 
error statements resulting from unclear code. The syntax check was frequently 
used each time a few programme lines were written.  
5.5.2 Visual and spot testing 
Visual tests were done by observing unexpected behaviours through NetLogo’s 
interface. The world display can be used to spot test both the overall programme 
and individual agents. The programme display used a simplified design such as 
different color settings to show important data and graphs. For spot test 
calculations and observations, the monitor displayed variable values for each 
individual (patch and turtle). 
5.5.3 Print statement 
NetLogo input and output primitives, such as export-output, print, show and 
write, are written to a file or display that are useful in understanding programme 
steps. Print statements are used to detect where programme errors occurred. The 
export-output was consistently used during development of the models. 
5.5.4 Stress tests 
Input data and parameters outside the normal range of value are run for stress 
or extremes tests, which are helpful in finding hidden errors under normal 
conditions. For example, fish biomass should decrease rapidly with intensive 
fishing activities but if fish biomass remains stable, this could indicate errors in the 
model specification.  
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5.5.5 Code reviews 
Peer review is a very good technique to inspect a programme. It is important 
that peers compare code to model formulation and search for logic or 
typographical errors. This can be very valuable because fresh eyes are more likely 
to find errors the developer may not notice or identify. Also, peers can provide 
feedback to ensure codes are well organised and understandable. A few peers 
helped check the pilot models. In addition, discussions with peers were helpful in 
improving the model’s settings.  
5.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter presents the arguments for the use of a social simulation 
approach, in particular ABM. It argues that ABM is appropriate in this research 
context. Specifically, ABM’s flexibility allows the simulations of dynamic and 
complex systems capable of including different characteristics of agents and 
wetland fishery. Furthermore, the chapter provides information on how agents and 
their environments are specified and the rationales behind agent behaviour. The 
model setting explains fish habitats, property rights, and the dynamics of fish in 
model landscapes. It also describes adaptive behaviour and economic returns from 
fishing activities. Each fisherman is randomly assigned wealth, a fishing-coefficient, 
and initial fishing effort. The strategy for choosing fishing effort is adaptable and 
dependent on the learning process. Fishermen adopt the fishing effort from the 
most profitable neighbour. This model description and justification helps other 
users or readers understand the model and interpret the model outputs. 
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Chapter 6  
 
THE SPATIAL ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 
REGIMES IN FISHERIES 
This chapter uses an agent-based modelling approach to understand the spatial 
dynamics of a freshwater wetland fishery. The aim of the chapter is to develop a 
tool that can be used to assess various and competing ways to improve 
management of the fishery. The interactions between fishermen, fish stock 
dynamics, and fishing regulations are particularly important components of the 
model. The first section outlines the aim of the chapter and the rationale for the 
analyses. The second section provides a literature review focusing on property 
rights debates using simulation techniques. The third section provides a 
conceptual framework of FISH model and a summary of model procedures. The 
fourth section specifies how the wetland biology and regulation is modelled and 
outlines the policy scenarios. The penultimate section presents the results of an 
evaluation of the effects of different spatial distributions of property rights. 
Furthermore, a sensitivity analysis of critical model parameters is presented. This 
is followed by a discussion and conclusion of the main findings. The result of the 
analysis shows that the indicators for fish biomass and profits are higher when 
private property rights are allocated to fishery resources. For systems combining 
private and common property rights, the main finding is that designs of fishing 
grounds with the majority of the area allocated as common property outperform 
other designs. This is mainly because a large area under common property 
benefits the largest proportion of fishermen.  
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 INTRODUCTION  6.1
The management of Tonle Sap wetlands that is described in Chapter 2, section 
2.2.4 includes the allocation of property rights on fishable areas. For fisheries 
management, the wetlands are divided into three different zones under different 
regulations based on the spatial distribution of property rights. One zone is for 
fishery conservation; the other two zones are allocated for fishing purposes. This 
chapter focuses on the fishable zones where private and common property rights 
are implemented. Findings from the choice experiments (Chapter 4) suggest a 
potential connection between conservation behaviours of fishermen and property 
rights. This has also been supported by other research (e.g., Mansfield, 2004; 
Yandle, 2007) indicating that the allocation of property rights could create 
incentives for conservation and increase efficiency of resource use. Following on 
from this work, this chapter investigates whether a private property rights approach 
can encourage sustainable fishing in the context of small-scale fisheries.  
Fishery systems are socially and ecologically complex. They involve multiple 
subsystems (such as multiple users, several regulations and the resource system) 
at different levels (e.g., individuals, groups and whole communities), and spatially 
heterogeneous fishery resources. It is therefore important to take spatial structures 
and dynamics of complex fisheries into account when assessing the implications of 
alternative spatially explicit management policies. 
A simulation approach is used to analyse the effects of the interactions between 
fishermen in the spatio-temporal dynamics of fisheries with a mix of private and 
common property fishing areas. Agent-based modelling (ABM) has been selected 
as an appropriate tool for examining the complexity of fishery dynamics. The 
rationale for selecting ABM is described in Chapter 5. Previous studies have 
simulated the effects of allocating property rights to fishermen in the form of 
harvesting quotas or individual transferable quotas (ITQs) which allocate a share of 
a total allowable catch. This approach is used to encourage fishermen to minimise 
fishing effort and maximise profits (by catching when fish prices are high) (Grafton 
et al., 2006). For example, Guyader and Thébaud (2001) modelled ITQs and 
evaluated the parameters that relate to distributional issues in the operation of 
ITQs. However, they used a static model although the analysis of fishery practices 
must consider fishery dynamics. The dynamic approach taken here builds on the 
work of Little et al. (2009) who used a spatially explicit and dynamic model to study 
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the effect of ITQs for multiple species fisheries. However, all these papers provide 
a different perspective on property rights in fishery management to that of this 
thesis. For ITQs, property rights are assigned to a quantity of fish (harvesting 
quotas), while in this thesis ownership is allocated to a fishing area with closed 
boundaries.  
The aim of this chapter is to explore how different spatial patterns of resource 
extraction rights influence the sustainability of inland fisheries. Particularly, fishery 
sustainability is evaluated according to two indicators: biology and socio-
economics. The biological indicator is measured through the level of fish biomass 
and the socio-economic indicator is measured by fishing profits and the wealth of 
the fishing society. To address this aim, the relationship between fishing intensity 
of heterogeneous fishermen and fish biomass is simulated under fishing grounds 
characterized by different habitat qualities and differential zoning of extraction 
rights. In order to reveal the effects of the allocation of property rights on the 
sustainability of the fishery, the results are compared between private and common 
property rights patches and among different policy scenarios. 
 LITERATURE REVIEW 6.2
Several researchers are using simulation techniques to address the issues of 
resource degradation and pollution. Their results have indicated that property 
rights are important for resource management. For instance, Angelsen (1999) 
explores the expansion of agriculture and deforestation using different modelling 
approaches to investigate the implications of assumptions relating to the allocation 
of property rights, labour markets and household objectives. The result shows that 
an increase in deforestation may be caused by land titling and intensification 
programmes in the agricultural sector because clearing forest land gives farmers 
property rights over the land. However, one model found that changing from 
private ownership to open access did not increase levels of deforestation; this may 
be partly because the benefits from private ownership (i.e., forest products) are not 
included in the private property simulations. This means that maintaining private 
property rights might still be important. This is supported by the work of Webster 
and Wu (1999) who show how important private property rights are for the 
reduction of urban pollution. They use a cellular automata modelling approach 
together with GIS to study the implications of alternative property rights systems on 
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the regulation of urban pollution. Their simulation develops two scenarios: with and 
without community property rights for land use. The preliminary results of both 
scenarios reveal that industrial land without property rights for land use may create 
a socially inefficient city. This is because the intensity of development ignores 
external costs and increases to a point where the marginal costs exceed marginal 
social benefits. Cellular automata models enable a large number of agents to be 
included; however, their ability to accommodate complicated designs of agents is 
low (Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005).  
Other types of simulations have also been used to study common-pool 
resources and property rights such as a system dynamics and bio-economic 
modelling. For instance, Castillo and Saysel (2005) model individual decision rules 
of resource users and their incentives for cooperation using a system dynamics 
approach. The target participants (agents) were people who relied on common-
pool resources and encountered cooperation dilemmas. This model can be used to 
define relevant factors in decision-making for resource management. A 
combination of laboratory experiments and simulation modelling has also been 
illustrated as a promising approach to examining social dilemmas related to 
common-pool resources. Nevertheless, system dynamics models cannot include 
more than one level of analysis so they are not suitable for investigating 
phenomena such as the effects of property rights on two or more variables (e.g., 
individual and societal). An agent-based model can overcome some of the 
disadvantages of system dynamics models as it can model highly complex agents 
and allow for communication between them. ABM is appropriate for analysing 
property rights issues since these issues generally involve not only different types 
of property rights but also agents with sophisticated characteristics.  
ABM has been used to address property rights issues in different contexts such 
as simulating the effects of intellectual property rights (Boisot et al., 2007). Their 
models are developed to understand the creation of new knowledge and the social 
costs relating to new knowledge in economic systems. For natural resources, 
Bowles and Choi (2002) use ABM to investigate how the collectivist attitudes of 
hunter-gatherers could persist over long time periods and how individual property 
rights change this social order. They suggest that the long-lasting social order of 
hunter-gatherers can be attributed to the presence of inter-group conflicts and to 
people who followed the traditions and second-order social punishments (in order 
to avoid violations of the norms). The model results reveal that emergence of 
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agriculture and an increase in possession can lead to the introduction of individual 
property rights. The study concludes that although past society consists of 
socialists, reduction in this typical attitude and introduction of property rights 
provide a better system of coordination among members of groups. This system is 
only possible after the insecurity of land tenure is reduced and crops and livestock 
are domesticated. 
Most of the papers investigating the effects of property rights systems or 
comparing different types of property rights show positive effects from the 
enforcement of formal ownership. However, in this paper the focus is on the 
consequences of different combinations of two types of property rights (private and 
communal) on small-scale fisheries. This emphasis is new to the literature, 
especially the simulation to investigate the spatial distribution of dynamic resource 
availability and fisherman behaviour. The analysis provides information on 
behavioural adaptation in terms of the evolution of fishing effort as a response to 
the allocation of fishing rights. This is very important in order to identify effective 
management solutions taking into account potential changes in fishery pressure as 
a result of alternative patterns of fishing rights (Hilborn, 1985; Millischer and 
Gascuel, 2006; Bastardie et al., 2010). If fishery managers understand the spatial 
pattern of harvesting pressure, they can implement specially designed 
management to better account for spatial variability in the productivity of the stock, 
the spatial variability in pressure and the mobility of the resource.  
 THE “FISH” MODEL STRUCTURE   6.3
Overall, the FISH model simulates a small-scale fisheries world. The model is 
specified to represent the small-scale fisheries in Tonle Sap wetland (described in 
Chapter 2). The model simulates interactions of fisherman behaviour in terms of 
purchasing exclusive fishing licences and harvesting in different property rights 
zones. The conceptual framework of the model is shown in Figure 6-1. Four 
different policy scenarios are simulated to analyse the effects of property rights in 
terms of the proportion of the area allocated to different property rights zones and 
their spatial patterns. The results of those scenarios are compared in terms of fish 
biomass and profit per fisherman. 
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Figure 6-1 Conceptual framework of FISH model 
 
In terms of property rights two types of fishing grounds are defined: private and 
common (or public). Each time period in the simulation equals one year, which 
comprises two seasons of fishing: closed season and open season. All fishing 
grounds are open access for all fishermen in the closed season (i.e., all are 
common fishing grounds). Some of the common fishing grounds in the closed 
season are converted to private fishing grounds in the open season. The private 
fishing grounds are usually located in better-quality habitat. The fishermen decide 
on their fishing location, either in the private or common fishing grounds, based on 
the best available fishing ground in the best habitat within a neighborhood. The 
agents are autonomous and self-directed and have the ability to learn from each 
other. The fish stock in each cell reproduces and the reproduction dynamics 
depend on harvesting rate, habitat quality and fish migration. The model is written 
in NetLogo (Wilensky, 1999) and the user interface is shown in Figure 6-2. The 
figure demonstrates an example of FISH model run over a period of 1,000 years. 
The interface consists of controllers of model variables, plots of economic and 
biological variables and the view of the fisheries world. 
Macro scale: fishing community 
 Density of fish stocks/biomass 
 Socio-economics of fishing households  
 
Micro scale: fishing grounds 
 Types of property rights 
 Habitat values 
Adaptive strategy 
 Adopted fishing 
effort 
 At neighbourhood 
scale 
Individual socio-
economic 
characteristics  
 Fishing 
skills/intuition 
 Fishing effort 
 Wealth 
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Figure 6-2 The user model interface showing the changeable parameters, output 
plots, and the emergence of the fishery at 1,000 years. Dark blue shows 
common fishing grounds; light blue represents the common fishing grounds 
in good habitats; and cyan (greenish-blue) shows the private fishing grounds. 
 
The fisheries world consists of a fishing ground of 12 x 12 cells of HABITAT that 
have FISHSTOCK in them as it allows the representation of the pattern of property 
rights and habitat qualities in Tonle Sap in a symmetric pattern. The relatively small 
number of plots ensures that the model simulations can run quickly which is 
essential during model development. This provides 144 cells of fishing grounds 
which can be rearranged to represent alternative property rights characteristics 
and variability in the habitat properties. Initially, the density of fish stock is 
randomly distributed. The two main characteristics of the fishing grounds are 
habitat quality and property rights. Four different values of habitat qualities and two 
types of property rights can be assigned to each cell. Fishermen initially have 
different WEALTH, CATCHABILITY COEFFICIENTs (e.g., fishing gear) and 
FISHING EFFORT (e.g., number of boats and fishing hours). Initially, each 
fisherman is randomly located but they can later search and move to better habitat 
in neighborhood depending on their RADIUS OF VISION (the distance they can 
see). Within each radius of vision, fishermen can select less overcrowded locations 
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where the total catchability coefficient is less than an OVERCROWDING 
THRESHOLD. The model begins with a closed season when all fishing grounds 
are open for everyone to harvest. The HARVESTING is controlled by the 
CATCHABILITY COEFFICIENT multiplied by FISHING EFFORT. Fish biomass in 
each cell is updated after the HARVESTING, GROWTH, EMIGRATION and 
IMMIGRATION processes. The quality of fish habitat and the availability of fish 
stock influence fish growth in the future. In particular, the GROWTH rate varies 
depending on HABITAT types, while the migration rate relies on NEIGHBOURS’ 
fish biomass (four or eight neighbouring cells). After harvesting in the closed 
season, fishermen can adjust their fishing strategy by learning and adopting the 
fishing effort of the most profitable fisherman from within their RADIUS OF VISION, 
and this fishing strategy is used in the next fishing season. For the open season, 
some fishing grounds are converted into private fishing areas. Fishermen have to 
decide between purchasing a fishing licence for an exclusive fishing area, or 
fishing in the common fishing grounds for free. The licence fees for private fishing 
grounds reflect the quality of fish habitat (the better the habitat, the higher the 
price). When the open season begins, fishermen search for the best habitat within 
their neighbourhood RADIUS OF VISION and check whether that cell is PRIVATE 
PROPERTY or COMMON PROPERTY. For a private fishing ground, if it is still 
available to purchase, fishermen need to have WEALTH greater or equal than 1.5 
times the licence fee to be able to purchase exclusive access. The other 
procedures in the open season are the same as the closed season, apart from the 
migration procedure. Fish in private areas cannot migrate because all boundaries 
are closed.   
 POLICY SCENARIOS 6.4
This chapter does not analyse purely common or private rights scenarios but 
focuses on the combination of both types. The policy scenarios are created from 
the combination of two main patterns of property rights allocation and two sizes of 
private fishing grounds. There are four scenarios (Figure 6-3) incorporating 
combinations of spatial pattern and share of private fishing ground. Policy scenario 
cross private dominant represents the cross pattern of a combination of 92 cells of 
private fishing grounds and 52 cells of common areas. The policy scenario scatter 
private dominant represents a scatter pattern created from a combination of 92 
cells of private fishing grounds and 52 cells of common areas. Policy scenario 
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cross common dominant represents a cross pattern of a combination of 52 cells of 
private fishing grounds and 92 cells of common areas. Policy scenario scatter 
common dominant is a scatter pattern created from a combination of 52 cells of 
private fishing grounds and 92 cells of common areas. All patterns are hypothetical 
designs. The cross pattern is adapted from the layout of fishing lots in Tonle Sap 
fisheries, while the scatter pattern is designed to analyse the impact of distributing 
private property rights over the entire wetland area. 
 
 Cross private dominant  Scatter private dominant 
Cross common dominant Scatter common dominant 
Figure 6-3 The different patterns of fishing grounds for four policy scenarios (dark 
blue shows common fishing grounds; light blue represents common fishing 
grounds in good habitats; and cyan (greenish-blue) shows private fishing 
grounds) 
 
All policy scenarios are simulated using the same default values for each run 
(Table 6-1). One hundred repetitions of each scenario are run and an average of 
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the hundred simulations is used as the final result (as there was very little variation 
between runs). 
Table 6-1 The default values of the FISH model parameters 
Parameters Default values 
Catchability coefficient Random between 0.02 and 0.05 
Fishing effort Random between 0.4 and 0.8 
Fisherman population 200  
Radius of vision 3 
Licence fee 25, 40, 60, and 120 USD 
 RESULTS 6.5
The models demonstrate how regulation of local interactions between fishermen 
and fish biomass lead to different outcomes at a macro level. The state of the 
fishery that emerged as a result of the interactions is presented in the following 
three sections. Section 6.5.1 compares the simulation outputs of private and 
common property rights. Section 6.5.2 demonstrates the effects of different 
combinations of property rights in terms of patterns and sizes of fishing grounds. 
Section 6.5.3 presents the results of the sensitivity analyses of selected 
parameters of interest. The sensitivity analysis illustrated in the chapter relates to 
the number of fishermen and their radii of vision. 
 Effects of property rights 6.5.1
This section evaluates the effects of private and common property rights using fish 
biomass and fishing profits as indicators. It compares the profits between private 
and common property fishermen and the quantity of fish biomass in private and 
common fishing grounds. For all scenarios, private property rights seem to offer 
benefits to licence holders and provide more fish in the future. The results show 
that fishermen who bought exclusive fishing licences always make higher profits 
irrespective of the policy scenarios (policy scenario cross common dominant is 
shown in Figure 6-4). In the long term, the profit trend for common property 
fishermen declines slightly, whereas the profit trend for private fishermen slightly 
increases before stabilising. At year 1,000, the profit of private fishermen is almost 
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double that of fishermen using the common fishing grounds. Fish biomass in 
private fishing grounds is also constantly higher than fish biomass in common 
property areas for all scenarios. Figure 6-5 (policy scenario cross common 
dominant) shows that fish biomass in both types of fishing grounds decreases in 
the first 500 years before stabilising. 
Figure 6-4 The dynamics of the profits of private and common property fishermen 
over the thousand years of the model run (policy scenario Cross common 
dominant) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6-5 The dynamics of fish biomass in private and common property fishing 
grounds over the thousand years of the model run (policy scenario Cross 
common dominant)  
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 Policy scenarios analysis 6.5.2
This section analyses the consequences of the combination of private and 
common property rights through the four different policy scenarios. The results are 
presented in two parts. The first considers the effects of the socio-economics of 
fishermen, analysing the relationship between wealth and fishing intensity. The 
second part considers the relationship between fish biomass and intensity of 
fishing activity. The results show that the scenarios that are dominated by common 
areas are preferred in terms of socio-economic and biological outcomes. This 
results seem to contradict the results reported in section 6.5.1 (property rights 
effects) showing the superiority of private property rights on fish biomass. 
However, section 6.5.1 evaluated private and common property rights in each year 
on their own, while this section analyses the different combinations of both types of 
property rights. In the mixed property rights systems those that have larger areas 
of common property rights produce better outcomes for both profit and fish 
biomass. This chapter shows that the evaluation of different scenarios needs to 
consider other key parameters together with the model outcomes, such as the 
number of fishermen and their radii of vision. The details are explained in section 
6.5.3. 
6.5.2.1 Socio-economic sustainability 
Scenarios where private property rights dominate contribute more to the overall 
economy of the community when the resource rents (licence fees) directly benefit 
the local economy. This is illustrated by the model results when the licence fees 
collected are included in the community economy. However, the FISH model 
scenarios reported below assume that licence fees do not directly contribute to the 
local community. The revenues from selling licences are assumed to go to the 
government. Hence, the following model results present community economies 
including only the direct income from fishing. The trends in collective wealth 
resulting from all policy scenarios significantly increase over time (Figure 6-6). This 
implies that when private property rights are dominant, it may not always provide 
the best aggregate outcome for the community even though the outcomes are 
superior for the licence holders (Figure 6-4). The scenarios in which common 
property rights dominate are a better option in terms of social and economic 
sustainability for the fishing community as a whole. To understand this, some of 
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common fishing grounds in the policy scenarios that are dominated by common 
property rights (cross common dominant and scatter common dominant) are 
located in good habitats and are adjacent to private fishing grounds that have a 
lower harvesting intensity. So the common property fishermen, who comprise the 
majority of the fishing community, directly benefit from effects of good habitat and 
spillover effects from private areas. Moreover, the common property fishermen 
have more area per person when there are more common property areas, which 
lead to less intensive fishing, i.e., reducing overfishing. 
 
 
Figure 6-6 The dynamics of the collective wealth over the thousand years of the 
model run for policy scenarios Cross private dominant, Scatter private 
dominant, Cross common dominant, and Scatter common dominant 
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Figure 6-7 shows higher profits from areas that are dominated by common 
property rights compared to areas that are predominantly private. The dynamics of 
profits are strongly linked to the quantity of fish harvested (Figure 6-8). This also 
explains why the overall accumulated wealth of the scenarios that are 
predominantly common property is higher than scenarios dominated by private 
areas. 
 
 
Figure 6-7 The dynamics of profit for a thousand-year model run under each of the 
policy scenarios Cross private dominant, Scatter private dominant, Cross 
common dominant, and Scatter common dominant 
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Figure 6-8 The dynamics of fishing intensity for a thousand-year model run under 
each of the policy scenarios Cross private dominant, Scatter private 
dominant, Cross common dominant, and Scatter common dominant 
 
The simulations of all scenarios show that the number of common property 
fishermen is always more than four times higher than the number of private 
fishermen in each year. Scenario cross private dominant and scatter private 
dominant (dominated by private property rights) can provide 92 exclusive fishing 
licences, which means a maximum of 46% of fishermen can benefit from private 
property rights. Whereas there are only 52 exclusive fishing licences allowed in 
scenarios Cross common dominant and scatter common dominant (dominated by 
common property rights). In these scenarios only 26% of fishermen can become 
licence holders. The model results in Figure 6-9 reveal that licence holders 
comprise approximately 20% and 12–15% of the total fishermen in scenarios 
dominated by private property rights and common property rights, respectively. In 
particular, there are approximately 3 fishermen per common property patch for 
policy scenarios cross private dominant and scatter private dominant, while there 
are around 1.8–1.9 fishermen per common property patch for scenarios Cross 
common dominant and scatter common dominant. The number of fishermen who 
buy fishing licences fluctuates in the first few years before becoming stable. This 
may be because of the random initial location assignment of each fisherman. 
Later, fishermen learn whether or not purchasing a fishing license is profitable and 
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the number of licenses stabilise. The percentage of fishermen who purchase 
exclusive fishing licences is lower than the maximum possible for all scenarios. 
The reason for this is fishermen have either not had sufficient wealth to purchase 
fishing licences, or private fishing grounds are further than the RADIUS OF VISION 
of those fishermen, i.e., the locations of those fishermen are not close to private 
fishing grounds. As the community is dominated by fishermen with common 
property rights fishing in communal areas, the overall outcome for the community 
is mainly a result of the outcomes for these fishermen. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6-9 The number of fishermen who purchase exclusive fishing licences 
under each of the four different policy scenarios (policy scenarios Cross private 
dominant, Scatter private dominant, Cross common dominant, and Scatter 
common dominant), n = 200 
 
6.5.2.2 Biological and ecological sustainability 
Fish biomass and fishing intensity develop over time. Figure 6-10 shows that 
the trend of fish biomass for all scenarios increases before gradually declining and 
becoming stable. Scenario scatter common dominant provides the greatest fish 
biomass. Improving the amount of fish biomass in the system leads to higher 
harvests (Figure 6-8), profits and collective wealth. In particular, when there are 
higher levels of fish biomass, the number of fish caught per unit of effort will be 
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regardless of policy scenario but that harvesting levels show considerable 
differences between scenarios.  
Figure 6-10 The dynamics of fish biomass for a thousand-year model run under 
each of the policy scenarios Cross private dominant, Scatter private 
dominant, Cross common dominant, and Scatter common dominant 
 
 
Figure 6-11 The dynamics of fishing efforts for a thousand-year model run under 
each of the policy scenarios Cross private dominant, Scatter private 
dominant, Cross common dominant, and Scatter common dominant 
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 Sensitivity analysis of the model parameters 6.5.3
This section analyses the relationships between the dynamics of fishery 
sustainability and input variables such as number of fishermen. In modelling this, 
the values of the variable of interest are changed while other variables are fixed at 
their default values (Table 6-2). Five repetitions were simulated for each 
combination of parameters to ensure that repetitive runs reveal consistent results. 
The model outputs show which variables influence fish biomass and the wealth of 
the society, and how. 
 
Table 6-2 The model range and default values of baseline parameters 
Parameters Model range Default values 
  Private property–
dominated scenario 
Common property–
dominated scenario 
Fisherman characteristics    
Fishing effort 0.4–0.8 Random 0.4-0.8 Random 0.4–0.8 
Catchability coefficient 0.02–0.05 Random 0.02–0.05 Random 0.02–0.05 
Wealth 300–600 Random 300–600 Random 300–600 
Radius of vision 1–4 3 3 
Fisherman population  1–400 200 200 
Fishing grounds    
Neighbours 4 or 8 8 8 
Habitat quality 0.05, 0.08, 0.12 
or 0.24 
0.05, 0.08, 0.12 or 0.24 0.05, 0.08, 0.12 or 0.24 
Percentage of private fishing 
grounds 
36 or 64 64 36 
 
Sensitivity analysis of the model parameters identified two that significantly 
influence the model results: the vision of the fishermen and the number of 
fishermen. 
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6.5.3.1 Radius of vision 
When fishermen have wider vision (i.e., larger radii of vision) to select fishing 
grounds, the collective wealth of the fishing community is lower (Figure 6-12). This 
can be explained as the consequence of the distribution of fishing effort. 
Fishermen use the radius of vision to search for better-quality fishing grounds. If all 
fishermen have equivalent wider vision, they all have almost similar information on 
fishing ground qualities. So, the wider vision results in higher numbers of fishermen 
competing for the same fishing grounds (i.e., the productive fishing grounds). This 
situation can reduce fish catch per unit effort, which then negatively impacts on the 
overall wealth of the community. However, when fishermen have narrow vision, 
they can only select fishing grounds close to their current location. This means that 
fishing effort is spread out over the whole area. This result is independent of the 
initial spatial allocation of fishermen. If fishermen are clumped together initially, 
they will still be dispersed after a few years even with narrow radii of vision. 
Fishermen are then able to catch more fish, even when fishing grounds are not the 
most productive, because they do not have to compete with other fishermen. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6-12 Wealth of fishing community as a function of fishermen’s radii of vision  
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6.5.3.2 Fisherman population 
The results show that the size of the fisherman population influences the 
collective wealth of the fishing community. A larger population leads to higher 
overall collective wealth (Figure 6-13) until a certain number fishermen (500), 
where collective wealth becomes stable. When the number of fishermen increases, 
more wealth is contributed to society even when profits per fisherman decrease 
because of the higher population. Figure 6-14 illustrates how overall profit reduces 
with an increase in fishermen because the amount of resource shared among them 
remains the same. In particular, when there is a smaller group of fishermen on 
private property, fishermen with common property rights are competing more over 
the common property areas. However, an increase in the number of fishermen 
does not significantly affect fish biomass (Figure 6-15). Although a smaller 
population of fishermen results in somewhat higher fish biomass, the bigger 
population of fishermen does not degrade fish biomass significantly.  
 
 
Figure 6-13 Collective wealth at year 1,000 as a function of number of fishermen 
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Figure 6-14 Mean fishing profits per fisherman at year 1,000 as a function of 
number of fishermen 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6-15 Fish biomass at year 1,000 as a function of number of fishermen 
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 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 6.6
This chapter aims to analyse the effect of different distributions of property 
rights on fisheries using an agent-based model. The model investigates the 
emergence of fishery dynamics from interactions between fishermen and fish 
stocks in private and common property fishing grounds. The FISH model gives 
reasonable projections of fishery dynamics. The simulations suggest that private 
property rights provide more security for society overall in terms of both the socio-
economics of the fishermen and the availability of fishery resources in the future. 
Even though private property rights provide the best return to fishermen, the reality 
is that it is not possible to offer all fishermen private rights. When a system that 
combines both private and common property rights over fishing grounds is 
examined, the results show that the overall benefits are higher when common 
property fishing grounds dominate. The appropriate combination of private and 
common property areas becomes important when the availability of private fishing 
grounds is limited and when not all fishermen have the money to invest in fishing 
licences. The results from the analysis of a variety of policy scenarios show that 
scenarios where common property fishing grounds dominate are the best for the 
production of fish biomass and overall community wealth.  
 Spatial effects of property rights  6.6.1
Private property rights are expected to create incentives for fish conservation 
and to improve efficiency of resource exploitation (Mansfield, 2004). This is 
supported by the findings of this research where fish biomass in private and 
common property areas in the model is compared. In each year, the areas under 
private ownership are more economically productive than areas under common 
ownership. The fishermen in privately licensed areas are able to adjust their 
harvesting strategy to maximise their income. The model results support the 
arguments of Sinclair et al. (2002) and Grafton et al. (2006) who assert that 
allocation of property rights will create resource rents and preserve fish biomass. 
The results reveal that without regulating fishing effort or fishing technology 
(modelled through the catchability coefficient), fish biomass might collapse in some 
areas. This is consistent with Grafton et al. (2006) who identify that, in addition to 
property rights, other management tools, such as price signals, harvesting 
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responsibilities (e.g., following fishery regulations) and adequate monitoring and 
surveillance may be needed to create sustainable fishing practices. 
The short period of private access rights (six months in each year) in the model 
is adapted from a past actuality where some small-scale fishermen in Tonle Sap 
illegaly sub-let a small area from lot owners (commercial fisheries) for a few 
months every year. Although this chapter is not focusing on investigating the 
consequences of long or short periods of private property rights, the model 
outcomes show a positive effect on fish biomass even when private rights are 
assigned for a short time (Figure 6-4). This result contrasts with Yandle (2007) who 
argues that security of long-term property rights is important for developing 
biologically and socially sustainable resource management. However, the key to 
improving fishery sustainability might not be the length of ownership period, but 
instead the distribution of fishing efforts. If some areas are intensively harvested, 
the sustainability of the whole fishery system might be affected too. For example, 
when only areas outside the private areas are fished intensively, the whole fishery 
system is impacted (by, for example, affecting fish reproduction and the quantity of 
fish biomass) because fish are a mobile resource. The short length of the 
ownership period in this model not only gives more opportunity for all fishermen to 
rotate rights over private fishing grounds in each year, it might also improve access 
to the productive fishing grounds among small-scale fishermen. Fishermen with 
common property rights are the first group of fishermen to lose profits if fisheries 
are overexploited and fish biomass is in decline.  
This chapter also shows that the different spatial patterns of joint private and 
common property fishing grounds results in different levels of fish biomass and 
wealth. Private areas are usually located in better-quality habitats than common 
property areas. However, the entire community benefits more when private fishing 
grounds are alternated with common fishing grounds (the scatter pattern). In the 
model simulations, the patterns are shown to be important for fish migration (from 
private areas to common property areas) but also for the ability of fishermen to 
access different fishing grounds. This might be due to underlying patterns of fish 
dispersal and quality of habitat. In particular, when private and common fishing 
grounds are alternated, common fishing grounds benefit from fish dispersal from 
private fishing grounds faster than for the other patterns because there are more 
neighbouring private fishing areas.  
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 Policy implications 6.6.2
The FISH model has been used to determine the relevant factors in decision-
making for fishery resources. Understanding spatial dynamics of fisheries and 
household economics may help to improve management of small-scale fisheries.  
Adjusting the property rights system could be a management tool used to 
improve the livelihoods of small-scale fishermen. However, the model outcomes 
also suggest that fishery regulations such as gear restrictions (i.e., controlling the 
catchability coefficient) are needed along with adjustments to the ownership 
system, as suggested by Grafton et al. (2006).  
The number of private fishing grounds should take the population of fishermen 
into account in its design. As the model outputs indicate, the scenarios that are 
dominated by common property rights result in higher fish biomass This is 
particularly the case when fishermen population is high, even though some of them 
move to private fishing grounds. However, there are still a lot of fishermen 
competing in the common fishing grounds because of the limited availability of 
fishing licences. However, when the number of fishermen is reduced (i.e., below 
the number of private fishing grounds available), the scenarios dominated by 
private property rights provide slightly higher amounts of fish biomass. This implies 
that if there is a smaller group of fishermen, the privately dominated scenarios 
contribute more to the sustainability of the fishery in terms of fish reproduction. 
However, if private fishing grounds dominate and the fishermen population is high, 
then high levels of competition exist in the common areas resulting in lower fish 
biomass. This means the population density of common fishermen on the common 
property fishing grounds considerably influences the overall dynamics of fish 
biology and the socio-economics of the community. Although, individual private 
licence holders can contribute to a higher level of wealth-creation in the 
community, the majority of community members are common property fishermen. 
So, when policy makers decide on the size of private areas or the number of 
private fishing grounds, they should also consider the size of the fisherman 
population since this will affect the overall benefits of fishing. For example, if the 
fisherman population is high, larger common property fishing areas should be 
designed.  
The price for licence fees should be considered carefully, particularly for small-
scale fisheries. The results show that licence fees influence the allocation of fishing 
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effort. A price increased does not generate greater wealth for the wider community 
and does not necessarily result in a more sustainable fishery. If the price is high, 
some common property areas are intensively harvested because more fishermen 
are excluded from buying fishing licences and so fish in the common fishing 
grounds instead. This means harvesting pressures are moved into the common 
fishing grounds reducing fish biomass for the fishery as a whole.  
 Applications of agent-based modelling in fisheries 6.6.3
This chapter contributes to the literature dealing with applications of ABM as it is 
the first agent-based model to simulate the interactions of small-scale fishermen 
under different property rights over fishery resources. Other researchers have 
applied simulation approaches to property rights in marine fisheries (Guyader and 
Thébaud, 2001; Guyader, 2002; Little et al., 2009). However, these papers explore 
the effects of ITQs for commercial marine fisheries. The resource extraction rights 
are assigned to the resource itself (i.e., fish) rather than over areas for fishing as in 
this thesis. Studies of property rights issues in the context of fisheries also usually 
use qualitative methods. For example, Ahmed et al. (2008) used Schlager and 
Ostrom (1992) concept of Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources to 
study wetland ownership in Bangladesh by surveying the villagers who live around 
the Hakaluki Haor wetlands. Their main findings indicated that villagers who have 
management rights are likely to participate in conservation activities. The Seri, a 
self-governed community of small-scale fishermen in Mexico, have ownership over 
fishing grounds and have succeeded in continuing to manage their fisheries in a 
sustainable way. They not only manage fishery resources for their members but 
also regulate rules for outsiders who want to access their fishing grounds. In 
addition, Toufique (1997) used a case study of an inland fishery in Bangladesh to 
analyse how and why a property rights regime failed to be established. However, it 
is difficult to deal with spatial and temporal research questions using qualitative 
methods such as surveys, in-depth research or case study analysis. This chapter 
provides a different perspective to the analysis of property rights issues by using a 
spatio-temporal model in the context of small-scale fisheries. This approach 
overcomes the disadvantages of non-spatial models, such as bio-economic 
models, by providing spatially dynamic outcomes. These can be useful in 
predicting spatially dynamic consequences for different policy scenarios before 
implementation. For fisheries management, it is also necessary to understand 
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spatial interactions between fishermen and the dynamics of the resource. ABM can 
handle spatio-temporal analysis of fishery resources and take into account fish 
biomass as a mobile resource. The model in this thesis has the ability to include 
heterogeneity of fishermen and fishing grounds to reflect the real world of fisheries. 
Last but not least, the combination of the flexibility of ABM and the user-friendly 
interface of NetLogo software means that policy makers and other researchers can 
use these models to test other scenarios for fisheries management and the model 
code can be developed for different purposes in the future.  
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Chapter 7  
RESERVE CREATION: EFFECTIVENESS OF ZONAL 
MANAGEMENT 
This chapter further investigates conservation management in Tonle Sap 
explored in the choice experiment analysis in Chapter 4. The small-scale 
fishermen from Tonle Sap revealed a preference for fishing grounds where 
conservation restrictions were imposed; however, improved conservation is also 
sought through zonal management. Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to explore 
the fishery dynamics of the wetland when conservation zones are included in the 
spatial agent-based model developed in Chapter 6. The first section of this chapter 
therefore introduces the rationale and aim of the chapter. The second section 
provides an overview of the literature on impacts of reserve creation on fishery 
productivity. The debate is both about whether such benefits exist and about the 
influence of various reserve designs on fishery sustainability. The third section 
presents the methods used in this chapter by outlining the model structure and 
scenarios analysed. This is followed by a results section, which shows that the 
most favourable reserve creation, in terms of economic returns to the community, 
is achieved when a fairly large area is conserved in locations where the habitat is 
sub-optimal in terms of fish productivity. Furthermore, the results show that a 
single-block reserve is superior to a fragmented reserve in terms of conservation of 
fish stocks and community economic returns. Moreover, solely in terms of the 
economic returns to the community, the results show that a fragmented reserve is 
also favourable. The last section presents the discussion and conclusions. 
7.1 INTRODUTION  
Reserve creation has been commonly used as a fisheries management tool in 
both freshwater and marine fisheries but especially for the latter. Reserves include 
marine protected areas (MPAs) and no-take zones (NTZs). The establishment of 
MPAs does not necessarily imply a complete ban of all fishing and other economic 
activities in the area but it does mean that all activities need to be under specific 
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management schemes (Hilborn et al., 2004). In this thesis, however, the 
conservation zones are defined as areas in which all types of fishing activities are 
excluded as this reflects how conservation areas are managed in Tonle Sap. The 
conservation measures aim to help maintain and enhance fish biomass and fish 
biodiversity because they eliminate fishing mortality from fishing activities inside 
the protected areas. This in turn has impacts on non-protected areas due to 
spillover of fish stocks (Ward et al., 2001). Successful conservation should lead to 
more egg production and more dispersal of fish to the fishing grounds (Roberts, 
1995). The value of the spillover effect from the reserve is not only the increase in 
fish biomass but also the increase in fish size (Russ and Alcala, 1996a; Wantiez et 
al., 1997). However, fish biomass will still be significantly greater inside than 
outside protected areas (Halpern, 2003). Fully protected marine reserves clearly 
confer benefits inside the reserves (Roberts, 2000) and may also help to increase 
harvesting levels outside the reserves in the long run. Marine biologists have 
argued that fully protected no-take reserves achieve more for sustainability than 
reserves that allow limited harvests (Roberts, 2000) (even if those limited-take 
reserves are well enforced). In particular, fish densities in the Philippines increased 
by over 800% in 11 years in the no-take Apo Island Reserve (Russ and Alcala, 
1996b), and on the Southern Cape coast in South Africa fish abundance is thirteen 
times higher within a reserve than outside (Buxton and Smale, 1989). 
Conservation areas also provide a buffer against an increase in fishing effort 
(Botsford et al., 2003) and habitat degradation. However, others argue that the 
creation of a reserve may cause degradation of fish habitats outside conservation 
areas due to increased exploitation in the non-reserve areas (Armstrong and 
Skonhoft, 2006).  
Conservation areas are also expected to reverse the decline in habitat quality 
from fishing activities inside the reserves (Ward et al., 2001). The effect on fish 
stocks of designating conservation areas may be similar to the effect of reducing 
fishing effort (Botsford et al., 2003); however, the opposite has also been argued: 
that a reduction in fishing effort will not improve fish habitats to the same extent as 
a conservation areas do because of, for example, the effects of habitat destruction 
from fishing gear (Roberts, 2000).  
However, conservation might not succeed without the support of other 
management tools such as limitation of fishing effort and capacity (Hannesson, 
1998) along with careful planning and assessment (Hilborn et al., 2004). Without a 
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reduction in fishing effort outside reserves, fish stocks can still be overexploited 
(Roberts et al., 2005). Despite the promising results from implementation of MPAs, 
they are still only used to a limited extent. Less than 10% of MPAs achieve their 
conservation aims, and their spatial extent only covers 5.2% of the marine area 
worldwide (Wood et al., 2008).  
Several pertinent questions relate to fisheries conservation: whether 
conservation is needed (e.g., Hilborn et al., 2004), where reserves should be 
located (e.g. Roberts, 2000; Roberts et al., 2003), how size impacts the effects of 
reserves (e.g. Roberts et al., 1997; Murawski et al.; Gell and Roberts, 2003; Russ 
et al., 2003) and the effects of habitat characteristics on conservation outcomes 
(Hawkins et al., 2006). Several methods have been used in studies of fisheries to 
assess the effectiveness of MPAs. These include direct observation (e.g. Roberts, 
1995), statistical analysis (e.g. Hawkins et al., 2006) dynamic modelling (e.g. 
Pelletier et al., 2008) and static bio-economic modelling (e.g. Armstrong and 
Skonhoft, 2006). This chapter addresses questions focusing on reserve sizes, 
location and habitat types because they are important for designing conservation 
strategies. However, this thesis uses a different type of modelling framework and is 
set in a different context to the existing literature. No previous research, to the best 
of the author’s knowledge, has studied the spatial and dynamic effects of 
conservation combining different property rights and conservation zones. The 
spatial model in this thesis analyses the interactions between harvesting, mobility 
of fish stocks and the fishing regulations operating on both the spatial and temporal 
dynamics of the fishery.  
In Tonle Sap, the zonal management system consists of three different zones: 
private, common property and conservation. The private and common property 
zones are fishable areas that are clearly divided by boundaries. In conservation 
zones all fishing activities are prohibited. However, based on the evidence of 
fishery and habitat degradation, previous attempts to designate conservation 
zones in the Tonle Sap wetlands do not seem to have been successful (Sneddon, 
2007; Nuorteva et al., 2010). Although licences for private fishing areas have been 
(temporarily) revoked since 2012 (Royal Government of Cambodia, 2012) (to allow 
fish replenishment by reducing fishing effort from commercial fisheries), 
redesigning and enforcing conservation areas might be a management alternative 
for improving fisheries conservation in the future, not only in Tonle Sap but 
elsewhere. It is therefore important to understand the consequences of different 
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conservation designs on fishery dynamics in general in order to maximise the 
benefits from conservation.  
The spatial patterns investigated in this chapter are adapted from the single-
large-or-several-small-reserves debate, i.e., whether reserves comprise large 
single or small fragmented blocks. The management choices of reserve location 
also involve choosing the quality of habitat in which reserves are located, i.e., 
ranging from most productive to least.  
The impacts of the design of conservation management involve multiply agents 
in space and time. Any management of fisheries will reallocate that fishery’s 
resources among different users. ABM is a useful tool for analysing the effects of 
conservation in fisheries as it can deal with their multiple heterogeneous agents 
and spatial dynamics. In this chapter, the results of model simulations in terms of 
fish stocks and the livelihoods of fishermen are analysed and compared between 
reserve designs for fisheries.  
7.2 LITERATURE: AGENT-BASED MODELLING 
Wetland conservation is often argued to be an effective management tool to 
improve degraded fisheries. Although conservation research in fisheries covers a 
range of contexts and methodologies, most focus on marine fisheries. For 
example, Batista et al. (2011) aimed to develop a methodology for evaluating the 
effectiveness of MPAs as a management tool for small-scale marine fisheries. The 
approach is based on scoring a set of indicators, which are grouped into 
ecological, economic, governance, social and management indicators, before and 
after the establishment of an MPA. The main finding from the case study suggests 
an improvement in the trend of the scores for ecological, management and 
governance indicators but a decrease in the scores of the social and some of the 
economic indicators.  
One of the popular debates during the 1970s and 1980s was about whether a 
single large or several small reserves are preferred in terms of biodiversity 
conservation (McNeill and Fairweather, 1993; Stockhausen and Lipcius, 2001; 
Tjørve, 2010). According to the theory of island biogeography (MacArthur and 
Wilson (1967), the single block is favourable in terms of species richness. 
However, Daniel Simberloff argued against this theory and presented the idea 
of nested species composition. This concludes that if small reserves have no 
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shared species, they can possibly have more species than a single large reserve 
(Simberloff and Abele, 1976; Simberloff and Abele, 1982; 1984). In natural 
seagrass beds, a large proportion of species do not overlap among beds; therefore 
a single large bed has comparatively fewer species than several small beds 
(McNeill and Fairweather, 1993).  
To optimise conservation and economic benefits it is important to identify the 
reserve size needed to distribute benefits to fishing grounds. Research by, 
amongst others, Le Quesne and Codling (2009) and Hannesson (1998) supports 
the establishment of larger reserve areas while others (Ballantine, 1995; Roberts, 
1995) highlight the achievement of even small reserve areas. Hannesson (1998) 
used deterministic (bio-economic) equilibrium models (a continuous-time model 
and a discrete-time model) to study the effects of a marine reserve under three 
different scenarios: 1) entirely open access, 2) open access to the areas outside a 
marine reserve, and 3) optimal fishing. One of the key results was that 
conservation only generates small benefits if the reserve is established without 
constraining fishing capacities and efforts. Le Quesne and Codling (2009) applied 
population dynamic models to identify the optimal conservation area in terms of 
fishery benefits. They found that conservation areas need to comprise around 70% 
to 80% of the whole fishing area to be effective. The paper suggests that the yield 
from fishing in an open-access regime can be increased by introducing an 
optimally sized protected area ranging from 5% to 97% (depending on parameter 
values and time horizon). However, in empirical research there are cases showing 
an achievement of smaller reserve sizes. For example, at Sumilon, in the 
Philippines, a reserve of around 0.4 km2 has proved effective (Russ and Alcala, 
2003) and at Saba, in the Caribbean, a reserve of around 0.9 km2 has been shown 
to have significant effects (Roberts, 1995). Ballantine (1995) suggested, from a 
case study in New Zealand, that the size of no-take reserves should be 10% of 
total areas. These studies imply that reserve size is not the only factor to affect fish 
replenishment but others, such as habitat quality and restrictions on fishing efforts, 
also have an impact.  
Better habitat quality within a reserve may significantly influence the 
conservation effect (Hawkins et al., 2006) since habitat characteristics significantly 
shape the degree of biomass production. The relationship between habitat quality 
and fisheries is particularly strong for shoreline habitats such as mangroves and 
flooded forests. For example, Nagelkerken et al. (2002) proposed that (mangrove 
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and seagrass) habitat degradation has a negative impact on Caribbean fish stocks 
(especially coral-reef fish species) because these habitats function as nursery sites 
for several reef-species juveniles. Similarly, with freshwater fisheries a positive 
relationship between fish productivity and the quality of habitat in riparian zones 
(the ecosystems between terrestrial and aquatic systems) is found. Riparian zones 
are important for aquatic ecosystems (Welcomme, 1979; Naiman and Décamps, 
1997) because they (and floodplains) supply the essential energy to the food chain 
(Junk et al., 1989) and also transfer material and nutrients to the ecosystems 
(Pusey and Arthington, 2003 for details).  
In more recent studies, economic impacts have also been addressed 
(Hannesson, 1998; Sanchirico and Wilen, 2001; Smith and Wilen, 2003; Armstrong 
and Skonhoft, 2006). For example, Armstrong and Skonhoft (2006) introduced 
asymmetrical density-dependent migration between fishery reserves and adjacent 
areas into their bio-economic model. The model examined how four different 
scenarios (maximum harvest, maximum current profit, open access and maximum 
sustainable yield) were affected by the conservation management tool. Differences 
in ecological conditions inside and outside the reserves were expected due to 
habitat exploitation and consequent degradation. The authors suggested that the 
characteristics of the dispersal of the fish would impact the results. They compared 
the simulations under symmetrical and asymmetrical dispersal and concluded that 
under symmetrical dispersal the effect of conservation interventions is jeopardised 
and thus conservation creates negative profits and lower fish stocks.  
Location of marine reserves depends more on opportunities and social criteria 
than on scientific research (Roberts, 2000). Roberts et al. (2003) argued that, 
ideally, the biological criteria should be a priority when selecting a reserve location. 
However, past examples show that socio-economic criteria have often been given 
a greater weight: a likely effect of political intervention. Although the socio-
economic context should be included in the design and implementation of the 
reserves (to facilitate support and compliance with regulations (FAO, 2007)), the 
reserve may not have the desired effect if its biological value is low (Roberts et al., 
2003).  
Several studies have investigated different fishery reserve sizes, patterns and 
habitat qualities, as mentioned above. However, few studies have focused on both 
the biological and socio-economic aspects of conservation design using a 
modelling approach. In addition, there are no published papers investigating the 
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effects of designating fishery conservation areas under combinations of private and 
common property rights zones, as is practised in Tonle Sap.  
7.3 THE “FISHCON” MODEL STRUCTURE 
The FISHCON model is developed to investigate the spatial effects of the 
creation of conservation areas for fisheries. This model is developed from the FISH 
model by including conservation areas, with no harvesting pressure, into the 
model. The model shows the consequences of interactions between fishermen and 
fish biomass in private, common-property and conservation areas. The fish 
biomass varies with harvesting, fish growth and migration. The whole area 
(fishable and non-fishable grounds) in this model is characterized by two main 
attributes: quality of fish habitat and type of fishery management zone.  
The detailed specification of the model structure can be found in Chapter 5, 
section 5.4 and Chapter 6, section 6.3. To summarise, the fishermen fish in 
different fishing grounds divided into 12 x 12 plots. One run of the model comprises 
one year split into a closed and an open season. The closed season is for the first 
six months when fish freely migrate everywhere and fishermen have free access to 
all fishing grounds except for the conservation zones (i.e., only conservation zones 
areas and common property fishing grounds exist in the closed season). The 
private fishing grounds are added when the open season begins (for the last six 
months of the year). The private fishermen have exclusive fishing rights in fenced-
off areas. Apart from the harvesting process, which is excluded in the reserve area, 
most of the processes in the FISHCON model are almost identical to the FISH 
model. The FISHCON model also uses NetLogo (Wilensky, 1999), and the user 
interface is shown in Figure 7-1. The same methods of validating the FISH model 
described in the Chapter 6 were used for FISHCON model. 
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Figure 7-1 The user-model interface showing the changeable parameters, output 
plots and the emergence of the model at time, 1,000. Dark blue shows the 
common-property fishing grounds; light blue represents the common-property 
fishing grounds in good habitats; cyan (greenish-blue) shows the private 
fishing grounds; and green represents reserves. 
Different designs of reserves are made for the different analyses. For the 
analysis of reserve sizes, the reserves are designed to cover 11%, 22%, 33%, 
44% and 55% of the total wetland. The maximum size is set at 55% of the total 
area because it seems unrealistic to have very large conservation areas for inland 
fisheries in developing countries with high densities of fishermen. The size of 
reserves depends on the number of cells that are converted from private or 
common areas to conservation areas. The scenarios are chosen to reflect the 
spatial layout in the case study and the variation in conservation sizes from other 
fisheries. E.g., in a study of marine reserves the conservation areas varied 
between 0.002 to 846 square kilometres (Halpern, 2003).  
For the analysis of the spatial pattern of the reserve design, FISHCON 
investigates the effects of four different patterns of reserves (Figure 7-2). Two of 
them (large single square and large single rectangular) depict a large area of 
conservation reserve, whilst the other two patterns (small fragmented cross and 
small fragmented line) represent several small areas of conservation reserves. The 
small fragmented cross pattern represents a concentration of reserve areas in the 
centre of the wetland with fragmented areas coming out from the centre of the 
reserve. The design of the small fragmented line pattern represents a wetland with 
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a large fragmented reserve area with no central reserve. Each design has the 
same distribution of habitat quality and similar patterns of property rights but they 
have reserves located in different patterns. This results in different combinations of 
private and common areas while the reserve area is the same (Table 7-1). This 
has to be taken into account when interpreting the effectiveness of the designs.  
Table 7-1 The areas of reserves and private and common-property fishing grounds 
for the different model patterns 
Patterns Reserves    
(cells) 
Private areas 
(cells) 
Common areas 
(cells) 
Large single square 32 39 73 
Large single rectangular 32 36 76 
Small fragmented cross 32 44 68 
Small fragmented line 32 33 79 
 
For an analysis of habitat qualities, reserves are placed in one of three qualities 
of habitats: baseline, mixed or good (Figure 7-3). Each design has a similar pattern 
of property rights and habitat quality reflecting the situation in Tonle Sap. The 
designs have the same area of reserve in different locations (Table 7-2). The 
number of patches of private and common ownership varies between the designs. 
The quality of habitats is measured by the reproduction rate of the fish biomass. 
The three scenarios have the same distribution of habitat qualities as is found in 
Tonle Sap, but the location of the conservation areas varies. For the baseline-
habitat scenario, the reserve is located in normal habitats. For the mixed-habitat 
scenario, half of the reserve area is positioned in good habitats while the other half 
is located in normal habitats. And for the good-habitat scenario, all of the reserve is 
placed in good habitats.  
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Large single square Large single rectangular17 
Small fragmented cross Small fragmented line 
Figure 7-2 Four different patterns of reserves. Dark blue shows common-
property fishing grounds; light blue represents the common-property fishing 
grounds in good habitats; cyan (greenish-blue) shows the private fishing grounds; 
and green represents reserves. 
 
                                               
17 The green areas (above and below) are specified as a continuous area in the 
model.  
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Baseline-habitat scenario 
Mixed-habitat scenario 
Good-habitat scenario 
Figure 7-3 Three different allocation scenarios of reserves. Dark blue shows 
common-property fishing grounds; light blue represents the common-property 
fishing grounds in good habitats; cyan (greenish-blue) shows the private fishing 
grounds; and green represents reserves. 
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Table 7-2 The number of cells for reserves, private and common-property fishing 
grounds in different scenarios 
Scenarios Reserves (cells) Private areas (cells) Common areas (cells) 
Baseline habitat 32 52 60 
Mixed habitat 32 36 76 
Good habitat 32 20 92 
 
7.4 RESULTS 
The FISHCON model demonstrates the interactions between harvesting 
intensity and the dynamics of fish biomass for 1,000 years. This is used to evaluate 
the effects of reserve design on the fishery. Reserve design is described in terms 
of reserve sizes, patterns and habitat qualities. The results are reported as the 
mean (as there was very little variation between runs) of one hundred repetitions 
for each parameter value. The average values of the variables of interests, e.g., 
profits and fish biomass, are compared and analysed. The default values of the 
model parameters are set at 200 fishermen, cost of fishing licence equal to 500 
and radius of vision at four neighbouring cells.  
7.4.1 Reserve size 
The model investigates the effects of five different reserve sizes. The results 
show that the larger sizes of reserve lead to higher fish biomass, as shown in 
Figure 7-4. The trends of fish biomass increase in the beginning and then slightly 
decrease over time regardless of reserve size. The outcomes show that setting 
aside 55% of the total wetland as a reserve provides the highest fish biomass, 
followed by reserves of 44%, 33% and 22%, respectively. The lowest fish biomass 
results from reserve areas of 11%. The results show that the potential increase in 
fishing effort in the areas left out of the reserve does not eliminate the effect of the 
increase in fish biomass in the reserve.  
 
 
- 140 - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7-4 The dynamics of fish biomass for a thousand-year model run under 
reserve areas of 11%, 22%, 33%, 44% and 55% of the total wetland  
In terms of socio-economics, overall, mean profits increase sharply for a short 
period at the beginning of the model run. Thereafter, profits decrease gradually 
throughout the simulation (Figure 7-5). Most scenarios with a larger size of 
conservation area result in higher profits per person.  
 
Figure 7-5 The dynamics of fishing profits per fisherman for a thousand-year 
model run under reserve areas of 11%, 22%, 33%, 44% and 55% of the total 
wetland 
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Figure 7-6 depicts the upward trend in the average level of fishing effort over 
the time period of the model. The fishing efforts are shown to be very similar 
regardless of the reserve size. The largest reserve area delivers the lowest level of 
fishing effort and it provides the highest mean profit (Figure 7-5), while the number 
of fishermen are the same. As the total profit of the fishing community is the 
aggregated profit of all fishermen, the largest reserve also provide better total 
community profit. This implies that catch per unit effort is higher when the larger 
reserve area is introduced. The smallest reserve size (11%) produces the highest 
mean fishing effort. However, the profit per person in this scenario is slightly higher 
than the 22% reserve size. In summary, larger areas of reserve contribute more to 
both fish stock conservation and profit creation than smaller areas. Fishermen 
invest lower fishing effort but earn more profit. 
 
Figure 7-6 The dynamics of fishing effort values for a thousand-year model run 
under reserve areas of 11%, 22%, 33%, 44% and 55% of the total wetland  
 
7.4.2 Patterns of the conservation reserves 
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patterns are almost identical (Figure 7-7). Both the large single square and small 
fragmented cross pattern optimize the mean profit per fisherman. 
 
Figure 7-7 The dynamics of fish biomass for a thousand-year model run under 
the reserve patterns, large single square, large single rectangular, small 
fragmented cross and small fragmented line 
 
The mean profit per fisherman is influenced by reserve pattern (Figure 7-8). For 
all patterns, the mean profit increases initially before decreasing (at varying rates). 
At the end of the model run, the greatest profits result from the small fragmented 
cross pattern and the large single square pattern. These two patterns have more of 
the reserve area adjacent to the common-property fishing grounds than do the 
other patterns and therefore benefit fishermen fishing on the common property. 
This increases the overall profit of the fishing community since private fishermen 
already have access to more fish (greater biomass) and so it is more effective to 
increase the biomass in the common-property area. In addition, these two patterns 
have the highest population of fishermen on private property, which contributes to 
higher overall profit per person.  
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Figure 7-8 The dynamics of profit per fisherman for a thousand-year model run 
under the reserve patterns large single square, large single rectangular, small 
fragmented cross and small fragmented line 
 
 
Figure 7-9 The dynamics of the number of private fishermen or the fishermen who 
purchase a fishing licence for a thousand-year model run under the reserve 
patterns, large single square, large single rectangular, small fragmented 
cross and small fragmented line  
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The number of fishermen who purchase a fishing licence in order to fish in the 
private fishing areas is also dependent on the pattern of reserve (Figure 7-9). The 
number of private fishermen is in the range of 16 to 23 (around 50% of licences 
were purchased). Fishermen buy the fishing licence less under the small 
fragmented line reserve pattern than with other patterns, whereas the small 
fragmented cross pattern provides the highest number of private fishermen.   
Similar results are found for fishing effort (Figure 7-10). The small fragmented 
cross pattern gives the highest level of fishing effort, followed by the large single 
square pattern. These patterns are almost identical. The highest number of 
fishermen per common-property patch (around 2.6) results from the small 
fragmented cross pattern, while there are approximately 2.3–2.4 fishermen per 
common-property patch from other patterns.   
 
 
 
Figure 7-10 The dynamics of fishing effort values for a thousand-year model run 
under the reserve patterns, large single square, large single rectangular, 
small fragmented cross and small fragmented line 
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7.4.3 Location of conservation reserves  
Using the FISHCON model, this section analyses the effects of habitat in 
combination with the spatial pattern of reserves on fish biomass production and 
fishermen’s profits. The mean value of the parameters from hundred repetitions is 
calculated to synthesize the results. 
Considering only fish biomass within the reserve areas (Figure 7-11), the results 
clearly show, unsurprisingly, that reserves in good habitats provide higher fish 
biomass than others. This implies that there is a higher spillover effect into fishing 
grounds from reserves with good habitats.  
 
Figure 7-11 The dynamics of fish biomass in conservation reserves for a 
thousand-year model run under the reserve habitat qualities, baseline, mixed 
and good 
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the highest number of private fishing grounds (52 cells) but the good habitat 
scenario consists of only 20 private fishing grounds. As the unsold private fishing 
grounds have a similar function as the reserves, the private patches in the baseline 
scenario help to increase the amount of fish biomass. In addition, the biomass 
level in sold private fishing grounds also produces higher fish biomass than 
common-property fishing grounds. In contrast, the high common-property fishing 
area (92 cells) in the good habitat scenario also results in the highest number of 
common-property fishermen fishing under open-access conditions (leading to 
lower fish biomass). Even though the productivity of the fish stocks is higher in the 
good-habitat reserve, the allocation of reserves between the fishing zones in the 
good-habitat reserve results in a lower level of fish biomass.  
 
Figure 7-12 The dynamics of fish biomass for a thousand-year model run under 
the reserve habitat scenarios, baseline, mixed and good 
 
There are significant differences between the profits from the three different 
habitat scenarios (Figure 7-13). The baseline habitat generates the highest socio-
economic benefit to the fishing community. The profit from baseline-habitat 
scenario is almost triple the profit from the good-habitat scenario. In addition, there 
are a higher number of private fishermen in the baseline-habitat simulations 
(Figure 7-14) than in the good-habitat scenarios, where fewer fishermen purchase 
fishing licences due to their lack of availability. 
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Figure 7-13 The dynamics of profit for a thousand-year model run under the 
reserve habitat qualities, baseline, mixed and good 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
Figure 7-14 The dynamics of licence holders for a thousand-year model run under 
the reserve habitat qualities, baseline, mixed and good  
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7.5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS  
This chapter uses ABM to investigate the effects of various aspects of 
conservation reserves (size, pattern and habitat quality) on biological and socio-
economic indicators in a wetland fishery. Fish biomass and fishermen’s profits are 
used as indicators of biological and socio-economic sustainability of the fishery, 
respectively. The model captures variations in the size of private, common-
property and reserve areas. The results illustrate the effects from a conservation 
management perspective as well as partially in terms of privatisation of fishing 
rights. The main finding is that bigger reserve sizes, in a pattern of one solid block 
and located in a habitat of baseline quality, are favoured when considering both 
biological sustainability and the private profits of fishermen. However, a 
fragmented reserve pattern is as favourable as a one-block pattern if only the 
private profits of fishermen are considered. In the model, the fishing capacity (i.e., 
the number of fishermen) is assumed to be fixed. This means that long-term 
adjustments in the numbers of fishermen in response to the productivity of the 
resource are not taken into account.  
7.5.1 Implications for conservation biology 
The findings of this chapter are relevant to the debates in conservation biology 
relating to the size, pattern, and type of habitat of conservation reserves. The 
discussions in this thesis focus on fish biomass rather than species diversity as in 
the single-large-or-several-small debate about reserve size. Larger reserve sizes 
have been argued to provide higher fish biomass in the long term because the 
bigger size reduces mortality pressure within the conservation areas (Halpern, 
2003) and the spillover benefits fishable areas as well (Russ and Alcala, 1996). 
In this chapter, trends in patterns of reserve area do not display large 
differences in fish biomass between patterns. However, the large one-block pattern 
seems to be the most desirable design as it produces the greatest fish biomass. 
Variations in qualities of habitat sites produce different effects on fish biology. 
The model outcomes show that good habitats produce the most fish biomass in the 
reserve area compared to other habitats. This explanation is in accordance with 
Polunin and Roberts (1993) and Hawkins et al. (2006). However, considering the 
overall area (common-property, private and conservation zones together), locating 
reserves in good habitats does not necessarily provide the highest mean fish 
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biomass to the fishery system as a whole. In this case, the baseline-habitat 
scenario produces more fish biomass. This can be understood by a joint 
interpretation of the habitat effect and the effect of the private-property-right 
allocation. Higher numbers of licences are sold in the baseline-habitat scenario, 
which leads to lower harvesting intensity competing in small common-property 
areas and higher mean profit per fisherman. Secondly, the combined effects of 
conservation and unsold private fishing grounds have a similar spillover effect as 
conservation. The good-habitat scenario comprises only 20 private fishing 
grounds, while the baseline-habitat scenario has 52 private fishing grounds. If half 
of the private licences have not been purchased for both scenarios, the baseline 
scenario would have a larger area (approximately 58 cells) that do not have 
harvesting pressure.   
7.5.2 Socio-economic implications of conservation 
This section focuses on the setting up of reserves in terms of profit for the 
fishing community. This socio-economic indicator is important when considering 
reserve allocation as it is often set as a priority when reserves are established due 
to the comparatively high management costs associated with the presence a 
reserve compared to the potential economic benefits of conservation (Soulé and 
Simberloff, 1986).  
The findings show that larger reserve sizes not only produce more fish biomass 
but also higher profit. These results are supported by other research (Russ and 
Alcala, 1996a; Wantiez et al., 1997) suggesting significant spillover effects of 
conservation. It seems that the loss of fishable areas from the establishment of 
larger reserves does not impact the profit of fishermen. This finding is in contrast 
with the discussions of Batista et al. (2011) stating that profits decrease after the 
creation of MPAs because of the loss of fishing areas. They argue that the loss in 
area results in high harvesting pressure on the smaller remaining fishable area and 
decreases in captures per vessel because the spillover effects from the reserve 
are not large enough to reverse this tendency. However, the findings in this 
chapter show that there is an overall higher level of fish biomass in the fishable 
areas of the fishery when larger reserves are implemented. This results from the 
migration of fish from reserves to fishing grounds and leads to higher catch per unit 
effort and, in turn, higher fishing profits.  
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The best reserve patterns in terms of profit are the ones where the reserve 
areas lie in close proximity to the common-property areas, i.e., the spillover effects 
of the large single square and small fragmented cross reserves are greater and are 
more quickly realised in common-property fishing areas than elsewhere. The 
majority of the fishermen fish in common-property areas so these patterns will give 
more fishing benefits to the most fishermen. In terms of habitat quality of reserves, 
the results reveal that it is more favourable to locate a reserve in a baseline habitat 
because it increases the biomass in the common-property fishing grounds (by 
reducing overexploitation, which is common in most common-property fishing 
grounds). Secondly, when a reserve is set in a less productive area, fishermen will 
not be losing their productive fishing grounds. Furthermore, if more private licences 
are available, more fishermen may end up being private fishermen (with higher 
profits), and the fishing intensity in the common-property areas will be reduced.  
To summarise, setting aside areas of conservation can potentially be used as a 
management tool to meet a goal of fishery sustainability in terms of both biology 
and socio-economics. The designs and decisions on the creation of a reserve 
depend on which of the biology or socio-economic aspects are a priority. For small-
scale fishery communities who are usually not well-off, socio-economic success 
and improvement of the livelihoods of small-scale fishermen will often be a priority. 
However, this should be carried out in conjunction with consideration for biological 
criteria in order to avoid collapse of fish populations. These findings are similar to 
other studies (e.g., Soulé and Simberloff, 1986; Roberts, 2000) indicating that the 
social, political, and economic criteria should be prioritised before the biological 
criteria when the reserve location needs to be decided. The results of this chapter 
suggest that reserves can be designed to improve both socio-economic and 
biological indicators. Choosing the favourable design in terms of socio-economic 
output is not detrimental to the sustainability of fish stocks. 
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7.5.3 Agent-based modelling applications  
for fishery conservation  
This is the first research using ABM to study the effects of conservation under 
the designation of three different management zones; private, common-property 
and conservation. Some studies on fishery conservation issues do use simulation 
tools, e.g., Armstrong and Skonhoft (2006) and Hannesson (1998). However, using 
ABM to investigate the effects of the various designs of conservation areas is a 
new contribution to the literature on fishery conservation. The agent-based model 
allows policy makers to use spatial and dynamic information to test the impact of 
alternative management strategies. This enables analysis of far more realistic and 
complicated systems in spatial fishery management that cannot be analysed using 
traditional bio-economic models due to the complex and heterogeneous agents 
involved. The prediction of fishery dynamics under different what-if conditions 
provides information for policy makers to develop conservation plans. However, 
the agent-based model necessarily simplifies the complexities of fishery systems. 
When complex fisheries are simplified, alternative zoning arrangements can be 
tested against the objectives of the conservation plans. Simple models, with easily 
changeable assumptions and scenarios, can be a useful tool for decision-making. 
Agent-based models have been used in decision-making processes to ease the 
dialog between decision-makers and other stakeholders (Boulanger and Bréchet, 
2005). Further development of FISHCON can potentially be used for this purpose.  
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Chapter 8  
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter summarises the main findings presented in the empirical chapters 
(4, 6 and 7) and discusses the potential implications for fishery management. 
Following an overview of the key issues addressed in the thesis, the main findings 
related to the thesis objectives are presented. First, the implications of distributing 
fishing rights using auctions are discussed. Secondly, the effects of property rights 
and conservation efforts on fishery sustainability are examined. The chapter then 
summarise the empirical and methodological contributions of the research. Finally, 
the limitations of the approach taken in this thesis are discussed before making 
recommendations for future studies.  
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
Degradation of fish stocks and their habitats have been raised as major global 
problems (Hilborn et al., 2003; Worm et al., 2009; FAO, 2012), and this is also the 
case for the Tonle Sap wetlands (Nuorteva et al., 2010). Fishery management 
tools have not been successful in ensuring fishery sustainability. This is particularly 
the case for inland tropical fisheries where enforcement of rules is often limited. 
This thesis aims to improve our understanding of the management of small-scale 
tropical fisheries in developing countries using the Tonle Sap fisheries in 
Cambodia as a case study. This wetland provides a case to study the use of zonal 
management to regulate access to fishing grounds. To improve fishery 
management, past failures need to be understood, and the analysis of the effects 
of different potential designs of fishery management can provide an important input 
for development of new policies. The thesis used a combination of choice 
modelling and agent-based modelling. Choice modelling, based on choice 
experiment data, has been used to model fishermen behaviour in a hypothetical 
auction market. An agent-based model is employed to assess the complexity of 
fishery dynamics including the spatio-temporal interactions among fishermen, 
dynamic fish biomass, and fishery regulations. Different policy scenarios have 
been simulated from micro level activities (i.e., individual fishing) but the model 
outcomes are presented at the macro level (i.e., dynamics of biomass and profit for 
the fishing community). 
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The results of the choice experiment analysis identified different socio-
demographic groups of fishermen according to their preferences. The results also 
enable a specification of the relative importance of individual characteristics of the 
fishing lots. The fishermen behaviours can be characterised dividing the fishermen 
into two distinct groups, revealing a different behaviour in the hypothetical market. 
The results also reveal a possible connection between property rights and 
conservation behaviours, as fishermen associate higher values to private fishing 
grounds under conservation management restrictions. Secondly, the thesis 
investigates the property rights system in Tonle Sap in a spatial context. Finally, 
the thesis studies the use of conservation areas as a tool for managing fisheries, 
by modelling the spillover effects on the fisheries from conservation areas. The 
spatial analyses using agent-based models depict the consequences of the spatial 
interactions of three main components in fishery (fishery regulations, fishermen 
and fish biology). The simulations uncover the potential for using property rights 
and conservation as fishery management tools to enhance fishing profitability and 
ensure sustainability. The model shows a positive effect from using both property 
rights allocation and conservation.  
8.2 SYNOPSES OF THESIS FINDINGS 
8.2.1 The implications of the distribution of fishing rights  
To evaluate the auction-based system, the thesis investigates how fishery 
management systems affect different groups of small-scale fishermen and how 
different characteristics of fishing lots affect their bidding behaviour. A choice 
experiment approach is used to model fishermen’s choices in a hypothetical 
auction market by offering fishermen the choice between purchasing different 
potential fishing lots and a no purchase option, implying fishing only in the public 
fishing grounds. Small-scale fishermen are shown to be willing to bid for exclusive 
fishing rights in the Tonle Sap wetlands rather than choosing to fish only in the 
open access fishing grounds. In particular, flexible finance schemes (or micro 
finance operation) are shown to increase the likelihood of participation in potential 
future auctions.   
The thesis finds that fishermen have heterogeneous preferences for fishing lot 
characteristics and the fishing community consists of two segments, as the best 
model is a 2-segment latent class model. One segment expressed consistently 
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higher willingness to pay for fishing privileges through ownership of private lots. 
This implies that the other segment of the small-scale fishing community is unlikely 
to gain access to private fishing grounds under an auction system. The results 
reveal preferences for contracts with longer leasing periods. This is interpreted as 
an interest in securing longer term fishing rights to avoid the uncertainty of future 
auction outcomes. This is an encouraging finding as this indicates that it may be 
possible to encourage fishermen to consider long-term profits as opposed to short-
term resource exploitation.  
8.2.2 Spatial dynamics of fishing intensity and fish stocks: A 
combination of private property and common property rights 
With regards to linking conservation and private property rights indicated from 
choice experiment estimates, the second part of this thesis examines the spatial 
effects of different combinations of different resource extraction rights. In doing 
this, Agent-based modelling is used to identify the effects of property rights, i.e. the 
consequences of the various combinations of private and common areas, on 
fishery productivity and sustainability. The agent-based modelling is also used to 
analyse what parameters influence the performance under different property rights. 
The behaviour of the systems is modelled at the micro level by investigating the 
spatial interactions between heterogeneous fishermen, the dynamics of harvesting 
intensity and this fish stock response at each location. The outcomes however are 
presented at macro level in terms of overall fish biomass and socio-economics of 
the small-scale fishing community. 
The results of the agent-based modelling confirm that allocating private property 
rights will generate resource rents and conserve fish (Sinclair et al., 2002; Grafton 
et al., 2006). However, it is often not possible to assign private ownership to a 
whole fishing area because of the imbalance between resource availability and the 
population of fishermen. In addition, if all fishing grounds are converted to private 
areas, the lack of fish migration may have serious impacts on fish biology. A 
combination of private and common areas in a fishing season might provide a 
more sustainable solution. The results show that those designs where common 
areas dominate provide greater benefits to the fishing community as a whole. This 
result may be influenced by a number of factors, particularly by the number of 
fishermen. For instance, when fishermen population is high (which reflects the real 
situation in many developing countries), and fishing grounds are dominated by 
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private areas, there will be more competition over a smaller common area. This 
has a negative impact on the majority of the fishermen. Overall, a management 
system where private property rights dominate does not offer better conditions for 
fish conservation or socio-economic benefits to the community as a whole. 
8.2.3 Spatial effects of conservation in fishery dynamics 
The third part of this thesis investigates the consequences of different designs 
of conservation zones (sizes, patterns and locations). This complements the 
findings from choice experiment analysis showed that some small-scale fishermen 
are willing to participate in conservation management. Conservation areas are 
used as a fishery management tool in Tonle Sap wetlands, where fishing grounds 
have been divided into private, common and reserve areas. Effective conservation 
can potentially result in higher fish productivity (Roberts, 1995; Rodwell et al., 
2002) and can also offer a buffer zone against increases in fishing-efforts (Botsford 
et al., 2003) and habitat degradation. An agent-based model is used to simulate 
the interactions between fishermen and fish biomass in the zonal management 
systems in which different regulations are assigned to each zone.  
The results show that conservation areas contribute to fishery sustainability and 
a higher level of socio-economic performance for the fishing communities. The 
types and amounts of benefits vary and are determined by the design of 
conservation areas. Conserving a large proportion of the wetland, in large 
individual areas, located in the least productive areas provide the best 
improvement for fishery sustainability. However, conservation will not be 
successful if implemented without other management tools (Roberts et al., 2005); 
for example, fishing effort also needs to be controlled at an appropriate level.  
8.3 CONTRIBUTIONS 
This thesis represents the first time that both choice experiments and agent-
based models have been used to analyse the dynamics of small-scale fisheries in 
Tonle Sap Lake. In addition, this thesis contributes to the knowledge of inland 
fishery management, which have received less attention compared to marine 
fisheries. The contributions of the thesis can be split into empirical and 
methodological contributions. 
- 156 - 
 
8.3.1 Empirical contributions  
The findings improve our understanding of the dynamics of complex fisheries 
such as those in Tonle Sap wetlands. The empirical results contribute to debates 
on alternative approaches to inland fishery management, in particular property 
rights based approaches and approaches based on zonal management. 
8.3.1.1 Institutional and policy recommendations 
First, understanding sources of heterogeneity when selecting which types of 
fishing grounds to put on auction, can assist fishery managers in regulating fishing. 
For example, offering a variety of fishing lots’ characteristics can provide more 
opportunities in the auction market for small-scale fishing households. This is 
important for reducing the problem of unequal access to valuable fishing grounds 
among different groups of fishermen. Other methods might need to be considered 
apart from an auction-based system in order to better allocate exclusive fishing 
licences such as rotation or other administrative methods. This is because the 
poorest group of small-scale fishermen are not able to compete with richer 
fishermen using only an auction-based method. This is also supported by other 
research (Beck and Nesmith, 2001; Meinzen-Dick and Mwangi, 2008; Working 
Group on Property Rights, 2008) stating the difficulty of poorer groups in accessing 
resources. 
Second, a property rights approach can be used as a part of a wider fishery 
management scheme, but the management plans for small-scale or subsistence 
fisheries needs to be considered separately from the commercial fisheries. For 
example, the price of the exclusive fishing licences should be set based on socio-
economic characteristics of small-scale households such as households’ incomes. 
In addition, sizes of private fishing grounds also need to be set appropriately, to 
match the fishing gear of small-scale fishermen.  
Third, the effects of conservation areas may benefit the overall fishery system, 
however it may not achieve the goal of fishery sustainability if other management 
restrictions are not in place (Hannesson, 1998) and enforced (Hilborn et al., 2004). 
Similarly, property rights can also be used to improve sustainable fisheries but 
fishing regulations such as gear restrictions and effective monitoring are also 
needed (Grafton et al., 2006).  
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Fourth, the fishing areas that are predominantly common property are very 
important for fishery sustainability in terms of fish biomass and socio-economic 
outcomes. Although private property rights offer more fish and socio-economic 
benefits for the licence holders, this might not apply to the fishing society overall, 
when there is a high population of poor fishermen. So, the designs or combinations 
of commons and private areas should be considered along with the fishermen 
population in order to improve fishery sustainability. When the common fishing 
grounds are too small, these areas can get overexploited. The simulation results 
provide a guideline which suggests how conservation can be designed to support 
fishery sustainability. However decisions on the reserve locations also need to 
consider other information such as species biodiversity and investment and 
maintaining costs.  
Fifth, a comparision of the effects of long- versus short-periods of property 
rights allocation is not included in the analysis. In this study, private rights are 
assigned as short-term contracts. Nevertheless, the ABM results show a potential 
for private property rights allocation to contribute to maintain fish biomass. This 
contrasts with Yandle (2007) who states that the security of long-term property 
rights is important for developing biologically and socially sustainable resource 
management. In addition, the choice experiment outcome shows the preference for 
long-term property rights. However, other factors might influence fishery 
sustainability more than the lengths of ownership period, such as the spatial 
distributions of fishing efforts.   
Sixth, fish conservation zones will perform better when the reserves are large, 
and located in good habitat quality. The superiority of large reserves is consistent 
with other studies, for example, Le Quesne and Codling (2009) and Hannesson 
(1998) indicating higher achievement of conservation from large reserve areas. 
The good quality habitats provide a high level of fish biomass (Polunin and 
Roberts, 1993). Nevertheless creation of freshwater protected areas are often 
established when an opportunity emerges and based on social criteria rather than 
biological scientific research (Roberts, 2000). The model result suggests that this 
might be wise as the reserves which are located in the least productive habitats 
generate a higher benefit for the community in terms of socio-economic and 
biological sustainability. This is both because of the higher spillover effect but also 
because this leaves more areas as private property when the spatial distribution of 
habitats is as in Tonle Sap. In conclusion, it is not the valuable habitat that should 
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be reserved to promote productivity. Collectively the fishery is better off with higher 
spill-overs from productive reserves and a larger fraction of fishermen with 
licenses, as this controls effort.  
8.3.1.2 Additional supports for small-scale fisheries 
The results show that small-scale fishermen are interested in bidding for fishing 
lots; however, finance is still a constraint for the poorest small-scale fishermen. 
This finding is supported by other studies (e.g., Beck and Nesmith, 2001; Meinzen-
Dick and Mwangi, 2008; Working Group on Property Rights, 2008) showing that 
poorer groups in a community have more difficulty in accessing and exercising 
property rights. 
Different financial supports might be needed in order to enhance the interest in 
auction participation for small-scale fishermen. As such accessing a credit market 
and increasing levels of education might help the poorer group to participate in 
auctions. This is because auctioning of fishing lots requires capital to invest in the 
exclusive fishing licenses and maintenance for lot operation, as well as literacy to 
deal with formal government documents. 
8.3.2  Methodological contributions 
This research offers a new application of, and a new set of approaches to 
fishery management, in the contexts of small-scale inland fisheries in developing 
countries. It contributes to the understanding of property rights regimes and 
conservation in complex fishery system by exploring choice modelling and spatial 
simulations. The choice experiments and agent-based modelling enhance the 
understanding of harvesting pressures and dynamics of fisheries overall. The 
combination of the techniques provides an in-depth analysis of fishermen 
behaviours in auction markets and the spatial dynamics of fisheries.  
The thesis enhances the limited literature on the application of choice 
experiments approach in the context of wetlands in developing world. There are 
challenges in using a choice experiment approach in a developing country context 
(Bennett and Birol, 2010) as respondents are unfamiliar with filling out 
questionnaires due to, among other factors, limited education. To date, very few 
papers have applied choice experiments for wetlands valuation in developing 
countries (e.g., Do and Bennett, 2009), and for valuation of fisheries and 
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watersheds in the context of a developing country (Agimass and Mekonnen, 2011). 
So far, no publication has yet, to the authors’ knowledge, applied choice modelling 
to simulate behaviour in auction markets. This thesis therefore enriches the 
literature on choice experiment applications in fishery management in the 
developing world. 
The thesis provides a new application to assessment of the zonal designations 
integrating property rights and conservations. It is the first time an agent-based 
model has been used to simulate the effects of property rights and conservation for 
small-scale fisheries. Qualitative methods have been widely used to study property 
rights in fishery contexts (Toufique, 1997; Basurto, 2005; Ahmed et al., 2008). 
These methods can be suitable for evaluation of existing system of property rights 
but may not be appropriate to assess alternative designs of fisheries management. 
Other studies have investigated the effects of establishment of the protected areas 
in freshwater fisheries using different methods. These have been based both on 
field studies of existing protected areas (e.g., Cucherousset et al., 2007; Sarkar et 
al., 2008) and on identifying optimal locations in terms of species conservation 
objectives (e.g., Roux et al., 2008; Nel et al., 2009). Simulation approaches are not 
new to the study of fishery conservation, e.g., Armstrong and Skonhoft (2006) and 
Hannesson (1998). However, ABM offers a different perspective on the analysis of 
property rights issue by using a spatial context. A novel contribution of this 
research is the use of ABM to study the effects of conservation in small-scale 
fisheries under different allocations of property rights.  
8.4 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This section discusses the potential for further developing the research reported 
in this thesis. Therefore the discussion departs from the shortcomings of the 
approach taken in this thesis.  
First, commercial fisheries have been operating as a part of the Tonle Sap 
fisheries, but they are not included in this study. This is because the focus in this 
work has been on small-scale fishermen as the majority group in Tonle Sap. 
However, including large-scale fishing operations in the research would add more 
realism and complexity to the models. For a more accurate assessment of 
potential regulations, this would be an important aspect to include in further 
studies. Such a model will provide a more complete picture of the Tonle Sap 
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fisheries. This would allow a comparison of bidding behaviours between the large-
scale fishermen who have participated in auctions in the past and small-scale 
fishermen who have traditionally not participated in auctions. Such an analysis can 
potentially reveal further segmentation of resource users which also need to be 
considered in the design of a future auction-based system. For ABM, other groups 
of lot owners could be included as other types of agents. Other features in the 
zonal management, such as different sizes of private areas, could also be included 
in the FISH and FISHCON models. Second, as the ABMs are very flexible they can 
be extended by modifying the model code for other purposes. Future studies can 
include other activities in Tonle Sap to analysis the overall ecosystem services of 
Tonle Sap wetlands such as agriculture, energy exploration and recreational 
activities. Furthermore, the geographical features can be enhanced by integrating 
GIS information (e.g., land used data) into the model (e.g., Robinson and Brown, 
2009).  
Third, the number of fishermen for each simulation was assumed to be fixed in 
the ABMs. This does not allow for any new fishermen to enter or for unsuccessful 
fishermen to leave the fishing sector. However, providing flexibility in entering or 
leaving the fishing sector can be included in future work in order to investigate the 
development of the fishing communities. Relaxing this assumption will allow the 
fishermen who does not make profit anymore to leave the fisheries, and the 
remaining fishermen will be better-off. Weninger and Just (2002) provide an 
example of considering entry and exist behaviours for tradable output permits 
analysing the evolution of the permit price (costs of owning permit rights) and 
market efficiency (costs of productive capital). 
Fourth, the choice estimates show that the auction method might not be able to 
provide equal access for small-scale fishermen, due to the clustering of 
preferences and willingness to invest in exclusive rights. In order to suggest fairer 
methods for allocating fishing licences, further analyses need to evaluate various 
allocation methods, such as auctions, lotteries, rotation systems or some other 
forms of licences. 
Fifth, there is no modelling of preferences for conservation in the agent-based 
models. Nevertheless, a more explicit integration of the behavioural choice model 
and the agent-based model could be developed, by including choice experiment 
parameters as a way of characterising agents in the agent-based modelling (e.g., 
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Chapman et al., 2009). For example, valuations of each attributes and their levels 
of fishing lots for different types of fishermen could be simulated in the future. 
8.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Fisheries management is complex as it must deal with multiple users as well as 
biological and socio-economic uncertainties. In order to improve management 
systems, past management and current fishery dynamics need to be evaluated at 
the individual level, with policy suggestions made from the model outcomes at the 
society level. Combining the choice experiment approach and agent-based 
simulation can provide a better understanding of complex fisheries at both 
individual and societal level. This thesis suggests that it is possible to use property 
rights allocation and conservation areas combined with other fishery regulations, 
enforcement and monitoring systems to create effective management tools for 
small-scale fisheries. 
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Appendix A:  
SETS OF CHOICE CARDS 
(There are two different sets of choice cards) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
Choice set Version 1 
Q 2.1 Please choose ONLY ONE OPTION after considering the following three options. 
Which option would you like to choose? 
Attributes Annual 
fish catch 
(tonnes) 
Floor 
prices 
(USD/ year) 
A flexible 
payment 
scheme 
Leasing 
periods 
(years) 
Distance 
(kms) 
A conservation 
management 
plan 
My 
choice 
(tick 
only 
ONE) 
Options 
 
 
 
Option A 
 
 
Without a 
flexible 
payment 
scheme 
 
10 
 
10 
Include a 
CONSERVATION 
plan 
 
Catch 5 
tonnes of 
fish per 
year 
The 
minimum 
additional 
annual 
Payment is 
1600 USD. 
You do not 
have a 
flexible 
payment 
scheme 
You have 
10 years 
guarantee 
for 
exclusive 
fishing 
rights over 
the lot. 
The 
fishing 
lot is 
located 
10 km 
from 
your 
house. 
A conservation 
management 
plan needs to be 
included in the 
lot operation. 
 
 
 
 
Option B 
 
 
 
With a 
flexible 
payment 
scheme 
 
10 
 
10 
No restrictions  
Catch 45 
tonnes of 
fish per 
year 
The 
minimum 
additional 
annual 
Payment is 
1600 USD. 
You  have 
a flexible 
payment 
scheme 
You have 
10 years 
guarantee 
for 
exclusive 
fishing 
rights over 
the lot. 
The 
fishing 
lot is 
located 
10 km 
from 
your 
house. 
There are no 
restrictions. 
Option C I do NOT want to bid or pay for any of these options.  
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Q 2.2 Please choose ONLY ONE OPTION after considering the following three options. 
Which option would you like to choose? 
Attributes Annual 
fish 
catch 
(tonnes) 
Floor prices 
(USD / year) 
A flexible 
payment 
scheme 
Leasing 
periods 
(years) 
Distance 
(kms) 
A 
conservation 
management 
plan 
My 
choice 
is (tick 
only 
ONE) 
Options 
 
 
 
 
 
Option A 
  
 
 
With a 
flexible 
payment 
scheme 
 
10 
 
≤2 
Include a 
CONSERVATI
ON plan 
 
Catch 5 
tonnes 
of fish 
per year 
The minimum 
additional 
annual 
Payment is 
3,500 USD. 
You  have 
flexible 
payment 
scheme 
You have 
10 years 
guarantee 
for 
exclusive 
fishing 
rights over 
the lot. 
The 
fishing lot 
is located 
less than 
or equal to 
2 km from 
your 
house. 
A 
conservation 
management 
plan needs to 
be included 
in the lot 
operation. 
 
 
 
 
 
Option B 
 
 
 
Without a 
flexible 
payment 
scheme 
 
2 
 
10 
Include a 
CONSERVATI
ON plan 
 
Catch 5 
tonnes 
of fish 
per year 
The minimum 
additional 
annual 
Payment is 
1,600 USD. 
You do 
not have 
a flexible 
payment 
scheme 
You have 2 
years 
guarantee 
for 
exclusive 
fishing 
rights over 
the lot. 
The 
fishing lot 
is located 
10 km 
from your 
house. 
A 
conservation 
management 
plan needs to 
be included 
in the lot 
operation. 
Option C I do NOT want to bid or pay for any of these options.  
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Q 2.3 Please choose ONLY ONE OPTION after considering the following three options. 
Which option would you like to choose? 
Attributes Annual 
fish catch 
(tonnes) 
Floor 
prices 
(USD/ 
year) 
A flexible 
payment 
scheme 
Leasing periods 
(years) 
Distance  
 (kms) 
A 
conservation 
management 
plan 
My 
choice 
is (tick 
only 
ONE) 
Options 
 
 
 
 
 
Option A 
 
 
With a 
flexible 
payment 
scheme 
 
2 
 
 
10 
 
No 
restrictions 
 
Catch 45 
tonnes of 
fish per 
year 
The 
minimum 
additional 
annual 
Payment is 
800 USD. 
You  have 
a flexible 
payment 
scheme 
You have 2 
years 
guarantee for 
exclusive 
fishing rights 
over the lot. 
The 
fishing 
lot is 
located 
10 km 
from 
your 
house. 
There are no 
restrictions. 
 
 
 
 
 
Option B 
 
 
 
With a 
flexible 
payment 
scheme 
 
2 
 
10 
Include a 
CONSERVATI
ON plan 
 
Catch 20 
tonnes of 
fish per 
year 
The 
minimum 
additional 
annual 
Payment is 
1,600 USD. 
You  have 
a flexible 
payment 
scheme 
You have 2 
years 
guarantee for 
exclusive 
fishing rights 
over the lot. 
The 
fishing 
lot is 
located 
10 km 
from 
your 
house. 
A 
conservation 
management 
plan needs to 
be included 
in the lot 
operation. 
Option C I do NOT want to bid or pay for any of these options.  
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Q 2.4 Please choose ONLY ONE OPTION after considering the following three options. 
Which option would you like to choose? 
Attribu
tes 
Annual 
fish catch 
(tonnes) 
Floor prices 
(USD/year) 
A flexible 
payment 
scheme 
Leasing 
periods 
(years) 
Distance 
(kms) 
 
A 
conservation 
management 
plan 
My 
choice 
is (tick 
only 
ONE) 
Options 
 
 
 
 
 
Option A 
 
 
 
With a 
flexible 
payment 
scheme 
 
10 
 
 
≤2 
No 
restrictions 
 
Catch 10 
tonnes of 
fish per 
year 
The 
minimum 
additional 
annual 
Payment is 
1,600 USD. 
You  have 
a flexible 
payment 
scheme 
You have 
10 years 
guarantee 
for 
exclusive 
fishing 
rights 
over the 
lot. 
The 
fishing lot 
is located 
less than 
or equal 
to 2 km 
from your 
house. 
There are no 
restrictions. 
 
 
 
 
 
Option B 
 
 
With a 
flexible 
payment 
scheme 
10 
 
≤2 Include a 
CONSERVATIO
N plan 
 
Catch 20 
tonnes of 
fish per 
year 
The 
minimum 
additional 
annual 
Payment is 
800 USD. 
You  have 
a flexible 
payment 
scheme 
You have 
10 years 
guarantee 
for 
exclusive 
fishing 
rights 
over the 
lot. 
The 
fishing lot 
is located 
less than 
or equal 
to 2 km 
from your 
house. 
A 
conservation 
management 
plan needs to 
be included in 
the lot 
operation. 
Option C I do NOT want to bid or pay for any of these options.  
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Q 2.5 Please choose ONLY ONE OPTION after considering the following three options. 
Which option would you like to choose? 
Attributes Annual 
fish catch 
(tonnes) 
Floor 
prices 
(USD/ 
year) 
A flexible 
payment 
scheme 
Leasing 
periods 
(years) 
Distance 
(kms) 
 
A 
conservation 
management 
plan 
My 
choice 
is 
(tick 
only 
ONE) 
Options 
 
 
 
 
 
Option A 
 
 
With a 
flexible 
payment 
scheme 
 
2 
 
 
10 
No 
restrictions 
 
Catch 5 
tonnes of 
fish per 
year 
The 
minimum 
additiona
l annual 
Payment 
is 800 
USD. 
You  have a 
flexible 
payment 
scheme 
You have 
2 years 
guarantee 
for 
exclusive 
fishing 
rights 
over the 
lot. 
The fishing 
lot is 
located 10 
km from 
your 
house. 
There are no 
restrictions. 
 
 
 
 
 
Option B 
 
 
 
 
Without a 
flexible 
payment 
scheme 
 
10 
 
 
10 
 
No 
restrictions 
 
Catch 45 
tonnes of 
fish per 
year 
The 
minimum 
additiona
l annual 
Payment 
is 800 
USD. 
You do not 
have a 
flexible 
payment 
scheme 
You have 
10 years 
guarantee 
for 
exclusive 
fishing 
rights 
over the 
lot. 
The fishing 
lot is 
located 10 
km from 
your 
house. 
There are no 
restrictions. 
Option C I do NOT want to bid or pay for any of these options.  
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Q 2.6 Please choose ONLY ONE OPTION after considering the following three options. 
Which option would you like to choose? 
Attributes Annual 
fish catch 
(tonnes) 
Floor prices 
(USD / year) 
A flexible 
payment 
scheme 
Leasing 
periods 
(years) 
Distance 
(kms) 
A 
conservation 
management 
plan 
My 
choic
e is 
(tick 
only 
ONE) 
Options 
 
 
 
 
 
Option A 
 
 
 
Without  
a flexible 
payment 
scheme 
 
2 
 
 
≤2 
 
Include a 
CONSERVATI
ON plan 
 
Catch 20 
tonnes of 
fish per 
year 
The minimum 
additional 
annual 
Payment is400 
USD. 
You do 
not have 
a flexible 
payment 
scheme 
You have 
2 years 
guarante
e for 
exclusive 
fishing 
rights 
over the 
lot. 
The fishing 
lot is 
located 
less than 
or equal to 
2 km from 
your 
house. 
A 
conservation 
management 
plan needs 
to be 
included in 
the lot 
operation. 
 
 
 
 
 
Option B 
 
 
 
 
With 
a flexible 
payment 
scheme 
 
2 
 
≤2 
 
Include a 
CONSERVATI
ON plan 
 
Catch 
45 
tonnes of 
fish per 
year 
The minimum 
additional 
annual 
Payment is 
3,500 USD. 
You  have 
a flexible 
payment 
scheme 
You have 
2 years 
guarante
e for 
exclusive 
fishing 
rights 
over the 
lot. 
The fishing 
lot is 
located 
less than 
or equal to 
2 km from 
your 
house. 
A 
conservation 
management 
plan needs 
to be 
included in 
the lot 
operation. 
Option C I do NOT want to bid or pay for any of these options.  
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Q 2.7 Please choose ONLY ONE OPTION after considering the following three options. 
Which option would you like to choose? 
Attributes Annual 
fish catch 
(tonnes) 
Floor 
prices 
(USD / 
year) 
A flexible 
payment 
scheme 
Leasing 
periods 
(years) 
Distance 
(kms) 
 
A 
conservation 
management 
plan 
My 
choice 
is 
(tick 
only 
ONE) 
Options 
 
 
 
 
 
Option A 
 
 
 
Without  a 
flexible 
payment 
scheme 
 
2 
 
 
10 
Include a 
CONSERVATI
ON plan 
 
Catch 45 
tonnes of 
fish per 
year 
The 
minimum 
additional 
annual 
Payment is 
3,500 USD. 
You do not 
have a 
flexible 
payment 
scheme 
You have 2 
years 
guarantee 
for 
exclusive 
fishing 
rights over 
the lot. 
The fishing 
lot is 
located 10 
km from 
your house. 
A 
conservation 
management 
plan needs to 
be included 
in the lot 
operation. 
 
 
 
 
 
Option B 
  
Without  a 
flexible 
payment 
scheme 
 
10 
 
 
≤2 
 
No 
restrictions 
 
Catch 5 
tonnes of 
fish per 
year 
The 
minimum 
additional 
annual 
Payment is 
800 USD. 
You do not 
have a 
flexible 
payment 
scheme 
You have 
10 years 
guarantee 
for 
exclusive 
fishing 
rights over 
the lot. 
The fishing 
lot is 
located less 
than or 
equal to 2 
km from 
your house. 
There are no 
restrictions. 
Option C I do NOT want to bid or pay for any of these options.  
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Q 2.8 Please choose ONLY ONE OPTION after considering the following three options. 
Which option would you like to choose? 
Attributes Annual 
fish catch 
(tonnes) 
Floor prices 
(USD / year) 
A flexible 
payment 
scheme 
Leasing 
periods 
(years) 
Distance 
(kms) 
 
A 
conservation 
management 
plan 
My 
choice is 
(tick 
only 
ONE) 
Options 
 
 
 
 
 
Option A 
 
 
 
 
Without  a 
flexible 
payment 
scheme 
 
10 
 
 
≤2 
 
No 
restrictions 
 
Catch 45 
tonnes of 
fish per 
year 
The 
minimum 
additional 
annual 
Payment is 
1,600 USD. 
You do not 
have a 
flexible 
payment 
scheme 
You have 10 
years 
guarantee 
for 
exclusive 
fishing 
rights over 
the lot. 
The fishing 
lot is located 
less than or 
equal to 2 
km from 
your house. 
There are no 
restrictions. 
 
 
 
 
 
Option B 
 
 
 
 
With a 
flexible 
payment 
scheme 
 
2 
 
 
10 
 
No 
restrictions 
 
Catch 10 
tonnes of 
fish per 
year 
The 
minimum 
additional 
annual 
Payment 
is400 USD. 
You  have a 
flexible 
payment 
scheme 
You have 2 
years 
guarantee 
for 
exclusive 
fishing 
rights over 
the lot. 
The fishing 
lot is located 
10 km from 
your house. 
There are no 
restrictions. 
 
Option C 
 
 
I do NOT want to bid or pay for any of these options. 
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Q 2.9 Please choose ONLY ONE OPTION after considering the following three options. 
Which option would you like to choose? 
 Attributes Annual 
fish catch 
(tonnes) 
Floor 
prices 
(USD/ 
year) 
A flexible 
payment 
scheme 
Leasing 
periods 
(years) 
Distance 
(kms) 
 
A 
conservation 
management 
plan 
My 
choice 
is 
(tick 
only 
ONE) 
Options 
 
 
 
 
 
Option A 
 
 
 
 
With 
a flexible 
payment 
scheme 
 
10 
 
 
10 
 
Include a 
CONSERVATIO
N plan 
 
Catch 45 
tonnes of 
fish per 
year 
The 
minimum 
additional 
annual 
Payment 
is 400 
USD. 
You  have a 
flexible 
payment 
scheme 
You have 
10 years 
guarantee 
for 
exclusive 
fishing 
rights over 
the lot. 
The fishing 
lot is 
located 10 
km from 
your house. 
A 
conservation 
management 
plan needs to 
be included in 
the lot 
operation. 
 
 
 
 
 
Option B 
 
 
 
 
Without  a 
flexible 
payment 
scheme 
 
10 
 
 
≤2 
 
Include a 
CONSERVATIO
N plan 
 
Catch 10 
tonnes of 
fish per 
year 
The 
minimum 
additional 
annual 
Payment 
is 400 
USD. 
You do not 
have a 
flexible 
payment 
scheme 
You have 
10 years 
guarantee 
for 
exclusive 
fishing 
rights over 
the lot. 
The fishing 
lot is 
located less 
than or 
equal to 2 
km from 
your house. 
A 
conservation 
management 
plan needs to 
be included in 
the lot 
operation. 
Option C I do NOT want to bid or pay for any of these options.  
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Q 2.10 Please choose ONLY ONE OPTION after considering the following three 
options. Which option would you like to choose? 
Attributes Annual 
fish catch 
(tonnes) 
Floor 
prices 
(USD/ 
year) 
A flexible 
payment 
scheme 
Leasing 
periods 
(years) 
Distance  
 (kms) 
 
A 
conservatio
n 
management 
plan 
My 
choice 
is 
(tick 
only 
ONE) 
Options 
 
 
 
 
 
Option B 
 
 
Without  a 
flexible 
payment 
scheme 
2 
 
≤2 No 
restrictions 
 
Catch 5 
tonnes of 
fish per 
year 
The 
minimu
m 
addition
al annual 
Payment 
is 400 
USD. 
You do not 
have a 
flexible 
payment 
scheme 
You have 2 
years 
guarantee 
for 
exclusive 
fishing 
rights over 
the lot. 
The fishing 
lot is 
located 
less than 
or equal to 
2 km from 
your 
house. 
There are no 
restrictions. 
Option C  do NOT want to bid or pay for any of these options.  
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Choice set Version 2  
Q 2.1 Please choose ONLY ONE OPTION after considering the following three options. 
Which option would you like to choose? 
Attributes Annual 
fish catch 
(tonnes) 
Floor 
prices 
(USD / 
year) 
A flexible 
payment 
scheme 
Leasing 
periods 
(years) 
Distance 
(kms) 
 
A 
conservation 
management 
plan 
My 
choice 
is 
(tick 
only 
ONE) 
Options 
 
 
 
 
 
Option A 
 
  
 
Without   a 
flexible 
payment 
scheme 
 
2 
 
10 
No 
restrictions 
 
Catch 20 
tonnes of 
fish per 
year 
The 
minimu
m 
additiona
l annual 
Payment 
is 1,600 
USD. 
You do not 
have a 
flexible 
payment 
scheme 
You have 2 
years 
guarantee 
for 
exclusive 
fishing 
rights over 
the lot. 
The fishing 
lot is 
located 10 
km from 
your house. 
There are no 
restrictions. 
 
 
 
 
 
Option B 
 
 
 
 
With 
a flexible 
payment 
scheme 
 
10 
 
10 
Include a 
CONSERVATI
ON plan 
 
Catch 5 
tonnes of 
fish per 
year 
The 
minimu
m 
additiona
l annual 
Payment 
is 400 
USD. 
You  have a 
flexible 
payment 
scheme 
You have 
10 years 
guarantee 
for 
exclusive 
fishing 
rights over 
the lot. 
The fishing 
lot is 
located 10 
km from 
your house. 
A 
conservation 
management 
plan needs to 
be included 
in the lot 
operation. 
Option C I do NOT want to bid or pay for any of these options.  
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Q 2.2 Please choose ONLY ONE OPTION after considering the following three options. 
Which option would you like to choose? 
Attributes Annual 
fish catch 
(tonnes) 
Floor prices 
(USD / year) 
A flexible 
payment 
scheme 
Leasing 
periods 
(years) 
Distance 
(kms) 
 
A conservation 
management 
plan 
My 
choice 
is 
(tick 
only 
ONE) 
Options 
 
 
 
 
 
Option A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Without  a 
flexible 
payment 
scheme 
 
2 
 
 
≤2 
 
No 
restrictions 
 
Catch 10 
tonnes of 
fish per 
year 
The minimum 
additional annual 
Payment is 3,500 
USD. 
You do 
not have a 
flexible 
payment 
scheme 
You have 
2 years 
guarantee 
for 
exclusive 
fishing 
rights 
over the 
lot. 
The 
fishing lot 
is located 
less than 
or equal 
to 2 km 
from your 
house. 
There are no 
restrictions. 
 
 
 
 
 
Option B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Without  a 
flexible 
payment 
scheme 
 
10 
 
≤2 
 
Include a 
CONSERVATION 
plan 
 
Catch 45 
tonnes of 
fish per 
year 
The minimum 
additional annual 
Payment is1,600 
USD. 
You do 
not have a 
flexible 
payment 
scheme 
You have 
10 years 
guarantee 
for 
exclusive 
fishing 
rights 
over the 
lot. 
The 
fishing lot 
is located 
less than 
or equal 
to 2 km 
from your 
house. 
A conservation 
management 
plan needs to be 
included in the 
lot operation. 
Option C I do NOT want to bid or pay for any of these options.  
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Q 2.3 Please choose ONLY ONE OPTION after considering the following three options. 
Which option would you like to choose? 
Attributes Annual 
fish 
catch 
(tonnes) 
Floor prices 
(USD / year) 
A flexible 
payment 
scheme 
Leasing 
periods 
(years) 
Distance 
(kms) 
 
A 
conservation 
management 
plan 
My 
choice 
is 
(tick 
only 
ONE) 
Options 
 
 
 
 
 
Option A 
 
 
 
 
With 
a flexible 
payment 
scheme 
 
2 
 
 
≤2 
Include a 
CONSERVATIO
N plan 
 
Catch 
10 
tonnes 
of fish 
per 
year 
The minimum 
additional 
annual 
Payment is400 
USD. 
You  have 
a flexible 
payment 
scheme 
You have 2 
years 
guarantee 
for 
exclusive 
fishing 
rights over 
the lot. 
The fishing 
lot is 
located 
less than 
or equal to 
2 km from 
your 
house. 
A 
conservation 
management 
plan needs to 
be included in 
the lot 
operation. 
 
 
 
 
 
Option B 
 
 
 
 
 
With 
a flexible 
payment 
scheme 
 
10 
 
 
10 
No 
restrictions 
 
Catch 5 
tonnes 
of fish 
per 
year 
The minimum 
additional 
annual 
Payment is 
3,500 USD. 
You  have 
a flexible 
payment 
scheme 
You have 
10 years 
guarantee 
for 
exclusive 
fishing 
rights over 
the lot. 
The fishing 
lot is 
located 10 
km from 
your 
house. 
There are no 
restrictions. 
Option C I do NOT want to bid or pay for any of these options.  
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Q 2.4 Please choose ONLY ONE OPTION after considering the following three options. 
Which option would you like to choose? 
Attributes Annual 
fish catch 
(tonnes) 
Floor prices 
(USD / year) 
A flexible 
payment 
scheme 
Leasing 
periods 
(years) 
Distance 
(kms) 
 
A 
conservation 
management 
plan 
My 
choice 
is 
(tick 
only 
ONE) 
Options 
 
 
 
 
 
Option A 
 
 
 
 
With 
a flexible 
payment 
scheme 
 
10 
 
 
≤2 
 
No 
restrictions 
 
Catch 20 
tonnes of 
fish per 
year 
The 
minimum 
additional 
annual 
Payment is 
800 USD. 
You  have a 
flexible 
payment 
scheme 
You have 10 
years 
guarantee 
for 
exclusive 
fishing 
rights over 
the lot. 
The fishing 
lot is 
located less 
than or 
equal to 2 
km from 
your house. 
There are no 
restrictions. 
 
 
 
 
 
Option B 
 
 
 
 
With 
a flexible 
payment 
scheme 
 
10 
 
 
≤2 
 
No 
restrictions 
 
Catch 10 
tonnes of 
fish per 
year 
The 
minimum 
additional 
annual 
Payment is 
1,600 USD. 
You  have a 
flexible 
payment 
scheme 
You have 10 
years 
guarantee 
for 
exclusive 
fishing 
rights over 
the lot. 
The fishing 
lot is 
located less 
than or 
equal to 2 
km from 
your house. 
There are no 
restrictions. 
Option C I do NOT want to bid or pay for any of these options.  
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Q 2.5 Please choose ONLY ONE OPTION after considering the following three options. 
Which option would you like to choose? 
Attributes Annual 
fish catch 
(tonnes) 
Floor prices 
(USD/year) 
A flexible 
payment 
scheme 
Leasing 
periods 
(years) 
Distance 
(kms) 
 
A 
conservation 
management 
plan 
My 
choice 
is 
(tick 
only 
ONE) 
Options 
 
 
 
 
 
Option A 
 
 
 
Without a 
flexible 
payment 
scheme 
 
10 
 
 
10 
 
Include a 
CONSERVATI
ON plan 
 
Catch 10 
tonnes of 
fish per 
year 
The 
minimum 
additional 
annual 
Payment is 
1,600 USD. 
You do not 
have a 
flexible 
payment 
scheme 
You have 
10 years 
guarantee 
for 
exclusive 
fishing 
rights over 
the lot. 
The fishing 
lot is 
located 10 
km from 
your house. 
A 
conservation 
management 
plan needs to 
be included 
in the lot 
operation. 
 
 
 
 
 
Option B 
 
 
 
With 
a flexible 
payment 
scheme 
 
2 
 
 
≤2 
 
No 
restrictions 
 
Catch 20 
tonnes of 
fish per 
year 
The 
minimum 
additional 
annual 
Payment is 
400 USD. 
You  have a 
flexible 
payment 
scheme 
You have 2 
years 
guarantee 
for 
exclusive 
fishing 
rights over 
the lot. 
The fishing 
lot is 
located less 
than or 
equal to 2 
km from 
your house. 
There are no 
restrictions. 
Option C I do NOT want to bid or pay for any of these options.  
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Q 2.6 Please choose ONLY ONE OPTION after considering the following three options. 
Which option would you like to choose? 
Attributes Annual fish 
catch 
(tonnes) 
Floor prices 
(USD/year) 
A flexible 
payment 
scheme 
Leasing 
periods 
(years) 
Distance 
(kms) 
 
A conservation 
management 
plan 
My 
choice 
is 
(tick 
only 
ONE) 
Options 
 
 
 
 
 
Option A 
 
 
 
 
Without a 
flexible 
payment 
scheme 
 
10 
 
 
10 
 
No 
restrictions 
 
Catch 10 
tonnes of 
fish per 
year 
The minimum 
additional 
annual Payment 
is400 USD. 
You do 
not have 
a flexible 
payment 
scheme 
You have 
10 years 
guarante
e for 
exclusive 
fishing 
rights 
over the 
lot. 
The 
fishing lot 
is located 
10 km 
from your 
house. 
There are no 
restrictions. 
 
 
 
 
 
Option B 
 
 
 
 
 
Without a 
flexible 
payment 
scheme 
 
2 
 
 
10 
 
Include a 
CONSERVATION 
plan 
 
Catch 10 
tonnes of 
fish per 
year 
The minimum 
additional 
annual Payment 
is 3,500 USD. 
You do 
not have 
a flexible 
payment 
scheme 
You have 
2 years 
guarante
e for 
exclusive 
fishing 
rights 
over the 
lot. 
The 
fishing lot 
is located 
10 km 
from your 
house. 
A conservation 
management 
plan needs to 
be included in 
the lot 
operation. 
Option C I do NOT want to bid or pay for any of these options.  
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Q 2.7 Please choose ONLY ONE OPTION after considering the following three options. 
Which option would you like to choose? 
Attributes Annual 
fish 
catch 
(tonnes) 
Floor prices 
(USD / year) 
A flexible 
payment 
scheme 
Leasing 
periods 
(years) 
Distance 
(kms) 
A 
conservation 
management 
plan 
My 
choice 
is 
(tick 
only 
ONE) 
Options 
 
 
 
 
 
Option A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
With 
a flexible 
payment 
scheme 
 
2 
 
 
10 
 
Include a 
CONSERVATIO
N plan 
 
Catch 5 
tonnes 
of fish 
per year 
The minimum 
additional 
annual 
Payment is 
3,500 USD. 
You  
have a 
flexible 
payment 
scheme 
You have 
2 years 
guarantee 
for 
exclusive 
fishing 
rights 
over the 
lot. 
The 
fishing lot 
is located 
10 km 
from your 
house. 
A 
conservation 
management 
plan needs to 
be included in 
the lot 
operation. 
 
 
 
 
 
Option B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
With 
a flexible 
payment 
scheme 
 
2 
 
 
≤2 
 
Include a 
CONSERVATIO
N plan 
 
Catch 10 
tonnes 
of fish 
per year 
The minimum 
additional 
annual 
Payment is 
3,500 USD. 
You  
have a 
flexible 
payment 
scheme 
You have 
2 years 
guarantee 
for 
exclusive 
fishing 
rights 
over the 
lot. 
The 
fishing lot 
is located 
less than 
or equal to 
2 km from 
your 
house. 
A 
conservation 
management 
plan needs to 
be included in 
the lot 
operation. 
Option C I do NOT want to bid or pay for any of these options.  
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Q 2.8 Please choose ONLY ONE OPTION after considering the following three options. 
Which option would you like to choose? 
Attributes Annual 
fish catch 
(tonnes) 
Floor prices 
(USD / year) 
A 
flexible 
payment 
scheme 
Leasing 
periods 
(years) 
Distance 
(kms) 
 
A conservation 
management 
plan 
My 
choice 
is 
(tick 
only 
ONE) 
Options 
 
 
 
 
 
Option A 
 
 
 
 
 
With 
a 
flexible 
payment 
scheme 
 
2 
 
 
≤2 
Include a 
CONSERVATIO
N plan 
 
Catch 45 
tonnes of 
fish per 
year 
The minimum 
additional 
annual 
Payment is 
3,500 USD. 
You  
have a 
flexible 
payment 
scheme 
You have 
2 years 
guarantee 
for 
exclusive 
fishing 
rights 
over the 
lot. 
The 
fishing lot 
is located 
less than 
or equal 
to 2 km 
from your 
house. 
A conservation 
management 
plan needs to 
be included in 
the lot 
operation. 
 
 
 
 
 
Option B 
 
 
 
 
Without  
a 
flexible 
payment 
scheme 
 
2 
 
 
10 
 
No 
restrictions 
 
Catch 45 
tonnes of 
fish per 
year 
The minimum 
additional 
annual 
Payment is 800 
USD. 
You do 
not have 
a 
flexible 
payment 
scheme 
You have 
2 years 
guarantee 
for 
exclusive 
fishing 
rights 
over the 
lot. 
The 
fishing lot 
is located 
10 km 
from your 
house. 
There are no 
restrictions. 
Option C I do NOT want to bid or pay for any of these options.  
 
 
 
- 205 - 
 
Q 2.9 Please choose ONLY ONE OPTION after considering the following three options. 
Which option would you like to choose? 
Attributes Annual 
fish 
catch 
(tonnes
) 
Floor 
prices 
(USD / 
year) 
A flexible 
payment 
scheme 
Leasing 
periods 
(years) 
Distance 
(kms) 
 
A 
conservation 
management 
plan 
My 
choice 
is 
(tick 
only 
ONE) 
Options 
 
 
 
 
 
Option A 
 
 
 
 
Without  a 
flexible 
payment 
scheme 
 
10 
 
 
≤2 
 
Include a 
CONSERVATI
ON plan 
 
Catch 
20 
tonnes 
of fish 
per year 
The 
minimum 
additional 
annual 
Payment is 
800 USD. 
You do not 
have a 
flexible 
payment 
scheme 
You have 
10 years 
guarantee 
for 
exclusive 
fishing 
rights over 
the lot. 
The fishing 
lot is 
located less 
than or 
equal to 2 
km from 
your house. 
A 
conservation 
management 
plan needs to 
be included 
in the lot 
operation. 
 
 
 
 
 
Option B 
 
 
 
 
Without  a 
flexible 
payment 
scheme 
 
10 
 
 
10 
 
Include a 
CONSERVATI
ON plan 
 
Catch 
20 
tonnes 
of fish 
per year 
The 
minimum 
additional 
annual 
Payment is 
800 USD. 
You do not 
have a 
flexible 
payment 
scheme 
You have 
10 years 
guarantee 
for 
exclusive 
fishing 
rights over 
the lot. 
The fishing 
lot is 
located 10 
km from 
your house. 
A 
conservation 
management 
plan needs to 
be included 
in the lot 
operation. 
Option C I do NOT want to bid or pay for any of these options.  
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Q 2.10 Please choose ONLY ONE OPTION after considering the following three 
options. Which option would you like to choose? 
Attributes Annual fish 
catch 
(tonnes) 
Floor prices 
(USD / year) 
A flexible 
payment 
scheme 
Leasing 
periods 
(years) 
Distance 
(kms) 
 
A 
conservation 
management 
plan 
My 
choice 
is 
(tick 
only 
ONE) 
Options 
 
 
 
 
 
Option A 
 
  
With 
a flexible 
payment 
scheme 
 
10 
 
 
10 
No 
restrictions 
 
Catch 20 
tonnes of 
fish per 
year 
The minimum 
additional 
annual 
Payment is 
1,600 USD. 
You  have 
a flexible 
payment 
scheme 
You have 
10 years 
guarante
e for 
exclusive 
fishing 
rights 
over the 
lot. 
The 
fishing lot 
is located 
10 km 
from your 
house. 
There are no 
restrictions. 
 
 
 
 
 
Option B 
 
 
 
 
 
Without  
a flexible 
payment 
scheme 
 
2 
 
 
≤2 
No 
restrictions 
 
Catch 20 
tonnes of 
fish per 
year 
The minimum 
additional 
annual 
Payment is 
3,500 USD. 
You do 
not have 
a flexible 
payment 
scheme 
You have 
2 years 
guarante
e for 
exclusive 
fishing 
rights 
over the 
lot. 
The 
fishing lot 
is located 
less than 
or equal 
to 2 km 
from your 
house. 
There are no 
restrictions. 
Option C I do NOT want to bid or pay for any of these options.  
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
Appendix B: 
QUESTIONNAIRES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Survey of fishermen’s attitudes toward fishing 
regulation through auction based allocation of fishing 
rights.(Version 1) 
Section 1 Introduction  
(How familiar the respondents are ) 
Question 1 
1.1 How many years have you fished in the Tonle Sap wetland? ……… 
1.2 How far (from your house) you normally go for fishing? …..……Km 1.3 How many boats do 
you have?  ………………………………… Boats 
1.4 Approximately, how many tonnes do you catch per year? 
……………………………………………………………………….....Tonnes 
1.5 How many people help you when fishing? ………………………….. 
 
 
 
1.6  Do you pay any of these helpers?          Yes            No 
If YES how many paid helpers? ……………………………………. 
1.7  What types of fishing gear are you using? (Please list) 
1) ……………………………… 3)………………………………… 
2) ……………………………… 4) …………………………………. 
 
Section 2 Choice cards  
As a part of this study we would like to know how important different characteristics of 
the fishing lots are to you. So in the following questions, I will ask you to make some choices 
between 3 alternative options. I am going to describe the different characteristics of the 
hypothetical fishing lots which are available for you to purchase.  I would like you to tell me 
which ONE lot you would be willing to bid for. On each of the cards you will see and you 
must choose ONE option on EACH card. 
A hypothetical fishing lot is described by 5 attributes; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Date o.o/o.../2011 
Interviewer’s name ooooooooooooo..oooo.o. 
Time Start / Time Finishooooo..ooo.oooooo. 
Province ooooooooooo Villageo..oooooooo 
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1)  “Annual fish catch” means the ‘official record’ of the average of         fish caught per 
year for the past few years in the fishing lot. 
2) “Floor price” is a minimum bidding price in an auction in order to get exclusive fishing 
rights. In other words, the minimum additional annual payment that you have to pay 
while you are operating the fishing lot. 
3)  “Flexible payment schemes” means a scheme which allows you to pay (a bid price) for 
a fishing lot after the fishing season ends. In other words, you do not to pay any money 
in order to own a fishing lot on the auction day but you can pay after fish has been sold. 
4) “A leasing period” is the number of years that you have an exclusive fishing right in the 
lot. 
5) “Distance” means the distance between your house and the fishing lot. 
6) “Conservation management plans” means that the activities in the fishing lots need to 
comply strictly with fishery law so that pumping water for fishing and electro-fishing 
activity are prohibited, and you can only use nets with mash sizes bigger than 4 
centimeters.  
       Your choices involve 3 options. 
- Option A and B involve a purchase of a hypothetical fishing lot. 
- Option C is the current situation, no new action is involved; no new payment but no 
new fishing opportunity either. 
As you prepare to answer the next few questions, before you make a decision please 
consider; 
-  Each card has 3 options from which can select only ONE. 
-  You should consider each card independently. 
-  Please remember the following 3 things: 
First, I would like to remind you about your own household budget; at what price would 
your household be able to buy a fishing lot?  The payment for a chosen lot option would be 
made annually and you also have other expenses. Second, keep in mind that there are 
alternative fishing grounds, such as the public fishing areas. And third, please keep in mind 
that in the previous surveys we have found that people CHOSE options that they ACTUALLY 
would not be able or willing to purchase. For this reason, please imagine that your 
household is actually paying for the selected option. 
Now is time to choose (present choice cards) 
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            Question 2 Please choose ONLY ONE OPTION after considering the following three options. Which option would you like to choose? 
Q2 My choice is 
(tick only ONE) 
         Attributes 
Options 
Annual fish catch 
(tonnes) 
Floor price 
(USD / year) 
A flexible 
payment 
scheme 
 
A leasing 
periods 
(years) 
Distance 
(kilometers) 
 
A conservation 
management plan 
2.1 Option A 5 1,600 Without 10 10 With 
  Option B 45 1,600 With 10 10 Without 
  Option C I do NOT want to bid or pay for any of these options. 
 
2.2  Option A 5 3,500 With 10 ≤2 With 
  Option B 5 1,600 Without 2 10 With 
  Option C I do NOT want to bid or pay for any of these options. 
 
2.3  Option A 45 800 With 2 10 Without 
  Option B 20 1,600 With 2 10 With 
  Option C I do NOT want to bid or pay for any of these options. 
 
2.4  Option A 10 1,600 With 10 ≤2 Without 
  Option B 20 800 With 10 ≤2 With 
  Option C I do NOT want to bid or pay for any of these options. 
 
2.5  Option A 5 800 With 2 10 Without 
  Option B 45 800 Without 10 10 Without 
  Option C I do NOT want to bid or pay for any of these options. 
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   Question 2 (continue) 
Q2 My choice is 
(tick only ONE) 
        Attributes 
Options 
Annual fish catch 
(tonnes) 
Floor price 
(USD / year) 
A Flexible 
payment scheme 
 
A leasing periods 
(years) 
Distance 
(kilometers) 
 
A conservation 
management plan 
2.6  Option A 20 400 Without 2 ≤2 With 
  Option B 45 3,500 With 2 ≤2 With 
  Option C I do NOT want to bid or pay for any of these options. 
 
2.7  Option A 45 3,500 Without 2 10 With 
  Option B 5 3,500 Without 10 ≤2 Without 
  Option C I do NOT want to bid or pay for any of these options. 
 
2.8  Option A 45 3,500 Without 10 ≤2 Without 
  Option B 10 800 With 2 10 Without 
  Option C I do NOT want to bid or pay for any of these options. 
 
2.9  Option A 45 400 With 10 10 With 
  Option B 10 400 Without 10 ≤2 With 
  Option C I do NOT want to bid or pay for any of these options. 
 
2.10  Option B 5 400 without 2 ≤2 Without 
  Option C I do NOT want to bid or pay for any of these options. 
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Section 3 Follow-up questions 
I would like to ask a few further questions about the options that you have just 
chosen. You can be ensured that this information is strictly confidential. 
Question  3 
3.1 Were any of the attributes NOT important to you? If so, which? (several ticks are 
acceptable) 
           Fish catch                              Floor price                      
           Distance                                 A flexible payment scheme 
           Leasing period                        A conservation management plan 
Why they were not important to you?........................................................ 
………………………………………………………………………………… 
3.2 I was confused when I answered the choice questions (question 2). 
 
 
3.3 Did you always select option C which is the no purchase option? 
              Yes                                        No (please go to Question 4) 
If YES, which of the following most accurately explain your reasons for choosing this option? 
(please select only ONE) 
       I am not supporting the fishing lot system.  
       I am supporting the fishing lot system but I could not afford any of the options. 
       I am supporting the fishing lot system and I could afford a payment for a lot but I cannot 
get into the system because I do not have a supporter (“knong”) to introduce me. 
           I cannot decide which option is the best and would prefer to stay with my current 
situation. 
           I was not sure what I was being asked to do. 
           I have other reasons, please identify:………………………….. 
Question  4 
Please specify how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. 
          4.1 The fishing lot system depletes fish stocks. 
 
 
  
 Not sure Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly 
Not sure Strongly Disagree  Agree Strongly 
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4.2 The fishing lot system is an unfair allocation system. 
 
 
 
4.3 Lot owners always have conflicts with the fishery community and I support the fishery 
community and I believe that all lots should be abolished. 
 
           .  
 
4.4 Owner of lots should be able to sub lease some areas. 
 
 
 
4.5 The fishing lot system is the best system because the fishery resources can be used in the 
best way. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
4.6 Fishing lot operations help to protect bird species and flooded forests which are nursing 
grounds for fish.  
 
 
Question  5 
Could you please indicate how you feel about the following statements?  
5.1 An auction system is the best way to allocate fishing right. 
 
 
 
5.2 The auction system for allocating fishing lots in Cambodia should be improved. 
 
 
 
Please suggest how to improve the system. 
…………………………………………………………………………………. 
…………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
   Not sure Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly agree 
Not sure Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly agree 
Not sure Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly agree 
Not sure Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly agree 
Not sure Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly agree 
Not sure Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly agree 
  Not sure Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly agree 
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Section 4 Demographic information 
I would like to ask you some questions about your household which will help me 
understand why respondents select different options.  
 
Q 5.Gender                       Male                                     Female 
Q 6. House number ……………   Village name….………………… 
                                   Land-based village  or             Floating village 
Q 7.Name of respondents ……………………….………………………. 
Q 8.Age   ……….. years 
Q 9 Nationality            Khmer                                      Vietnamese 
                                    Other please specify …………………………… 
Q 10 The number of household members   ………………………and 
the number of them who are under 15 years old ………………….and over 70………….. 
 Q 11 The education level       
           Illiterate             Literate but never went to school  
              Primary              Secondary               Diploma or Certificate 
              Bachelor            Postgraduate            Other, please 
specify…………………………………..….. 
Q 12 Please specify all sources of household income  
  12.1)……...................        12.3)……………………    12.5)……………….. 
  12.2)…………………         12.4)…………………..      12.6)……………….  
Q 13  Annual household income ( approximate income from last year according to 
Q12)  Total income USD………………. 
  13.1)……...................        13.3)……………………    13.5)……………….. 
 13.2)…………………         13.4)…………………..      13.6)……………….  
Q 14 Typical annual profit from current fishing activities?  USD/year………..     
     14.1) Income from fishing activities……………………..USD/day 
      ( A number of days/month………..and a number of months/year…………) 
    14.2) Fishing costs   14.2.1) investment costs USD/year……………………. 
                                     14.2.2) maintenance costs USD/year ………………… 
Q15 Would you like to make other comments? 
…………………………………………………………………………………..……. 
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Thank you very much for your participation. 
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Appendix C:  
SURVEY INSTRUCTION 
Survey instructions for the questionnaire interviewers 
1. Please sign your name in the record sheet and indicate the number of the 
questionnaires which you are taking with you on that day. 
2. Please indicate the province/village or area in the record sheet. 
3. Go to the targeted area. 
4. Please write down the “number of questionnaire” in each page of the 
questionnaires. 
5. Visit fishermen who are household leaders 
6. In order to provide an ethical proof, please use the recorder for your 
interview (later on, please rename the record files in order following the 
number of questionnaire). 
7. Introduce yourself; 
“I am helping to conduct a survey about fishery management for a PhD 
student at Leeds University in the United Kingdom.  The aim of the study is 
to generate knowledge to improve the fishing management in the Tonle Sap 
wetland.  
 The study tries to improve understanding of how access to fishing grounds 
managed through the fishing lot system affects fishermen in the Tonle Sap 
wetland. The study will ask you about your opinion on the fishing lot system. 
We will also try to find out which aspects of the fishing lot system are of 
most importance to you.  You do not need to have any experience with 
purchasing fishing lots as we also want to find out why some fishermen only 
fish in the communal fishing ground. You will be asked to choose between 
different alternatives representing hypothetical fishing lots. You need to 
imagine that these hypothetical fishing lots are real fishing lots and you need 
to choose whether or not you would find it attractive to bid for any of them. If 
so, you need to choose which fishing lot is most attractive.  
Your answers and your name are “strictly confidential” and all of your 
answers and information will not be linked to your name. Also, you are free 
to refuse to answer any of the questions.” 
 Would you like to participate in this survey? If not please say thank you and find 
the next person.  
8. If yes, thank you for agreeing to take part in the survey. And emphasise 
that “the data will be kept strictly confidential and will be available only to 
members of the research team. Excerpts from the interview/ individual 
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results may be made part of the final report, but under no circumstances will 
your name or identifying characteristics be included in the report. Would you 
mind if I use a recorder?” 
And, if you have enquiries please contact Yingluk Kanchanaroek at 
Sustainability Research Institute, School of Earth and Environment, University of 
Leeds, Leeds, LS2 9JT, the United Kingdom,  Email: eeyk@leeds.ac.uk, Tel: 
+44(0)7541224348. 
9.  Please tick          to show that the respondent understands the contents. 
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Appendix D:  
THE KERNEL DENSITY OF 3-SEGMENT LATENT CLASS 
MODEL 
The figures below show Kernel density estimates for each attribute of 3-
segment Latent Class Model. 
 
 
(a) Value of fish catch 
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(b) Value of flexible finance schemes 
 
 
(c)  Value of leasing period 
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(d) Value of distance from home to a fishing ground 
 
(e)  Value of Conservation management plans 
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(f) Value of ASC (status Quo) 
 
